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A B S T R A C T 
 
 
In this thesis, I outline the normative relevance of religious political parties as 
carriers of values in the context of contemporary political theory. The central 
argument of my thesis is that religious political parties are, in ideal terms, vital 
institutional tools for channelling religious claims into the public political realm of 
liberal democratic polities, in a way that favours democracy. The reason for my 
claim is that there is a set of normative criteria th t all political parties ought to 
comply with. These include loyal opposition (i.e. the endorsement of the 
constitutional and institutional framework in which parties operate), 
acknowledgement and respect of political pluralism and commitment to pursuing 
power only through legal means. These normative crit ria are grounded in the idea 
that political parties are “bilingual”, i.e. they occupy a unique position between civil 
society and public political realm. By complying with these criteria political parties 
can contribute in channelling and moderating religious and other perfectionist claims 
in a way that renders them suitable for democratic politics. Furthermore I argue that 
religious political parties are best incorporated, in ideal terms, by a regime of non-
constitutional pluralism, where no religious faith is officially recognized in the 
constitution but the political guarantees exist for the expression of religious views in 
the public political realm through religious political parties. Finally, I examine two 
specific religious parties, the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma 
Partisi - AKP) in Turkey and the former Christian Democratic Party (Democrazia 
Cristiana - DC) in Italy, in order to assess to which extent they have complied with 
the normative criteria of party politics and, therefo , contributed in enhancing 
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In March 2008, Turkey’s Chief Public Prosecutor of the Supreme Court of Appeals 
Abdurrahman Yalçınkaya asked Turkey’s Constitutional Court to close down the 
moderate Islamist Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi - 
AKP) and to ban 71 senior AKP administrators from politics for five years. The 
AKP, according to the prosecutor, had been guilty of pursuing anti-secular activities. 
These included some controversial statements released to the press by party 
members, as well as provisions supposedly implemented such as an alcohol ban (that 
was overturned by the Council of State) and the construction of gender-segregated 
parks. Furthermore, in the 2007 the AKP had passed a bill lifting the headscarf ban 
in all universities, thus contravening Article 17 of the Higher Education Law.1 
 
While members of the secular Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi - 
CHP) moderately endorsed the prosecutor’s indictmen, minent members of the 
Nationalist Movement Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi - MHP) and pro-Kurdish 
Democratic Society Party (Demokratik Toplum Partisi - DTP) (as well as, obviously, 
of the AKP itself) raised their protests against the lawsuit, accusing it of seriously 
undermining Turkey’s democracy. If the indictment had succeeded, the AKP would 
have been the 25th political party to be banned by the Constitutional Court since its 
establishment in 1963 and it would have followed the fate of its two forerunners, the 
Welfare Party (Refah Partisi - RP) and the Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi - FP), both 
banned by the Constitutional Court in 1997 and 2001 respectively. Eventually the 
Court announced its verdict on 30 July 2008. The AKP was found guilty of anti-
secular activities but was not disbanded, due to the lack of the qualified majority (of 
seven out of eleven votes) necessary for this provisi n to be implemented. Yet the 
Court halved the public funding destined to the AKP.2  
 
                                                      
1 Today’s Zaman, “Closure case against ruling party creates shockwaves”, 15 March 2008 [online]. 
Available at: http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/detaylar.do?load=detay&link=136476 [accessed 
29 June 2009]. 
2 Hurriyet, “Turkey's court decides not to close AKP, urges unity and compromise”, 30 July 2008 
[online]. Available at: http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/english/home/9547882.asp?gid=244&sz=29614 





The AKP indictment case certainly exposes some of the main flaws of Turkey’s 
democracy and of its constitutional charter. However, it also raises a set of normative 
questions which are independent from the specific Turkish context. More 
specifically, are there any normative criteria all political parties ought to comply 
with? In which cases is the banning of political parties justified? Are religious parties 
not especially likely to become hegemonic, and therefore to represent a danger for 
liberal democratic polities? Most importantly, should religious claims be allowed 
into the public political realm of these polities, via religious parties? These are only 
some of the issues which inevitably arise when considering the AKP indictment case. 
Yet providing satisfactory answers to them requires going beyond a merely empirical 
account and shifting instead to the level of normative political theory. More 
precisely, it requires disclosing what normative criteria political parties, and religious 
political parties in particular, ought to comply with when they channel 
comprehensive conceptions of the good, such as religious ones, into the public 
political realm of liberal democratic polities.   
 
Political theory’s silence about party politics has only recently been broken by the 
systematic and pioneering work of Nancy L. Rosenblum.3 Yet political parties 
intuitively appear as central to any normative analysis of democratic politics, 
pluralism, and the promotion of comprehensive conceptions of the good within the 
public realm. Within liberal democratic polities, parties normally shape the political 
debate both before and after elections, and they ar the channels through which 
citizens pursue public office. Moreover, they convey sets of values condensed in 
their manifestoes and then translate them into policy proposals. Furthermore, parties 
help to select and organize the multitude of interests and demands which arise from 
civil society, rendering them suitable for political deliberation and decision-making. 
                                                      
3 Nancy Rosenblum, On the Side of the Angels: An Appreciation of Parties and Partisanship 
(Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2008); Nancy L. Rosenblum, “Religious Parties, 
Religious Political Identity, and the Cold Shoulder of Liberal Democratic Thought”, Ethical Theory 
and Moral Practice, Vol.6 (2003), pp.23-53; “Partisan Faith”, prepared for “Multiculturalism and the 
Antidiscrimination Principle”, Tel Aviv, December (2005) [online]. Available at: http://www.rg-
law.ac.il/conference05/articles/nancy.pdf [accessed 4 June 2008]; “Glorious Traditions of Anti-
Partyism and Moments of Appreciations”, Lecture 1, “On the Side of the Angels”, The Storr Lectures 
at Yale Law School, Spring (2006) [online]. Available at: 
http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~nrosenbl/Storrs_Lecture1.pdf [accessed 4 June 2008]; Russell 
Muirhead and Nancy L. Rosenblum, “Political Liberalism vs. ‘The Great Game of Politics’: The 





Most importantly, political parties are, in ideal terms, the institutional expressions of 
political pluralism. They are parts (from the Latin partiri , “divide into parts”)4 and 
therefore they are incompatible with political monism, i.e. the idea that a 
perfectionist state can only endorse and promote one conception of the good. The 
idea of political monism may lead to the mistaken co clusion that, if the state is a 
“bearer of ideals”, it can only respect and accept one political party, i.e. the party 
which supports the ethical system the state endorses.5 N vertheless, party politics is 
also incompatible with political neutrality, i.e. the idea that the state should refrain 
from the promotion of any comprehensive conception of the good life. Although a 
neutral state “respects all moral systems and all ideals, and therefore all the parties 
which defend them”,6 it may often prevent the channelling of comprehensive views 
into the public political realm, thus jeopardizing what I shall claim to be parties’ 
most fundamental function.7  
 
In establishing which regime would be most suitable in allowing the ideal presence 
of political parties, then, the alternative should not merely be between a 
perfectionist/monistic political regime and a neutral/pluralistic one. Indeed, as 
Maurice Duverger highlights, the connection between a perfectionist state and a 
single-party regime is not straightforward. Duverger notes how “certain single 
parties have arisen in neutral states which did not claim to be ‘bearers of ideals’: for 
example in Turkey”8 and how a plurality of parties could in principle have arisen 
also within perfectionist states, such as the Soviet Union where, he observes, “the 
rivalry between heavy and light industry might very well have become a party 
struggle, if the powers that be had desired it”.9 By admitting that, at least in principle, 
there might have been a multi-party system even within a totalitarian (i.e. strongly 
perfectionist and monistic) regime such as the Soviet Union, Duverger therefore 
                                                      
4 Compact Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
5 Maurice Duverger, Political Parties (translated from the French by Barbara and Robert North) 
(London: Methuen & Co. Ltd; New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1959), p.262. For an early 
analysis of single-party regimes, see Mihaïl Manoïlesco, Le Parti Unique (Paris: Les Oeuvres 
Française, 1936). 
6 Duverger, Political Parties, p.263. 
7 I will extensively analyse this aspect in chapter 2. 
8 Duverger, Political Parties, p.263. I will extensively analyse Turkey’s public philosophy in chapter 
10, emphasizing its non-neutral, strongly perfectionist laicist character. 





acknowledges the fact that not even a strongly perfectionist state may be able to 
prevent the emergence of a plurality of views and their institutionalization through 
party politics. As noted by Nancy Rosenblum, “[w]ith political organizations and 
especially partisanship, the ‘fact of pluralism’ is made concrete for democratic 
purposes”.10 
 
The alternative, therefore, should not merely be betwe n a perfectionist/monistic 
regime, where the state only promotes one conception of the good, and a 
neutral/pluralistic one, where the state respects all values and conceptions of the 
good but prevents them from entering the public politica  realm. A third way is 
available: pluralistic perfectionism, i.e. the idea that there are several values and 
conceptions of the good and that the state may promote any of them at the same 
time, or at least allow them to enter the public political realm through the channelling 
agency of political parties.11 This is therefore the sphere in which, I contend, political 
parties have a role of great value.  
 
In the light of these general considerations, I intend to supply a rationale for religious 
political parties: they are carriers of (religious) conceptions of the good into the 
public political sphere. I aim to explain why religious political parties matter in 
normative political theory and why I believe they can help to convey religious views 
into the political realm while at the same time respecting the principles of pluralism, 
democracy and political moderation. My analysis therefore aims to proceed beyond 
the existing literature on secularism, religion and politics. That literature does not 
take into account the normative and institutional significance of religious parties 
when addressing the relationship between political and religious realms.12 Moreover, 
this thesis also aims to build on the limited existing theoretical literature on political 
parties, by drawing out the significance of at least one of several potential avenues of 
research in this unexplored area of normative politica  heory.   
 
                                                      
10 Rosenblum, “Religious Parties, Religious Political Identity, and the Cold Shoulder of Liberal 
Democratic Thought”, p.24. 
11 See Simon Caney, “Anti-perfectionism and Rawlsian Liberalism”, Political Studies, Vol.43, No.2, 
June (1995), p.256. 





Central Argument and Structure of the Thesis 
This work is conceived as an exercise in analytical normative political theory, 
seeking to trace and scrutinize chains of argumentatio  from premises to 
conclusions, and to assess the coherence of the overall th oretical structure. Doing so 
is likely to include disclosing and clarifying underlying assumptions, evaluating the 
robustness of argumentative moves, situating the theory and its elements within 
relevant debates, and contextualizing the theoretical stakes in real world terms. The 
central argument of my thesis is that religious political parties are, in ideal terms, 
valuable institutional tools for channelling religious claims into the public political 
realm of liberal democratic polities, in a way that f vours democracy. The reason for 
my claim is that there is a set of normative criteria all political parties ought to 
comply with. These include loyal opposition (i.e. the endorsement of the 
constitutional and institutional framework in which parties operate), 
acknowledgement and respect of political pluralism and commitment to pursuing 
power only through legal means. These normative criteria, I will explain, are 
grounded in the idea that political parties are “bilingual”, i.e. they represent an 
institutional and “quasi-official” link between civil society and public political 
realm13 and “connect particular interests with general principles”.14 By complying 
with these criteria political parties preserve their bilingualism and can therefore 
contribute in channelling and moderating religious and other perfectionist claims in a 
way that renders them suitable for democratic politics. 
 
Furthermore, I argue that the inclusive public political realm necessary for the 
pluralistic perfectionism conveyed by political parties (and by religious parties more 
specifically) to be feasible ought to be guaranteed by a procedural model of 
deliberative democracy grounded in pragmatist epistmology. Political parties, 
including religious ones, mirror the features and normative requirements of 
pragmatist deliberation.15 Translated into terms of religious governance, religious 
political parties are best incorporated, in ideal terms, by a regime of constitutional 
                                                      
13 Muirhead and Rosenblum, “Political Liberalism vs. ‘The Great Game of Politics’: The Politics of 
Political Liberalism”, p.104. 
14 Ibid., p.104. 





non-establishment, where no religious faith is officially recognized in the 
constitution but political guarantees exist for theexpression of religious views in the 
public political realm through religious political parties.16  
 
Having devised a normative conception of religious parties, and explained which 
ideal institutional framework best allows their presence and functioning, I then apply 
my theoretical and normative findings to two specific religious parties, the AKP in 
Turkey and the former Democrazia Cristiana (DC) in Italy. I assess whether these 
two parties, and the institutional frameworks of religious governance in which they 
have operated, conform to the ideal of religious party politics that I endorse, and 
whether they have therefore contributed in enhancing democracy in their respective 
polities.   
 
Before examining religious parties, though, in the first part of the thesis I provide a 
more general theoretical and normative account of political parties broadly intended, 
so as to justify my view that religious party politics can imply the moderation and 
democratization of religious values when these are conveyed (by religious parties) 
into the public political realm of liberal democratic polities. In the first chapter of the 
thesis, I therefore set out an ideal conception of political parties and the normative 
criteria that stem from it. My account is grounded in the idea that political parties are 
“bilingual”, i.e. they represent an institutional and “quasi-official” link between civil 
society and public political realm17 and “connect particular interests with general 
principles”.18 I also provide a brief account of the history (and pre-history) of the 
term “party” in order to show how my normative account of party politics reflects the 
way parties have come to be understood since they first appeared on the political 
stage of Western polities. 
 
In the second chapter I examine an emblematic model of political neutrality, namely 
John Rawls’s theory of political liberalism,19 and reject it as a suitable ideal 
                                                      
16 See chapter 9. 
17 Muirhead and Rosenblum, “Political Liberalism vs. ‘The Great Game of Politics’: The Politics of 
Political Liberalism”, p.104. 
18 Ibid., p.104. 





framework for political parties carrying comprehensive conceptions of the good. By 
highlighting the non-neutral foundations and the expansive conception of public 
reason which characterize Rawls’s theory, I argue that political liberalism is 
potentially hostile to the presence of religious political parties. In the third chapter I 
analyse the utopian character of totalitarianism and its connection with ethical 
monism, assessing their relation with my ideal conception of political parties. By 
drawing on the work of Isaiah Berlin20 and George Crowder,21 I emphasize some of 
the implications of value pluralism for party politics, focusing especially on the 
distinction between value pluralism and Rawls’s conception of reasonable 
disagreement. In this way, I intend to reject monistic perfectionism and highlight that 
the state promotion of substantive values does not e tail the imposition of a single 
conception of the good upon society. On the contrary, by emphasizing the utopian 
nature of both ethical and political monism, I aim to show that perfectionist politics 
does in fact involve the promotion of a plurality of c nceptions of the good and that 
party politics represents its clearest expression.  
 
In the second part of the thesis I focus on the limits and constraints which ought to be 
imposed upon political parties within liberal democratic polities and on the 
relationship between political parties and democrati  deliberation. In the fourth 
chapter I investigate the normative grounds for theimposition of institutional 
constraints upon party politics and for the banning of political parties, especially 
focusing on antidemocratic and anti-system parties. Y t I argue that, although these 
parties ought in principle to be banned, as they contravene the normative criteria of 
party politics, there might sometimes be stronger normative reasons why they should 
be accepted within liberal democratic polities.  
 
In the fifth and sixth chapters, I advance an account f “deliberative perfectionism” 
and provide a theoretical defence of a model of democratic deliberation grounded in 
pragmatist epistemology. By analysing the work of Jürgen Habermas,22 George 
                                                                                                                                                    
2005a). 
20 Isaiah Berlin, “Two Concepts of Liberty”, in Isaiah Berlin, Liberty (edited by Henry Hardy) 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp.166-217. 
21 George Crowder, Liberalism and Value Pluralism (London, New York: Continuum, 2002). 





Sher23 and Cheryl Misak,24 I unveil the normative links between perfectionism, 
pluralism and democracy. I then argue that parties ar  an indispensable resource for 
democratic deliberation and that the normative roleof political parties can be best 
understood on the basis of a model of democratic deliberation grounded in 
pragmatist epistemology. By establishing an intrinsic connection between truth, 
inquiry and experience, I argue, pragmatism provides th  rationale for a democratic 
deliberation which mirrors some of the normative criteria of party politics, i.e. 
parties’ requirement to submit their views to the trial of elections and, consequently, 
to present, assess and modify their policy proposals before other parties and the 
public. Furthermore, this model offers normative grounds for endorsing an inclusive 
conception of the public political sphere, permeabl to comprehensive conceptions of 
the good (including religious ones). This pragmatist theory of deliberative 
perfectionism, applied to political parties, represent  the focal point of my thesis and 
provides the link between the first and third parts. 
 
In the third part of the thesis I shift to a closer examination of religious political 
parties as they provide, I believe, the most evident example of perfectionist partisan 
agency. Religious parties convey religious conceptions of the good into the public 
political realm and, in normative terms, they ought to abide by the rules and limits 
imposed by the institutional and constitutional framework within which they operate. 
In the seventh chapter, I examine recent debates in contemporary political theory 
concerning the idea of public reason and the role of r ligious arguments in the public 
political forum. While endorsing the idea of a more inclusive public sphere than the 
one advocated by political liberals, I argue that religious political parties, by 
complying with the normative criteria of party politics, can be vital in providing an 
institutional and normative channel for an inclusive but critically checked public 
deliberation. In this way, they can channel and moderate religious claims in a way 
that favours democracy. 
                                                                                                                                                    
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996a); “Three Normative Models of Democracy”, in S. Benhabib (ed.), 
Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1996b), pp.21-30. 
23 George Sher, Beyond Neutrality: Perfectionism and Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1997). 





In the eighth and ninth chapter, I examine various ideal institutional models of 
church-state relations and critically assess their implications for a normative theory 
of religious political parties. I argue that Veit Bader’s25 model of non-constitutional 
pluralism (NOCOP) provides, in ideal terms, the most suitable framework for the 
presence of religious political parties. Yet I also claim that NOCOP is normatively 
justified and institutionally feasible only if religious political parties, intended as the 
institutional vehicles of the pragmatist model of deliberative perfectionism that I 
defend in the fifth and sixth chapters, are placed at its core. 
 
In the fourth and final part of the thesis, I move on to analyse two moderate religious 
political parties, the AKP in Turkey and the DC in Italy. My purpose is to assess 
whether these two parties have conformed to my normative ideal of religious party 
and, consequently, whether they have contributed in channelling religious claims into 
the public political realm in a way that favours democracy. In the tenth chapter I 
argue that the AKP has so far abided by the normative criteria of party politics and 
therefore preserved its bilingualism and contributed in enhancing democracy in 
Turkey. This distinguishes it from its Islamist forerunners and especially from the 
Welfare Party (Refah Partisi – RP). On these grounds, I argue, the AKP ought not o 
be banned. I also argue that Turkey’s current regim of religious governance, which I 
define as “monistic and top-down laicism”, ought to be replaced by a form of non-
constitutional pluralism in line with the ideal model that I have endorsed in the ninth 
chapter. This kind of institutional arrangement would be more hospitable to religious 
political parties.  
 
The AKP has often been compared to Western European Christian Democratic 
parties, due to the moderation with which it promotes policies grounded in religious 
values.26 In the eleventh chapter, I therefore examine a specific Christian Democratic 
party, the former Democrazia Cristiana (DC) in Italy. I claim that the Italian DC 
displayed a lower degree of compliance (than the AKP) with the normative criteria 
                                                      
25 Veit Bader, Secularism or Democracy? Associational Governance of Religious Diversity 
(Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2007). 
26 William Hale, “Christian Democracy and the JDP: Parallels and Contrasts”, in M. Hakan Yavuz 
(ed.), The Emergence of a  New Turkey: Democracy and the AK Party (Salt Lake City: The University 





of party politics. It gradually became entangled with Italy’s state apparatus and 
therefore partly jeopardized its bilingualism and the possibility of being a democratic 
channel for religious claims into the public political realm. The DC also failed to 
promote the reform of Italy’s regime of almost religious establishment, sanctioned by 
the 1929 Concordat between the Fascist regime and the Catholic Church and 
subsequently incorporated into the 1948 republican Co stitution. The DC ought to 
have called for the disestablishment of Catholicism, and for its replacement with a 
regime of non-constitutional pluralism which would have been more suitable, in 
ideal terms, to its religious partisan identity and to religious party pluralism. Instead 
the DC failed to challenge that institutional framework and, even when the latter was 
partly reformed in the 1980’s, becoming in principle more inclusive towards 
religious pluralism, the DC was unable to redefine ts identity in a way fully 
consistent with the normative criteria of party politics and with party bilingualism. 
Therefore, even though the DC, like most Christian Democratic parties in Western 
Europe, played a crucial role in integrating Catholic citizens into liberal democratic 
politics, it contributed in preserving an institutional framework hostile to a plurality 
of religious faiths and parties and, therefore, it failed to fully exploit the democratic 
potential of religious party politics. 























Chapter 1 - What is a Party and What Ought It to Do? Setting Out 
the Conceptual and Normative Framework 
 
Political parties are voluntary organizations which place candidates in elections in 
order to obtain control of government. This minimalist definition is commonly 
endorsed in the literature on party politics. Anthony Downs, for example, defines 
“party” as “a coalition of men seeking to control the governing apparatus by legal 
means”1 whereas Leon D. Epstein depicts a party as “any group, however loosely 
organized, seeking to elect government officeholders under a given label”.2 John 
Aldrich characterizes political parties as “coalitions of elites to capture and use 
political office”.3 Finally, according to Giovanni Sartori, a party is “any political 
group identified by an official label that presents at elections, and is capable of 
placing through elections...candidates for public office”.4  
 
A minimalist and broad definition of political parties, such as the one that I have just 
provided, is able to accommodate the variety of parties which we might encounter in 
the real world. Indeed very different kinds of organizations are commonly defined as 
“political parties”. The Nazi and Fascist parties which gained power in Germany and 
Italy after World War I (WWI) and established totalit rian regimes are quite 
different, for example, from the Labour Party in contemporary Britain or the former 
Italian Communist Party (Partito Comunista Italiano - PCI) in Italy. Green parties, 
Christian Democratic Parties, nationalist and separatist parties are also normally 
considered examples of “political parties”, despite th ir different ideologies, aims 
and internal organizations. Only a sufficiently broad definition, like the one that I 
provided above in line with the existing literature on party politics, may therefore be 
able to justify considering such diverse organizations “political parties”. 
 
                                                      
1 Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper, 1957), pp.24-5. 
2 Leon D. Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democracies (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 
1980), p.9. 
3 John Aldrich, Why Parties? (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), p.19. 
4 Giovanni Sartori, Parties and Party Systems (Cambridge: Cambridge  University Press, 1976), p.63. 
For a summary of definitions of “party” see John Kenn th White, “What is a Political Party?”, in 




Within this broad category, if we look at the political landscape of Western liberal 
democratic polities, we encounter political parties which display very different levels 
of commitment to liberal democratic values or to plura ism. Most political parties 
operating within Western countries endorse the liberal democratic values which lay 
the foundations for the constitutional and institutional frameworks of these polities. 
Some parties, however, invoke discrimination towards certain categories of citizens 
(e.g. blacks, gays etc.). Others might even use democratic politics in order to achieve 
power and dismantle democratic institutions and party pluralism from within, 
although there are fewer examples of such parties nowadays. I will look in more 
detail at the problems these parties raise in the fourth chapter. For now it suffices to 
say that, under the label “party”, as commonly intend d in the literature, we can find 
a very broad variety of organizations. These might be more or less compatible, 
within Western liberal democratic polities, with the liberal democratic foundations of 
the regimes in which they operate.  
 
The presence of allegedly undemocratic parties often raises important questions in 
democratic regimes. It is often debated, for example, whether such parties should be 
banned or whether they should be welcomed into the democratic political process. 
These normative questions, however, cannot be answered from within the limits of 
the empirical literature on party politics. Certainly empirical grounds might 
sometimes be crucial for justifying the implementation of normative principles (e.g. 
we should prove that a party pursues an antidemocratic agenda before banning it on 
the basis of certain normative grounds). However, the justification itself for either 
including or excluding certain parties from democrati  politics must rely on 
normative foundations.     
 
For these reasons, I intend to provide a normative ccount of political parties in order 
to show why parties can be good for democratic regim s and to establish whether 
those parties which do not commit to democratic principles should be excluded from 
democratic politics. As I suggested in the introduction, the relevance of political 
parties for normative political theory stems from their being carriers of 




“‘bilingual’...they connect particular interests with general principles”.5 They are 
neither mere associations nor state institutions. Itead, they are located halfway 
between civil society and public political realm and they provide a unique, hybrid 
and semi-institutional connection between the two domains. On the one hand, 
therefore, they foster specific values and policy proposals, grounded in their political 
platforms. On the other hand, they do not act in isolation but within the broader 
constitutional and institutional frameworks of the regimes in which they operate. 
These features render them unique.  
 
The bilingualism of political parties also emerges from the specific way in which 
they channel societal claims into the public political realm. Parties politicize citizens’ 
demands, values and interests by enacting both a quantitative and qualitative 
selection. On the one hand, they select a limited number of issues (among the 
plurality of demands arising from civil society) whic  deserve political attention, and 
synthesize them through party manifestoes and party programmes, therefore setting 
the political agenda for the broader public. On the other hand, they re-shape such 
values, interests and demands in political terms, i.e. they translate them into specific 
political platforms and policy proposals with the aim of implementing them if and 
when they achieve control of political power.  The translation of societal claims into 
political ones is the unique contribution that parties can provide thanks to their 
bilingual and hybrid nature. 
 
Parties, unlike single-issue groups, are “wide-ranging agenda-setting”6 organizations. 
While being expressions of particularistic conceptions of the good, they relate them 
to the broad range of policy areas and long-term political issues that the government 
of a modern nation-state normally involves. Parties, moreover, do not simply mirror 
pre-existing societal interests and demands. Instead, they are “opportunistic 
responses to political possibilities”.7 Social cleavages, that is, do not necessarily 
                                                      
5 Russell Muirhead and Nancy L. Rosenblum, “Political Liberalism vs. ‘The Great Game of Politics’: 
The Politics of Political Liberalism”, Perspectives on Politics, Vol.4, No.1, March (2006), p.104. 
6 Nancy Rosenblum, “Political Parties as Membership Groups”, Columbia Law Review, Vol.100 
(2000), p.825. 
7 Nancy Rosenblum, On the Side of the Angels: An Appreciation of Parties and Partisanship 




translate into political parties; “[s]ome one has to politicize events, to define their 
political relevance in terms of a choice between or among parties”.8 Parties, 
therefore, draw the lines of divisions which are politically relevant and they choose 
how to reframe societal demands in relation to a broader political agenda and in 
opposition to their political adversaries. In this way, parties articulate and crucially 
simplify political debate, placing citizens before a more straightforward set of 
options and rendering their electoral choices easier to make.9  
 
Parties are therefore “channels of expression...They ar  an instrument, or an agency, 
for representing the people by expressing their demands”.10 Rather than merely 
communicating citizens’ opinions, parties “provide for something that no poll or 
machine can supply: They transmit demands backed by pressure. The party throws 
its own weight into the demands it feels compelled to respond to”.11 Parties may also 
shape, manipulate and somehow distort public opinion.12 However, despite being a 
“two-way communication channel”,13 they function more as bottom-up expressing 
channels than as top-down manipulative bodies.14  They therefore provide citizens 
with a specific channelling agency that no other institutional or non-institutional 
body can offer, as they are the only organizations able to enhance citizens’ demands 
with a semi-institutional sway, thanks to their intermediate position between civil 
society and public political realm. 
 
Given the bilingual nature of party politics, I would like to provide an ideal 
characterization of political parties which I will rely on throughout my thesis and 
which might help to address the normative questions discussed in the introduction, 
i.e. why parties can be good for democratic politics and whether certain parties ought 
to be banned from it. My central claim is that, in order to remain bilingual, parties 
ought to maintain a balance between particular and general principles, partiality and 
                                                      
8 Michael F. Holt, The Political Crisis of the 1850s (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1978), p.183. 
9 See Rosenblum, “Political Parties as Membership Groups”, pp.825-826. 
10 Sartori, Parties and Party Systems, p.27. 
11 Ibid., p.28. 
12 For this point, see Sigmund Neumann (ed.), Modern Political Parties (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1956), p.397. 
13 Sartori, Parties and Party Systems, p.28. 




unity. Parties, that is, ought to express “loyal opp sition”15 and “regulated rivalry”,16 
i.e. they ought to promote particular values and interests while, at the same time, 
acknowledging and respecting the whole of which they are parts and the other parts 
within it. In Western liberal democratic polities, for example, political parties act 
within institutional frameworks characterized by multi-party systems and democratic 
electoral politics. Due to their bilingualism, therefore, they ought to acknowledge 
and respect the liberal democratic frameworks in which they operate, while 
promoting their particularistic views. This also implies that political parties ought to 
seek power only through the legal channels established by the framework in which 
they operate. In liberal democratic polities, therefor , they ought to seek control of 
government only through democratic elections, rather an by using violent means 
(e.g. terrorism, war etc.).17 On the same grounds, parties also ought to be ready an  
willing to be voted out of office via legal means. They ought to accept, that is, the 
provisional nature of political authority.  
 
At the beginning of the present chapter I explained how the pursuit of political power 
through elections is the feature highlighted by virtually all definitions of political 
parties. However, we might sometimes encounter parties which do not even comply 
with this minimal criterion of party politics, e.g. revolutionary parties. It is therefore 
important, in the present normative analysis, to highlight that commitment to 
electoral trial, in liberal democratic polities (and in all those polities in which 
elections represent the legal route to government), should be grounded in the idea of 
loyal opposition which characterizes my ideal account of political parties. Only in 
this way can electoral commitment acquire normative relevance for this study. 
Consequently, for example, revolutionary parties which aim to obtain power, within 
liberal democratic polities, by using violent means, i fringe the normative criteria of 
party politics that I am presenting here.        
 
On the basis of the analysis conducted so far, therefore, a party ought to behave 
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neither as a monistic body identifiable with the state nor as a faction, which is “only 
a part for itself”.18 Either behaviour would jeopardize party bilingualism. On the one 
hand, parties ought to remain “parts” and, therefore, they ought to acknowledge and 
respect party pluralism, i.e. the presence of other parties, alongside them, within the 
polity in which they operate. Indeed, by ceasing to be parts, and aiming to identify 
themselves with the whole in which they operate (e.g. by eliminating party 
pluralism), parties would crucially undermine their bilingualism and become 
undistinguishable from the state. They would no longer provide the intermediate 
channels between civil society and state, particularistic idioms and a common 
institutional and political language. Parties, therefo e, ought to acknowledge party 
pluralism in order to remain bilingual. In ideal terms, party bilingualism could not 
even be conceived without party pluralism.  
 
On the other hand, while being channels of particularistic conceptions of the good, 
parties ought to behave as “parts-of-a-whole”.19 Their partiality ought not to be 
absolute, and therefore factional, but related to the whole of the polity in which they 
operate. Parties, that is, ought to take “a non-partial approach to the whole”.20 
Parties, therefore, ought to constantly balance “partisanship and impartial governing, 
loyalty to the party and loyalty to the state, party interest and general interest”.21 
Only in this way can parties avoid the risk of running into two opposite tendencies: 
factionalism, if they behave like mere parts unrelated to the whole, and unitarism, if 
they attempt to identify themselves with the whole. The ideal meaning of party 
politics is in this permanent tension between plurality and unity, partiality and 
wholeness, i.e. the contrasting tendencies that parties ought to constantly keep in 
balance.  
 
In order to remain parts, parties also ought not to forego the comprehensive 
conceptions of the good of which they are political expressions. Renouncing the 
channelling of perfectionist views would undermine a party’s bilingualism by 
eliminating its particularistic idiom. Consequently, the party would only be able to 
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speak the common political language shared by all parties, without being able to put 
forward a specific message able to distinguish it from other parties. These are the 
kinds of features which may characterize, for example, so-called “catch-all 
parties”.22 Such parties present a general and indeterminate programmatic core, as 
well as the lack (or almost) of an a priori selection of issues and policy positions.23 
Instead of an ideology, they provide a mere indeterminate “meeting ground for the 
elaboration of concrete action for a multiplicity of interest groups”.24 Catch-all 
parties, therefore, forego their particularistic idiom and, consequently, jeopardize 
their bilingualism. Their specific language becomes undistinguishable from the 
common language that they share with other parties. Therefore they might no longer 
be able to provide a source of political integration f r individual citizens.25 They 
might risk being assimilated into the institutional framework which should in theory 
only provide the common ground for their action. This infringement of party 
bilingualism is even stronger in the case of “cartel parties”, i.e. those “colluding 
parties [that] become agents of the State and employ the resources of the State to 
ensure their own collective survival”.26 Both catch-all and cartel parties, therefore, 
infringe an important normative criterion of party politics.  
 
The loss of its particularistic idiom may therefore represent, for a party, the loss of its 
unique bilingualism. Yet, unlike the other normative criteria of party politics that I 
am presenting here, it does not warrant in itself the banning of a party. It may 
certainly provide an argument for invoking an interal reform of the party but, unlike 
the other criteria, it does not have immediate effects on the polity and on the other 
parties. The lack of loyal opposition, respect of pluralism and use of legal means to 
pursue power certainly bear direct consequences on both the polity and the other 
parties within it. As well as undermining a party’s bilingualism, therefore, they 
constitute a threat that may warrant the exclusion of any party which does not 
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comply with them from the public political realm. Instead, a party’s decision to 
relinquish its specific perfectionist claim(s) only has consequences for the party in 
question and for its constituency. As long as the party maintains respect for the other 
criteria (e.g. by not attempting to subvert the existing institutional framework or to 
eliminate party pluralism etc.), there are no reasons f r excluding it from the public 
political realm (although there are reasons for condemning its behaviour on 
normative grounds).              
 
For parties to be able to comply with the normative criteria presented here there must 
already be a “consensus at the community level and on fundamentals - and especially 
on the rules for resolving conflicts”.27 Only this would allow parties to conflict over 
specific policies and to be “a subdivision compatible with unity rather than a division 
that disrupts it”.28 In other words, an institutional and constitutional fr mework (i.e. 
the “whole”) must already be settled for party bilingualism to be feasible.29 A 
conflict concerning the underlying values of a political system would only allow the 
presence of monolingual factions, speaking the soleidioms of particularistic, self-
referential interests and values. This also implies that such a framework ought to be 
impartial. If it was grounded in partial values and demands, it would cease to be a 
whole and it would identify with one of its parts.   
 
The balancing act that parties ought to perform, in the presence of an established and 
impartial political settlement, would result in the emergence of a “pluralistic 
unanimity”,30 i.e. the coexistence of a unitary political framework and a plurality of 
parties pursuing particular goals without threatening the fundamental values and 
institutions of the framework itself. This is what happens, most of the time, in the 
real world. As I suggested earlier, in Western liberal democratic countries most 
political parties display a bilingual political agency. They both promote partial views 
and recognize the legitimacy of the framework in which they operate. Some parties, 
however, participate in democratic party politics while invoking, more or less 
openly, the demise of that framework. Some pursue, for example, separatist aims, 
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therefore threatening the political and geographical unity of the polity. Others might 
aim to achieve power through the legal route of party politics, rhetorically endorsing 
liberal democratic principles, with the objective of dismantling democracy itself 
from within once they are in power. These kinds of parties, several examples of 
which I will present in the fourth chapter, do not entirely conform to the normative 
criteria of party politics that I have illustrated so far.          
 
Such criteria help therefore to develop an ideal conception of political parties, 
characterized by an ideally balanced bilingualism and establishing how parties ought 
to behave in the real world. Real parties might conform more or less to this ideal 
conception. It is the degree of such conformity which may help us to establish 
whether certain real-world parties are good for democratic politics or whether, in 
certain circumstances, they should be excluded fromit. If intended in the ideal sense 
that I have illustrated here, however, political parties defy the critique that party 
politics inevitably reinforces divisions within plural societies, thus jeopardizing 
political unity and stability, as parties “do not just reflect but also create lines of 
division”.31 Parties, unlike factions, ought to conceive and promote divisions in order 
to foster collective benefits. Only this would allow them to preserve their unique 
bilingual identity. Parties which comply with these id al criteria, therefore, can have 
a positive role in democratic politics. By introducing new cleavages and lines of 
divisions, they can encourage citizens to endorse values and policy preferences while 
acknowledging the presence (and the constraints) of a common institutional and 
constitutional framework. In other words, party cleavages thus intended can in effect 
promote, rather than jeopardize, political and social stability and unity, once a 
political framework is already in place. 
 
The analysis conducted so far might therefore help us to understand better the 
normative dimension of party politics. My ideal coneption of parties, entailing loyal 
opposition and regulated rivalry, use of legal means for obtaining power and 
acknowledgment and respect of pluralism, helps us to es ablish how parties, as we 
commonly intend them in everyday politics, ought to behave. The normative criteria 
                                                      




stemming from the idea of party bilingualism imply that political parties ought to 
refrain from both factionalism and unitarism, and that they ought to accept pluralism 
and recognize the political framework in which they operate. By complying with 
these ideal criteria, parties can therefore provide an important contribution to 
democratic politics. Indeed, values and interests which, at the pre-political and pre-
partisan levels, are intransigent and divisive, acquire a novel meaning when 
conveyed by political parties which comply with the normative criteria that I have 
presented here. They may become respectful both of the common institutional 
framework (the “whole”) in which parties (the “parts”) operate and of the other 
parties within that framework. By setting these normative criteria, we might be able 
to assess with more clarity which parties, if any, ought to be excluded from 
democratic politics. This is a task that I will purs e in the fourth chapter. Now I 
would like instead to show why the ideal conception of parties that I have presented 
here is neither unusual nor implausible. In the next s ction I will therefore illustrate 
how this conception, grounded in the unique bilingual nature of party politics, echoes 
the way parties gradually came to be understood after they first appeared on the 
political arena in the Western world.  
 
What is a Party? A Historical Background 
The use of the word “party” became widespread through t Europe during the 18th 
century. Parties were initially considered analogous to factions in that they expressed 
“divisions around ideas or personal interests which t reatened peaceful 
government”.32 Among the main exponents of that initial anti-partisan trend, Lord 
Bolingbroke was the first to clearly assert that “governing by party…must always 
end in the government of a faction…Party is a political evil, and faction is the worst 
of all parties”.33 As Sartori notes, however, although Bolingbroke oft n uses “party” 
and “faction” interchangeably, other times he emphasizes how the latter term denotes 
personal interests to which the common, national interest is subordinated whereas the 
former indicates a “real difference of principles and designs”.34 Despite this 
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distinction, however, Bolingbroke’s aim remained to “reconcile parties and to 
abolish odious distinctions”.35 
 
The two main aspects of Bolingbroke’s analysis, namely the distinction (still in 
embryonic form) between parties and factions, and the purpose of overcoming 
partisan divisions, are also highlighted by David Hume. Hume emphasizes how “to 
abolish all distinctions of party may not be practicable, perhaps not desirable in a 
free government”.36 However, like Bolingbroke, he believes that it would be wise to 
abolish all those partisan divisions “entertaining opposite views with regard to the 
essentials of government”.37 Hume distinguishes parties grounded in religious 
principles, that he considers “the most cruel factions that ever arose from interest and 
ambitions”,38 from those arising from political principles, whic represent a lesser 
threat to the unity of a state.39 
 
Despite its negative consideration of partisan divisions, the Humean account paved 
the way for Edmund Burke’s innovative analysis of parties which was to be greatly 
influential in the two subsequent centuries. As well as emphasizing, like Hume, the 
inevitable pluralism of views emerging from free thought, Burke especially stresses 
the importance of “connections in politics” as “essntially necessary for the full 
performance of our public duty”40 and as the best way to “easily and speedily 
communicate the alarm of any evil design”.41 Yet it is important to note that 
“Burke’s advantage was to write almost a century after the 1688-1689 settlement, 
that is, when both the religious and the constitutional crises had clearly been 
resolved”.42 As I explained in the previous section, the bilingualism of party politics 
presupposes “peace under a constitutional rule, not a  internal war investing, among 
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other things, the very establishment of a constitution”.43 Thanks to the presence of a 
constitutional agreement in England, Burke was therefore able, for the first time, to 
conceive parties, in ideal terms, as vehicles through which different views could be 
advanced regarding how constitutional principles should be implemented.44 For the 
first time, that is, the idea of party bilingualism emerged in all its novelty and 
strength. Loyal opposition and “regulated rivalry”45 began to define the normative 
dimension of party politics, establishing the ideal goals that, if sought by parties, 
would enable them to preserve their specific bilingual nature and remain distinct 
from mere factions.46  
 
Burke’s original view, which was rendered plausible by the presence of a 
constitutional settlement, probably also reflected d eper changes which had already 
characterized the history of Western political thought during the 17th century. Since 
the times of the Athenian democracy and of the Roman Republic it had been 
constant, among political thinkers, the idea that te political community could only 
be conceived as a unified political body, analogous to a human body, which the 
presence of factions could only undermine. The politica  body could only be healthy, 
in this conception, if each part performed its function and pursued its specific goals 
in order to promote the common good.47 This conception was radically rebuffed, for 
the first time, by Thomas Hobbes.48 Hobbes still conceived the body politic as 
resembling a natural body, an organic whole. However, he crucially intended it as an 
artificial  body, created by its subjects for their own preservation. Within the body 
politic, each subject would remain readily identifiable as an individual.  
 
This new conception, which provided the foundations f the modern contractualist 
view of the body politic, became widespread in Engla d after 1660, i.e. just before 
the Glorious Revolution which helped to establish the constitutional settlement on 
which Burke’s conception of parties relied. Hobbes, for the first time, introduced the 
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idea that the body politic could be made of parts (or “parties”) which might disagree 
with each other while living together according to a common rule, without 
threatening the unity and stability of the whole. In the previous, organic conception 
of the body politic, any division would have been considered factional, i.e. disrupting 
of the whole. In the new one, the principle of loyal opposition, as well as that of 
pluralistic unanimity, became for the first time con eivable in ideal terms.49 Both the 
vocabulary and the “necessary stock of images, in which anything like the modern 
notion of party could be conceived”50 developed as a result of these deep changes in 
the history of political thought. The Hobbesian revolution, preceding Burke’s work 
by more than a century, provided therefore important theoretical and normative 
grounds for the gradual acceptance of political parties. 
 
Burke’s conception of political parties, reflecting party bilingualism and establishing 
loyal opposition and regulated rivalry as the ideal goals of party politics, was not 
immediately understood and endorsed. The outbreak of the French Revolution 
especially contributed in delaying its widespread acceptance. The Rousseauian roots 
of the Revolution, as well as its emphasis on reason and individualism, led one if its 
main exponents, Louis de Saint-Just, to stress that “in dividing a people factions 
replace liberty with the fury of partisanship”.51 Even in the newborn United States, 
despite the presence of a political and constitutional unity, James Madison 
considered both factions and parties as “adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to 
the permanent and aggregate interests of the community”. 52 Nevertheless, Madison 
also acknowledged, to some extent, the distinction between factions and parties and 
the latter’s capacity to impose a qualitative shift upon pre-existing societal 
cleavages.53 Yet he regarded this shift as entirely negative. Parties, in his view, 
would likely exasperate rather than moderate division .54 According to Rosenblum, 
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Madison belongs to a tradition of antipartyism which, while acknowledging social 
and political pluralism, rejects political parties a they “impede balance or harmony 
among recognized social parts”55 and result in “fatal divisiveness”.56 The 
politicization of societal demands, in this conception, is seen as the radicalization of 
their divisiveness. Madison’s anti-partisan and anti-factional thoughts were also 
echoed by George Washington57 and Thomas Jefferson.58  
 
Due to this widespread “anti-party” climate in Britain, France and in the United 
States, it took several decades before an ideal conception of parties, intended as 
bilingual carriers of loyal opposition and regulated rivalry, and the normative criteria 
stemming from it, would become widely accepted. Yetthis is how we have come to 
understand parties in contemporary democracies. Few would deny parties’ unique 
bilingual nature, i.e. their being different from mere associations and from state 
institutions. Furthermore, we normally disapprove of parties which aim for the 
dismantling of democratic institutions, or which aim to eliminate party pluralism and 
achieve full control of the state, thus establishing totalitarian regimes. Parties are 
normally accepted on the condition that they maintain a fine balance between their 
particularistic and holistic drives, i.e. that they remain bilingual. The normative 
criteria of party politics are grounded in the idea (and in the ideal) of party 
bilingualism.  
 
By looking at the history (and, to some extent, at the “prehistory”) of the idea of 
“party”, therefore, I have tried to show that my ideal conception of political party, on 
which I ground my normative analysis, is not unusual or meaningless. Ideal parties 
abide by the principles of loyal opposition and regulated rivalry. They pursue 
political power only through legal means, e.g.  through elections rather than violent 
means. Furthermore, they acknowledge party pluralism while respecting the 
constitutional and institutional framework in which they act. These are, therefore, the 
criteria real parties ought to abide by in order to emain bilingual. By complying with 
them, parties operating within liberal democratic regimes can contribute in 
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enhancing democratic politics. Furthermore, these crit ria might help us to decide 
which parties ought to be excluded from democratic politics. I will examine the 
former task in chapters five and six, whereas I will engage with the latter problem in 
the fourth chapter. 
 
Defining Religious Political Parties 
Having provided an ideal characterization of political parties, establishing the 
normative criteria of party politics, I am now going to illustrate the implications of 
this account for religious political parties. First of all, however, a definition of 
religious parties is required. They can be defined, in very minimalistic terms, as 
parties which channel religious claims into the public political realm and only ground 
their policy proposals in religious values. A slightly more articulated definition is 
provided by Nancy Rosenblum, who defines religious parties as political parties 
which “appeal to voters on religious grounds and draw their inspiration from 
religious values if not theology”.59 As for my general definition of political parties 
(i.e. voluntary organizations which place candidates in elections in order to obtain 
control of government) also this definition of religious parties is intentionally 
minimalistic and broad. A great number of parties can therefore be included under 
this label.  
 
Indeed religious political identity ranges “from partisanship aimed at influencing 
public policy in ways that serve the essentials of ‘the faith’ or ‘faith’ to political 
activity aimed at demonstrating that religion is the vital underpinning of political 
order rightly understood, including liberal democracy”.60 Religious parties may be 
inspired by religious values to different degrees and in order to support very different 
kinds of political frameworks. On one side of the spectrum, we find those extremist 
religious parties, more common in new (and often fragile) democratic polities, which 
aim to replace democracy with a theocratic government.61 These kinds of 
fundamentalist parties represent extreme examples of religious party politics and, 
apart from a few exceptions (e.g. the fundamentalist Calvinist Dutch Political 
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Reformed Party [Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij – SGP]), they are not very 
common within liberal democratic polities. Indeed “‘integralism’ (the view that 
values and practices in every sphere must be religious and congruent) is not an 
essential defining characteristic of religious politics. Religious politics is not 
necessarily preoccupied with the romantic attempt to eliminate tension and 
alienation”.62 Religious political parties, therefore, cannot be id ntified merely with 
those integralist parties which only represent extreme examples of religious political 
identity.  
 
On the other side of the spectrum, we find denominatio l mass parties (e.g. 
Christian Democratic ones), mostly operating within Western liberal democratic 
polities. These parties do not normally constitute a problem for liberal democracy 
and they are more often concerned with the representatio  of religious citizens and 
religious demands, rather than with the attempt to impose a holistic religious 
worldview upon society. Moreover, sometimes their major goal is to protect the 
religious sphere of life from the coercive authority of the state, rather than to impose 
a theocratic government.63 In this way, religious parties often aim to guarantee, 
especially within strongly secular polities, the “self-protection”64 of religious faiths 
against anti-religious policies or, more generally, against “the omnipresence of laws, 
regulations, subsidies and inducements that touch on every aspect of religious life”.65 
Paolo Pombeni, for example, highlights how the original goal of Christian 
Democracy in Western Europe “was not so much to fashion a new explanation (and 
perhaps a new organization) of public space as to move a cultural community (in this 
case a religious community) towards a new organization of public space hostile to 
it”. 66 
 
This important function of religious parties in Western liberal democratic polities 
relies on the view that religious values play an essential role in the lives of religious 
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believers and that therefore “[f]aith cannot be privatized. Believers should not be 
treated as ‘second class citizens’”.67  
 
An important implication of my definition of religious parties is that, in order to 
qualify as “religious”, a political party must ground its manifesto and policies in 
religious views, even when such policies (e.g. bans on abortion, funding of religious 
schools etc.) can be defended without appeal to religious values. Its endorsement of 
such policies, that is, must rely on religious values. There might certainly be non-
religious reasons (e.g. utilitarian, liberal etc.), for example, for opposing the 
legalization of abortion or endorsing the funding of religious schools. Religious 
parties, however, are those which ultimately appeal to religious reasons when 
supporting these provisions. They “invoke the sacred roots and reasons for authority 
and institutions, and argue that public ideals may be defended more persuasively and 
obligations motivated more dependably on religious than secular grounds”.68 This is 
a crucial aspect of religious partisan identity and distinguishes religious parties from 
other kinds of parties (e.g. conservative, liberal etc.). It may also help us to 
understand why religious parties do not find much normative and institutional space 
in those contemporary political theories (e.g. political liberalism) which tend to 
relegate religious values and reasons to the private realm and argue that public ideals 
ought to be justified on political, not comprehensive grounds. In the second chapter, I 
will show how John Rawls’s political liberalism is not hospitable, in ideal terms, to 
religious parties as I define them here.  
 
Certainly it might be unlikely to find political parties which ground all their policy 
proposals in religious arguments all the time. Indeed, as highlighted by Jeff Spinner-
Halev in his analysis of religious conservatism, while “some political positions taken 
by religious conservatives do have clear biblical roots [e.g. the injunction against 
homosexuality]”,69 in many other cases religious conservatives clearly ppeal to 
secular grounds (e.g. opinion poll surveys, social science, scientific arguments etc.) 
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in order to sustain their political views. For example, “those sceptical of evolution do 
not just talk about Genesis, but about gaps in the fossil record”.70 Nevertheless, as in 
this example, their religious and political views are likely to be so entangled that 
“[f]undamentalists (and other religious conservatives)...will not be able to separate 
the sacred and secular aspects of their beliefs easily”. 71 This kind of entanglement is 
what religious parties must display, in order to qualify as “religious”. 
 
My account requires a final clarification. The requirement that parties must 
exclusively appeal to religious values, as normative grounds for their policies, in 
order to count as “religious” parties, does not mean that they can only appeal to 
fundamentalist religious values. As I have already explained, my minimalistic 
definition of religious political party includes both fundamentalist religious parties, 
on the one hand, and denominational mass parties, on the other hand. All parties 
within this broad range must ultimately ground their policies in religious values, in 
order to qualify as “religious”, whether their policies aim to establish a theocratic 
regime or, for example, to provide public funding for religious schools within liberal 
democratic regimes. Religious parties, that is, believ  that “religion is the vital 
underpinning of political order rightly understood, including liberal democracy.”72 
The exclusive appeal to religious values can in principle provide the normative 
grounds for both theocratic and liberal democratic politics.  
 
The minimalistic definition provided here is therefore able to include a broad variety 
of religious parties, ranging from religious fundamentalist parties to Western 
Christian Democratic parties. It accommodates, for example, both the SGP and the 
Italian People’s Party (Partito Popolare Italiano – PPI) in pre-Fascist Italy which, 
while not being confessional party, was “inspired by Christian idealism”.73 The same 
could be argued of all Christian Democratic parties in Western Europe. The basic 
principles of Christian Democracy (e.g. personalism, ubsidiarity and federalism) are 
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deeply grounded in Christian doctrine and Catholic social teaching.74 Most 
importantly, “without the basis of Christianity a true form of Christian Democracy 
could not develop”.75 We can still find this Christian inspiration in contemporary 
Christian Democratic parties. Indeed if we look at the Basic Programme of the 
European People’s Party (EPP), a transnational European party which comprises 
Christian Democratic parties from EU member states as well as associate and 
observer members from non-EU states, we can still find the link between political 
and policy positions and religious values.76 The EPP’s programme emphasizes “the 
link...between...Christian values based on the Gospel and Christian cultural heritage 
and...the democratic ideals of freedom, fundamental equality between men, social 
justice and solidarity”.77 This kind of loose reference to religious values and 
“Christian idealism”,78 which characterizes Christian Democratic parties, is ufficient 
for considering these parties religious, according to the broad definition provided 
here. 
 
The Normative Dimension of Religious Party Politics  
The analysis conducted in the previous section aimed to provide a broad definition of 
“religious party”. However, as in the case of parties generally intended, also in the 
case of religious parties we require, beside a minialistic and inclusive definition, a 
normative characterization. This ought to be grounded in the normative criteria of 
party politics which, as I explained in the first chapter, stem from the unique 
bilingual nature of political parties. Like other parties, religious parties are bilingual, 
i.e. they are placed halfway between state and civil society and therefore “they 
connect particular interests with general principles”.79 Religious parties relate 
religious comprehensive views to the political framework in which they operate. 
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They are neither mere associations, entirely placed within civil society, nor state 
institutions. Therefore, in order to remain bilingual, they ought to display loyal 
opposition and regulated rivalry, as well as recognizing “that they are ‘parts’ of an 
overarching system and that the elimination of others is neither possible nor 
desirable”.80 They ought to respect party pluralism, including both religious and non-
religious parties.  
 
On the basis of the analysis conducted in this chapter it might be argued that, in ideal 
terms, the decision to enter party politics “signals  minimal effort to cast goals in 
terms that apply beyond themselves, to argue that wis good for the group is also a 
public good”.81 By complying with the normative criteria of party politics, religious 
political parties (but also non-religious ones) can play a very beneficial role within 
liberal democratic polities and provide “an affirmation of the democratic structure of 
civil authority and democratic procedures”.82 Participation in party politics can also 
have a formative effect upon religious citizens and religious groups, originating a 
process of “democratic acculturation”.83 This is a merely empirical statement, which 
should be kept separate from the normative argument that I am developing here. Yet 
there is some empirical evidence that, by accepting to participate in democratic party 
politics, religious faiths have often moderated their beliefs and adjusted them to 
democracy. Eldon Eisenach, for example, highlights ow in American political 
history each religious faith has, “in the very process of accepting the invitation [to 
enter democratic politics], modified its own self-understandings and the way it 
presents its beliefs to its own members and to the larger community”.84 Similarly, 
confessional parties which operated in Western Europe between the end of the 19th 
century and World War II (WWII), and which originally endorsed holistic religious 
views, “eventually relaxed their antipluralist, antipolitical ambitions, and…were 
integrated into the political systems they loathed an had intended to subvert”.85     
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The moderating function of party politics is linked to the creative agency of parties 
that I highlighted at the beginning of the present chapter. I explained that parties do 
not automatically arise from societal cleavages but actively draw the lines of political 
division. When we look at religious parties, this implies rejecting the view “that 
individuals become partisans by way of their membership in social, religious or 
cultural groups”.86 There is not a deterministic link, that is, between r ligious identity 
and religious political identity. In the case of Christian Democratic parties in 19th 
century Western Europe, for example, “lay political leaders took a religious identity 
that in respect to democratic politics was neutral or hostile, and characterized the 
religious community in a way that came to include political identity conducive to 
democratic participation via the confessional party”.87 Choosing not to develop a 
religious political identity in order to participate o democratic politics, and to remain 
instead anchored to one’s holistic religious worldview, may involve “high costs in a 
religiously pluralistic and democratic society. Self-distancing removes the religious 
community, its institutions and ideas, from participat on in the larger spiritual and 
intellectual life of the nation and, through that, of one’s own time”.88 Therefore, even 
thought the potential moderating effect of democrati  participation is a merely 
empirical matter, we can at least say that exclusion fr m it, either chosen by religious 
groups or imposed by a secularist or anti-religious state, might have serious 
implications in pluralistic liberal democracies. As well as marginalizing religious 
groups, it might also jeopardize the stability and unity of the polity, by leaving it 
subject to stronger factionalist drives.    
 
Within liberal democratic polities, the process of democratic acculturation favoured 
by religious parties might contribute in educating their members to present and 
implement perfectionist policies with a more moderat  nd compromising attitude in 
the public political realm. This thesis does not aim, however, to assess the potential 
moderating effects of democracy upon political parties. Its central claim, instead, is 
purely normative: those parties (both religious and non-religious) which, within 
liberal democratic polities, comply with the normative ideal of party politics that I 
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have presented here, and which therefore preserve their bilingualism, provide a vital 
instrument for channelling religious claims into the public political realm in a way 
that favours democracy.  
 
AKP and DC: Two Case Studies 
It might be argued that the presence of the two aspect  of religious partisan identity 
that I have illustrated earlier, i.e. the positive link between the party’s programmatic 
core and its underlying religious values, and the negative self-protective attitude 
towards all-encompassing secular regimes, are present in different measures and 
combinations in different religious parties. Of the two case studies that I will 
consider in the final section of the thesis, for example, the AKP can still be placed on 
the negative side of the spectrum, being still actively engaged in rendering Turkey’s 
public political sphere more open to religious values and demands. The AKP’s call 
for the deprivatization of religion, accompanied by the critique of an all-
encompassing secular state undermining religious expression at all levels, warrants 
the inclusion of the AKP among religious political parties as they have been defined 
here. The religious identity of the AKP, however, also emerges from the fact that the 
party is “deeply involved in Islamic social ethics and cultural norms, and stresses the 
religious values and interests of its pious electorate”.89  
 
The other party that I will examine in the final part of the thesis, i.e. the Italian 
former DC, instead, can more clearly be identified with the positive link between 
Christian and Catholic values and political action, in line with Sturzo’s account of 
Christian Democracy. Indeed, the founding document of the DC stated that “only the 
spirit of fraternity carried and alimented by the Gospel can save peoples from the 
catastrophe to which totalitarian myths may conduct them”.90 Tolerance, freedom 
and other values broadly endorsed within Western liberal democracies were therefore 
seen by the DC as stemming from fundamental Christian and Catholic values. The 
link between DC’s ideology and Catholic religion also emerges from another of the 
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party’s early programmatic documents.91 Having highlighted that the DC mainly 
comprised of Catholic believers, the document emphasizes how the Catholic citizen 
who enters the party “does not change belief...[or] sever the umbilical cord which 
bonds him to...the Church, but in fact he continues to draw from the Christian 
heritage the vital ferment that also in the public life must preserve and aliment 
him”.92 Yet we can also find, in these early documents, the DC’s willingness to 
ensure that post-Fascist Italy would be inclusive towards Catholicism in the public 
political realm. According to Alcide De Gasperi (first secretary of the DC and author 
of these programmatic documents under the epithet “D mofilo”), “it is in the very 
interest of democracy that such a Christian yeast should ferment in all social life, and 
that the spiritual mission of the Catholic Church be carried out in full freedom”.93 
The DC, at least initially, had to fight in order to ensure that the constitutional and 
institutional framework of the new Italian state, emerging from WWII, would not be 
hostile to the public role of Catholic citizens. I will explain in the last chapter how 
the debate concerning the recognition of Catholicism as state religion in the 1948 
republican constitution represented the turning point in the relationship between DC, 
Catholic Church and Italian state.   
 
Both AKP and DC, then, can be considered religious parties on the basis of the 
definition that I provided in the previous section. However, I would like to clarify 
better, before concluding this chapter, the reasons why I have chosen them as case 
studies to assess the applicability of my normative theory of religious) parties. Both 
DC and AKP are located on the more moderate side of the religious party politics 
spectrum. Neither is a fundamentalist religious party. Although their policies and 
manifestoes have been influenced by religious faith in a very loose sense, in both 
cases we can trace their political platforms back to religious values, either Christian 
or Islamic. One might perhaps argue that it would have been more useful, for a 
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normative analysis of the relationship between religious parties and liberal 
democracy, to focus on more extremist and fundamentalist religious parties. Yet, 
despite some exceptions (e.g. the abovementioned SGP), such parties are more 
common in new (and often fragile) non-Western democracies. Therefore they might 
be less useful for showing the positive contribution religious parties can make to the 
integration of religious faiths into established liberal democratic polities. Indeed I 
will explain how, despite some flaws, both AKP and DC have contributed in 
integrating religious citizens into the democratic life of their respective polities. I 
will also assess to which extent both AKP and DC have complied with the normative 
criteria of party politics that I have presented in this chapter. Finally, the analysis of 
DC and AKP will be crucially useful for relating my normative analysis of religious 
parties to a normative assessment of institutional regimes of religious governance, an 
aspect which is central to my work. Indeed Italy and Turkey present very different 
(almost conflicting) institutional regimes of religious governance, displaying very 
different approaches to the role of religion in the public political sphere and to 
religious pluralism. Examining DC and AKP will therefore allow me to relate my 




In this chapter I have set out the theoretical framework for my normative analysis of 
political parties in general, and religious parties in particular, by outlining the 
normative criteria of party politics. In the next chapter, I will examine a paradigmatic 
model of political neutrality, namely John Rawls’s theory of political liberalism.94 
By unveiling the non-neutral foundations of Rawls’s theory and its expansive 
conception of public reason, I will conclude that political liberalism restricts the 
normative and institutional space available to those political parties which convey 
comprehensive conceptions of the good, especially re igious ones. I will therefore 
reject pluralistic neutrality as a suitable framework for party politics and move on, in 
the third chapter, to a critical assessment of monistic perfectionism. 
 
                                                      





Chapter 2 – Political Parties and the Limits of Political Liberalism      
 
In this chapter I will outline and criticize the implications of a paradigmatic model of 
political neutrality, i.e. John Rawls’s1 “political liberalism”, for the normative theory 
of political parties that I presented in the first chapter, especially for a normative 
theory of religious parties. The idea that political p rties, broadly intended, are 
integral to Rawls’s political liberalism, has been suggested by Russell Muirhead and 
Nancy L. Rosenblum.2 They argue that parties represent an institutional a d “quasi-
official” link between civil society and public political realm,3 that they are 
“‘bilingual’…[therefore]…as agents of a publicly recognized overlapping consensus, 
they connect particular interests with general principles”.4 Having endorsed so far 
this conception of parties intended as bilingual agents, and having drawn my 
normative theory of party politics from it, in this chapter I will assess Rawls’s 
political liberalism in order to verify whether it is sufficiently inclusive, in ideal 
terms, to allow the presence of parties conveying reli ious and other comprehensive 
views. I will conclude that, due to its expansive con eption of public reason, political 
liberalism seriously limits, in ideal terms, the number and kinds of comprehensive 
views5 which may be channelled by political parties, in general, into the public 
political realm, and that this renders it particularly inhospitable to the presence of 
religious political parties.  
 
Political Liberalism: Reasonable Pluralism and the Public Justifiability of 
“Justice as Fairness”  
Rawls first aired his theory of political liberalism in a series of lectures and articles6 
published throughout the 1970s and the 1980s, then more systematically in Political 
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Liberalism.7 Aware of criticisms alleging the presence of substantive (liberal) 
assumptions in A Theory of Justice,8 Rawls gradually shifted from a comprehensive 
to a merely political conception of liberalism and a mitted the “unrealistic idea of a 
well-ordered society as it appears in Theory”.9 He attributed this unfeasibility to the 
fact that “in Theory a moral doctrine of justice general in scope is not dis inguished 
from a strictly political one. Nothing is made of the contrast between comprehensive 
philosophical and moral doctrines and conceptions limited to the domain of the 
political”.10 In this sense, political liberalism should be intend d as a theory which 
applies only “to the basic structure of society, its main political, social, and economic 
institutions…independently of any wider comprehensive religious or philosophical 
doctrine; and…in terms of fundamental ideas viewed as implicit in the public 
political culture of a democratic society”.11 Rawls also underlines how political 
liberalism does not apply to matters of ordinary politics but rather to the 
“constitutional essentials”, that is, questions such as “who has the right to vote, or 
what religions are to be tolerated, or who is to be assured fair equality of opportunity, 
or to hold property”.12  
 
The “original position”, the methodological expedient introduced by Rawls in A 
Theory of Justice, in order to devise the principles of justice which should regulate 
society, is still viewed by Rawls as a useful devic for working out a publicly 
justifiable conception of “justice as fairness”, consisting of two basic principles. The 
first maintains that “each person is to have equal right to the most extensive total 
system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all”.13 
The second states that “social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that 
they are both (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, and (b) attached to 
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offices and positions open to all under conditions f fair equality of opportunity”.14 
Nevertheless, both the “original position” and “justice as fairness” are now 
conceived as relevant only for people as citizens, that is, as members of a certain 
type of political community (i.e. a liberal and democratic one) of which those 
principles must provide the foundations. Furthermore, the original position is only 
adopted to articulate in a more systematic way certain ideas that Rawls considers to 
be implicitly shared within the public political cult re of Western liberal societies. 
This, in Rawls’s view, represents an important condition for the public justifiability 
of “justice as fairness”15 but not a determinant one.16 Indeed Rawls is still driven by a 
deep allegiance towards the liberal political ideal and the virtues that this may foster 
within society,17 independently from any sociological consideration or from any 
“fortunate coincidence”.18  
 
The starting point of Rawls’s analysis is his acknowledgement of the presence of a 
“reasonable pluralism” of comprehensive views19 in Western liberal democratic 
societies. This is due to “the work of free practical reason within the framework of 
free institutions”20 and, more specifically, to what Rawls defines “the burdens of 
judgement”, that is, “the many hazards involved in the correct (and conscientious) 
exercise of our powers of reason and judgement in the ordinary course of political 
life”. 21 Among these “hazards”, Rawls mentions the difficulty of assessing evidence 
and its weight in drawing conclusions, as well as the indeterminacy of all our 
concepts and the fact that our values are shaped by our personal experience. Due to 
the fact of reasonable pluralism, Rawls emphasizes, a “continuing shared 
understanding on one comprehensive religious, philosophical, or moral doctrine can 
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be maintained only by the oppressive use of state power”.22 
 
This is why, according to Rawls, a political conception of justice can legitimately 
regulate a political community (e.g. by providing the basic principles for its 
constitutional arrangement) only if it is publicly justifiable, independently from any 
specific comprehensive doctrine. Grounding the political conception solely upon a 
specific comprehensive doctrine (e.g. that endorsed by a certain religious group) 
would show a lack of consideration towards those citizens who do not endorse that 
same conception.23 Political power, for Rawls, is therefore legitimate “only when it 
is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens as 
free and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and 
ideals acceptable to their common human reason”.24  
 
Public justifiability is internally linked to the idea of “public reason”. This is defined 
by Rawls as “the reason of equal citizens who, as acollective body, exercise final 
and coercive power over one another in enacting laws nd in amending their 
constitution”.25 Public reason, Rawls highlights, implies that citizens “should be 
ready to explain the basis of their actions to one a other in terms each could 
reasonably expect that others might endorse as consiste t with their freedom and 
equality”.26 The content of public reason, in Rawls’s view, identifies “certain basic 
rights, liberties, and opportunities”, attributes to them priority position “especially 
with respect to claims of the general good and of per ectionist values; and third, it 
affirms measures assuring all citizens adequate all-purpose means to make effective 
use of their basic liberties and opportunities”.27 The basic structure of society should 
not be organized, according to Rawls, so as to consiste tly reflect the views of one 
sub-group that holds a comprehensive doctrine other citizens do not share.28 
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While acknowledging the presence and importance of comprehensive doctrines, 
Rawls relegates them to the so-called “background culture”29 of civil society, the 
social dimension where associations, churches, families etc. exist and operate.30 
According to Rawls, therefore, the views endorsed by each citizen are made of two 
parts, namely “the publicly recognized political con eption of justice…[and] a (fully 
or partially) comprehensive doctrine to which the political conception is in some 
manner related…[C]itizens individually decide…in what way the public political 
conception all affirm is related to their…comprehensive views”.31  
 
The Narrow Scope of a Reasonable Overlapping Consensus 
Rawls’s conclusion, highlighted in the previous section, raises some issues. 
Certainly, according to Rawls, comprehensive views and political conception of 
justice are different levels of the same thing (i.e. a citizen’s overall worldview). In 
this sense, for example, a citizen’s view regarding which religious faith(s) should be 
tolerated in the constitution of a polity (or, more strongly, which ones should be 
incorporated into its institutional framework) may just be a part of that citizen’s 
comprehensive (religious, non-religious or even anti-religious) view(s). However, 
the expression “in some manner”, that Rawls uses to describe how citizens relate the 
political conception to their comprehensive view(s), highlights the indeterminacy of 
this connection. This depends on the fact that different comprehensive doctrines may 
organize their various parts (including their political part) in different ways, therefore 
rendering it very difficult to provide a general account of how the relationship 
between the political conception and other parts of a comprehensive doctrine works.  
 
Yet the specific examples (i.e. Kant’s moral philosophy, classical utilitarianism and a 
comprehensive pluralist theory)32 that Rawls provides in order to explain how 
comprehensive doctrines relate political liberalism to their other parts, seem to be ad 
hoc examples. Although these doctrines may be related to political liberalism, they 
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represent only a fraction of the comprehensive doctrines endorsed within Western 
liberal democratic societies.33 Indeed, Rawls’s argument does become more 
problematic when he focuses on the example of “religious doctrines with an account 
of free faith”.34 Such doctrines, according to Rawls, endorse the political conception 
as their account of free faith “lead[s] to a principle of toleration and underwrite[s] the 
fundamental liberties of a constitutional regime”.35 The account of “free faith”, here 
highlighted by Rawls, refers to the Lockean ideas that “the understanding cannot be 
compelled by force to belief...[and that]...only faith and inward sincerity gain our 
salvation and acceptance with God”.36 Rawls acknowledges that “perhaps too 
optimistically…except for certain kinds of fundamentalism, all the main historical 
religions admit of such an account [i.e. of free faith] and thus may be seen as 
reasonable comprehensive views”.37 Why is Rawls thinking that he might be too 
optimistic? This is not a mere sociological or empirical consideration. What he is 
implicitly acknowledging, I suspect, is that there might not actually be a connection 
between the comprehensive (moral, ethical, philosophical) aspects of many religious 
faiths and the political (liberal) conception of justice. Moreover, his doubts are not 
restricted to fundamentalist views; they also concer  “all the main historical 
religions”.38     
 
Rawls’s argument is that, if a religious comprehensive doctrine contains an account 
of free faith (i.e. if it is reasonable on Rawls’s definition), then it can also include 
political liberalism (i.e. as one of its parts). Rawls’s (perhaps unwarranted) optimism, 
then, seems to lie in the idea that most non-fundamentalist religious comprehensive 
doctrines do include such an account, and that therefore they are reasonable (i.e. on 
Rawls’s definition). If this is the case, though, the “reasonable overlapping 
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consensus”39 among plural comprehensive doctrines which, according to Rawls, is 
guaranteed by a freestanding political conception of justice, will be among a 
potentially very small set of people, excluding both non-fundamentalist and 
fundamentalist unreasonable religious comprehensive doctrines as well as many 
other unreasonable non-religious comprehensive doctrines.        
 
This is not a merely empirical or sociological issue. The source of the problem, 
instead, is normative and lies in Rawls’s own definitio  of “reasonable” 
comprehensive doctrines. “The reasonable”, Rawls argues, “is an element of the idea 
of society as a system of fair cooperation…Reasonable persons…desire for its own 
sake a social world in which they, as free and equal, can cooperate with others on 
terms all can accept”.40 This definition conceals a liberal conception of the person 
and of society which, even if intended in a merely political (i.e. non-comprehensive) 
meaning, does not seem to be justified on independent grounds.41 As Mulhall and 
Swift state, “by defining ‘the reasonable’ as including a commitment to a politically 
liberal vision of society, Rawls defines anyone who queries or rejects that vision as 
‘unreasonable’; but he offers no independent reason for accepting that morally-
driven and question-begging definition”.42 Rawls’s argument, therefore, seems 
circular in so far as it considers reasonable only those people who endorse political 
liberalism (i.e. as one part of their comprehensive doctrines) and, at the same, time, 
only allows reasonable people within political liberalism  
 
Rawls’s conception of reasonableness, therefore, still relies on a “metaphysical 
backing”,43 namely a liberal one. Although his political liberalism does not aim “to 
settle questions of objectivity in ethics”,44 Rawls still needs to rely on substantive 
foundations in order to justify why, for example, practices which have become 
accepted in Britain, such as the exclusion of women from all-men clubs or the 
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practice of female circumcision, ought to be considere  unreasonable.45 Unless we 
rely on substantive liberal grounds, we might risk reducing the problem to the 
question “whether a liberal view can be got to prevail in a power-game where 
winners are always reasonable and losers always unreasonable”.46 However, this is 
not how Rawls himself conceives political liberalism. He does not argue that the 
political conception of justice should result from a mere pragmatic balance between 
different moral views present within society. This process, according to him, would 
be “political in the wrong way”47 and perhaps, we might argue, not so different from 
the idea that “justice is what suits the strong”.48 Instead Rawls endorses a 
freestanding political conception of justice in thehope that “this idea, with its index 
of primary goods arrived at from within, can be the focus of a reasonable 
overlapping consensus”.49 However, this might remain a mere hope “without some 
transcendental reason why a liberal convergence should occur”.50  
 
Therefore, although Rawls’s account might provide th criterion for establishing 
which comprehensive doctrines can be parts of an overlapping consensus (i.e. those 
doctrines which include political liberalism as one of their parts) it excludes a priori 
all those doctrines which are not necessarily extremist or intolerant, but which do not 
contain political liberalism as one of their parts. As Rawls’s own doubts regarding 
religious doctrines suggest, many comprehensive doctrines might potentially fall into 
this category. Instead of adopting a neutral epistemological notion of 
“reasonableness”, Rawls loads this concept with a political liberal connotation. This 
renders his political liberalism circular, insofar s it excludes unreasonable views 
from public debate just because they are not politica ly liberal, and therefore less 
inclusive.  
 
Political Liberalism and the Imperfect Bilingualism of Political Parties 
The analysis conducted so far suggests important cosequences for a normative 
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account of political parties. As Muirhead and Rosenblum note, parties help 
“elements of civil society enter public political life”,51 they are “both associations 
with roots in civil society and quasi-official actors in the electoral process and in 
government”.52 Parties therefore establish a connection between th  political and the 
non-political realms. Rather than merely “adapting” the latter to the former, they 
“discover and define politically relevant differences, they create the terms of 
contest”.53 Via the semi-institutional bilingual dimension of partisan politics, 
individuals can foster and promote their own conceptions of the good life within the 
political arena. Their views are not simply channelled but also reshaped and 
reinterpreted by political parties. 
 
Given their bilingualism, I argued in the first chapter, parties ought to respect the 
ideas of “loyal opposition”54 and “regulated rivalry”,55 denoting a political 
antagonism respectful towards constitutional principles and political adversaries. The 
politicization of comprehensive doctrines through party politics ought to involve the 
acknowledgement of the political framework in which these views are fostered and 
the constitutional limits within which this fostering may be enacted. By complying 
with the constraints and opportunities of party politics, political parties which convey 
comprehensive (religious, moral etc.) doctrines, especially in liberal democratic 
polities, can therefore channel and moderate perfectionist claims in a way that 
favours democracy.  
 
Rawls’s political liberalism, however, prevents the politicization of many 
comprehensive doctrines (including religious ones), thus also forsaking the potential 
beneficial agency of religious political parties. Potentially many comprehensive 
doctrines are unreasonable on the basis of Rawls’s account, thus rendering the 
overlapping consensus feasible only among a limited number of people (and parties). 
Within this framework, therefore, religious political parties ought to restrict their 
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political platforms to those policy positions grounded in reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines, and abandon instead those grounded in unreasonable comprehensive 
doctrines, as the latter cannot relate to political liberalism and therefore cannot be 
admitted into political debate. As I will show in the next section, this restriction 
applies to political parties in full, not only to debates concerning constitutional 
matters. 
 
Rawls’s political liberalism, therefore, is inhospitable to those political parties which 
convey (as sole or partial aspects of their political platforms) unreasonable (i.e. 
politically non-liberal) comprehensive doctrines, both religious and non-religious. As 
these doctrines can potentially be many (as Rawls’s own doubts regarding religious 
doctrines seem to suggest), political liberalism crucially restricts the room for party 
politics and especially for religious partisan advocacy. The number and kinds of 
parties which may act as “agents of a publicly recognized overlapping consensus”,56 
and as linkage bodies between non-political and political spheres, will therefore be 
limited. Only those parties which convey reasonable (e.g. in Rawls’s restrictive 
meaning) comprehensive doctrines (e.g. a “utilitarian” party, a “Kantian” party etc.) 
can find space in Rawls’s framework.   
 
The problem, in this sense, is not that political liberalism is grounded in a 
comprehensive doctrine. Indeed, in order to be the focus of an overlapping 
consensus, it must be grounded in a number of comprehensive doctrines, i.e. all the 
reasonable ones. However, unreasonable doctrines are potentially many. Therefore, 
if parties’ bilingualism implies their sharing political liberalism as a common idiom, 
and if political liberalism can provide an overlapping consensus only among a very 
limited number of comprehensive doctrines (i.e. those reasonable on Rawls’s 
definition, and therefore already committed to political liberalism) then we are left 
with a very limited kind of party pluralism.  
 
Many religious or non-religious parties which convey unreasonable comprehensive 
views (as defined by Rawls) would not be allowed to present their political platforms 
                                                      




in the public political realm. As political liberalism, according to Rawls, is not part 
of the comprehensive doctrines on which their political platforms rely, such parties 
are excluded from the overlapping consensus invoked by Rawls. Mastering the 
Rawlsian common political language compels parties to choose among a very limited 
range of comprehensive idioms (i.e. those which include political liberalism as one 
of their parts), resulting in what we could define as an “imperfect bilingualism”. In a 
metaphorical sense, if we identify (for example) the common language as English, 
Rawls’s model implies that parties can only speak those idioms which belong to the 
same linguistic family as English (e.g. Dutch and German but not Arabic or 
Chinese). There might be very few bilingual parties in Rawls’s polity. 
 
Political Parties, Stability and the Overriding Power of Political Values  
Rawls argues that, once political liberalism has been recognized as publicly 
justifiable on neutral grounds, the problem arises of its actual applicability and stable 
support within a plural society where individuals pursue different conceptions of the 
good. According to Rawls, I have already explained, the purpose of the “freestanding 
political conception” that he delineates is that “with its index of primary goods 
arrived at from within, [it] can be the focus of a reasonable overlapping 
consensus”.57 This, Rawls argues, guarantees that political values “normally 
outweigh whatever other values oppose them”.58 Elsewhere Rawls claims that “most 
people’s political conceptions are no more than partially comprehensive” and that, as 
a consequence, “when conflicts do arise, the politica  conception has a better chance 
[than any comprehensive view] of sustaining itself and shaping those views to accord 
with its requirements”.59 Rawls is quite ambiguous on this point. He does not clarify 
how the political conception is normally going to prevail over comprehensive 
doctrines. The expressions that he uses, such as “normally” or “better chance”, 
suggest that the primacy of the political conception s not inevitable. However, 
Rawls also seems to overlook the many real-life cases in which the political 
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conception (together with the peaceful and stable society that it helps in fostering) is 
in fact rejected by particular individuals or groups, due to the overriding importance 
that certain comprehensive doctrines (religious, moral, philosophical etc.) have in 
their lives.60 Rawls simply considers these doctrines unreasonable, and therefore 
excludes them from the overlapping consensus. However, as I have already 
explained, his conception of reasonableness is circular and grounded in metaphysical 
liberalism. Furthermore, I will explain later the ngative implications of excluding 
unreasonable views from the public political realm nd from party politics.    
 
It is interesting, for now, to note how Rawls himself, in Justice as Fairness, seems to 
openly acknowledge the problems raised by his conception of the overlapping 
consensus. “Political liberalism”, he writes, “does not say that the values articulated 
by a political conception of justice…outweigh the transcendent values…- religious, 
philosophical, or moral - with which the political conception may possibly conflict. 
To say that would go beyond the political”.61 In another passage of Justice as 
Fairness, however, he seems to return to the idea that “with regard to the 
constitutional essentials and questions of basic justice, and given the existence of a 
reasonably well ordered constitutional regime, the...basic political values...have 
sufficient weight to override all other values that may normally come into conflict 
with them”.62 This shows that Rawls’s faith in the stabilizing role of the political 
conception of justice seems to be inconsistent through ut his later work.  
 
Certainly, according to Rawls, political liberalism is supposed to outweigh 
comprehensive views only on narrowly political issue  (i.e. constitutional essentials 
and questions of basic justice). Rawls’s aim, that is, is not to eliminate or even 
reduce reasonable reasonable disagreement. Yet Rawls seems to acknowledge that, 
in order to guarantee the “political” character of his theory, he must avoid 
considering the political conception of justice as lways able to outweigh 
comprehensive doctrines when conflicts between the two arise. This, in some way, 
gives more consistency to Rawls’s view, being more in line with the “political” shift 
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of his theory. Yet it seems to limit considerably the efficacy of the overlapping 
consensus in guaranteeing stability within plural societies, even within the narrow 
sphere of constitutional essentials and questions of basic justice and even within the 
potentially limited realm of reasonable comprehensive views.  
 
Political Parties and the Constraints of Public Reason      
Despite his narrow and exclusive conception of public reason, Rawls makes a 
distinction between the non-political associational sphere, on the one hand, and the 
public political one on the other. He then argues that he limits of public reason “do 
not apply to our personal deliberations and reflections about political questions, or to 
the reasoning about them by members of associations such as churches and 
universities, all of which is a vital part of the background culture”.63 The promotion 
of comprehensive views, both reasonable and unreasonable, is not restricted at this 
level. Substantive, communal values, according to Rawls, can legitimately be 
pursued and realized within families, churches, private associations etc. where only 
very basic principles and rights apply (e.g. right no to be tortured or not to be killed) 
but not the whole set of principles of justice which affect the basic structure and 
those issues which involve the constitutional essentials.64 
 
Political parties, though, exist on the borderline between political and non-political 
realms. They are not mere private associations, they do not belong entirely to the 
realm of civil society. They are bilingual “points of connection”65 between political 
and non-political domains. The substantive goals and values that a party endorses 
and fosters are generally intended by its members as values which should shape 
public policy if and when the party achieves power. Parties are therefore strongly 
affected by the constraints of public reason which apply to the public political realm. 
Any restrictions to the kinds of issues which may be discussed in the public political 
forum, and to the comprehensive doctrines which may be advocated there, have 
direct implications for party politics. Rawls seems to acknowledge this aspect by 
arguing that, even though it does not apply to associati ns within civil society, “the 
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ideal of public reason does hold for citizens when they engage in political advocacy 
in the public forum, and thus for members of political parties and for candidates in 
their campaigns and for other groups who support them”.66 
 
In order to appreciate the importance of Rawls’s statement, it is important to 
remember that, for Rawls, the constraints of public reason, which prevent 
(potentially many) unreasonable comprehensive doctrines from being advocated in 
the public political realm, only apply to the constitutional essentials and to questions 
of basic justice, not to the sphere of ordinary legislative politics.67 As the latter is 
where political parties mostly operate, it seems that ere might still be great space, 
in Rawls’s model, for political parties intended ascarriers of comprehensive 
conceptions of the good. As long as the political debate in which they are involved 
does not concern constitutional matters, parties ar free, it seems, to appeal only to 
comprehensive doctrines in fostering their policy positions. 
 
There are three possible answers to this point. First, although Rawls still explicitly 
acknowledges the distinction between constitutional and ordinary politics in Justice 
as Fairness,68 he sometimes admits that, if the limits of public reason can be shown 
to hold at the level of the constitutional essentials, then they may gradually be 
applied to less fundamental matters, that is, matters of ordinary politics.69 In other 
words, Rawls does not always seem to envisage a neat boundary between the two 
spheres and to impose a priori limitations to the area within which the constraints of 
public reason ought to apply. Second, it is significant that, when he imposes the 
constraints of public reason upon political parties and party members, Rawls no 
longer specifies that such constraints only ought to apply to deliberations regarding 
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constitutional essentials. Rawls’s argument, in this sense, seems to proceed on a 
double track. On the one hand, he suggests that the constraints of public reason only 
ought to apply when constitutional matters and issue  involving basic justice are at 
stake (despite the abovementioned inconsistencies). On the other hand, when 
mentioning parties, his distinction between constitutional and non-constitutional 
matters seems to suddenly become more relaxed. The limits of public reason, Rawls 
argues, apply to members of political parties and to citizens who “engage in political 
advocacy in the public forum”.70 Yet Rawls omits the requirement that such political 
advocacy ought to concern constitutional or fundamental matters. He uses instead the 
more generic expressions “political questions” and “political advocacy”.  
 
This shows that, beside the content of deliberation (i.e. what issues are being 
discussed), Rawls also attributes great importance to the locus of deliberation, being 
it churches, families, the parliament, the constitutional court etc. This implies that, as 
soon as we cross a certain line (i.e. the line betwe n private and public realms) 
regardless of what questions are debated, the constraint  of public reason ought to 
apply in full. Therefore, although it is true that Rawls grants broad scope to the 
expression of religious and comprehensive views within he associational realm, it is 
also true that the constraints that he imposes upon political parties and public 
officials are much more stringent than might initially appear. This is due to the fact 
that Rawls places political parties entirely within the public political sphere and not 
on the borderline between political and non-political realms where they belong. 
Parties, for Rawls, are just appendices of the basic structure, wholly conditioned by 
the constraints of public reason imposed upon them in a top-down fashion. As these 
constraints are quite expansive and potentially prevent many unreasonable (i.e. on 
Rawls’s definition) comprehensive doctrines from being advocated in the public 
political realm, this crucially limits the number and kinds of parties (including 
religious ones) which may legitimately exist and function in political liberalism.  
 
Thirdly, even if we granted that the constraints of public reason, to which political 
parties are subjected, only apply to matters involving constitutional essentials, we 
                                                      




should note that Rawls does not always set a clear borderline between constitutional 
and non-constitutional issues. This makes it difficult to discern when and where the 
limits of public reason ought to apply and it implicitly signals that constitutional 
essentials are often involved, directly or indirectly, when matters of ordinary politics 
are discussed in the public political forum. Kent Greenawalt, for example, notes how 
comprehensive views may often influence the understanding that different 
individuals have of the constitutional essentials, nd that appeal to political values 
alone may not be sufficient for applying such fundamental principles to concrete 
policy issues.71 According to him, several political topics are located on the 
borderline between constitutional and non-constitutional spheres (e.g. the issue of 
surrogate motherhood contracts). Moreover, he argues, sometimes it is very difficult 
to decide whether certain comprehensive views count as public reasons and therefore 
are suitable for deliberation regarding constitutional essentials. For example, whereas 
religious comprehensive views certainly do not count (in his view) as public reasons, 
“references to religious traditions as sources of general human or particular cultural 
understanding”72 may do. 
 
We might also argue that, as well as the borderline between constitutional and 
ordinary politics, also the boundary between political and non-political realms (e.g. 
regarding the role of the family) is sometimes quite indeterminate in Rawls’s 
analysis.73 The continuous interaction between the two domains, combined with the 
one between constitutional and ordinary politics, makes it therefore very difficult to 
clearly delimit the area subject to the constraints of public reason. Given that parties 
act as bridges between political realm and background culture,74 once we admit that 
the Rawlsian constraints of public reason apply (through a sort of spillover) to the 
latter as well, this further restricts the number and kinds of issues which may be 
channelled by political parties into the public political realm. 
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If we therefore combine these lines of argument, the restriction that Rawls’s political 
liberalism imposes upon political parties appears to be threefold. First, parties (i.e. 
party members, candidates etc.) ought to be fully sbject to the constraints of public 
reason. Second, although the latter only apply to constitutional essentials and matters 
of basic justice, it is often very difficult to disentangle these from less fundamental 
matters (i.e. matters of ordinary legislative politics). Third, although the constraints 
of public reason do not in principle apply to the non-political realm of civil society, 
the boundary between the latter and the political sphere is often blurred in Rawls’s 
account. This might potentially determine a spillover of the public reason constraints 
on to the background culture. Combined together, these critiques suggest that the 
range of issues about which public deliberation is subject to the constraints of public 
reason, therefore not allowing any exclusive reference to comprehensive conceptions 
of the good, is potentially very large. This would defy the central feature of religious 
partisan identity, i.e. the belief that “public ideals may be defended more 
persuasively and obligations motivated more dependably on religious than secular 
grounds”.75 
 
Rawls’s thick and all-encompassing conception of public reason undermines 
therefore the significance of political parties and the idea that “[w]ith political 
organizations and especially partisanship, the ‘fact of pluralism’ is made concrete for 
democratic purposes”.76 By limiting the variety of issues which may be channelled 
into the public political realm, Rawls’s political liberalism leaves little scope for the 
bilingualism of political parties and, consequently, for the normative criteria that 
stem from it and which can produce beneficial effects within liberal democratic 
regimes. This might prevent the potentially moderating role of political parties 
which, by complying with the ideals of loyal opposition and respect of party 
pluralism, can re-mould societal demands and make them compatible with the 
constitutional principles of the polity in which they operate, e.g. a liberal democratic 
polity. Preventing citizens from conveying their full reasons into public deliberation 
may subtract unreasonable views from the criticisms that they may deserve and it 
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may also inhibit citizens with contrasting reasonable views from taking into account 
different perspectives and therefore partly revising their own positions. The result of 
this “is likely to be to encourage the very dogmatic attitudes Rawls wants to 
avoid”.77  
 
This is the most serious implication of Rawls’s political liberalism, both for a 
normative theory of party politics and, more generally, for the problem of dealing 
with unreasonable comprehensive views in the public political realm of liberal 
democratic polities. Reasonable comprehensive views, we have seen, are for Rawls 
those committed to a politically liberal vision of society. Among them, we saw, 
Rawls includes religious comprehensive doctrines with an account of free faith. A 
freestanding political conception of justice, according to Rawls, guarantees a 
“reasonable overlapping consensus”78 among these plural comprehensive doctrines. 
Yet I also emphasized how potentially many comprehensiv  (e.g. religious) doctrines 
might be unreasonable in Rawls’s meaning. This implies that the reasonable 
overlapping consensus invoked by Rawls might potentially involve a very limited 
number of comprehensive doctrines. 
 
Furthermore, I argued, Rawls does not adopt a merely epistemological notion of 
“reasonableness”, but loads this concept with a political liberal connotation, thus 
rendering his political liberalism circular insofar s it excludes unreasonable views 
from public debate just because they are not politica ly liberal. Merely to say that 
unreasonable comprehensive views ought to be excluded from political liberalism 
because they are not politically liberal sounds like a tautological and circular 
conclusion. Certainly reasonableness, intended in Rawls’s meaning, only entails a 
commitment to political liberal values, not to comprehensive liberalism. In this 
sense, this concept might in fact be more inclusive than I have been arguing so far. 
Indeed it does not involve a moral duty, for citizens who endorse religious or other 
perfectionist views, to embrace comprehensive liberalism but only the political 
requirement to justify their positions only in political terms, in those areas subject to 
the constraints of public reason (which, as I explained earlier, might potentially be 
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Yet I also emphasized how many religious faiths, including mainstream non-
fundamentalist ones, might be unreasonable in Rawls’s terms and therefore not 
include political liberalism as one of their parts. Is it legitimate, we should therefore 
ask, to exclude such unreasonable comprehensive views from those areas of the 
public political realm which, directly or indirectly, are subject to the constraints of 
public reason in Rawls’s account? More crucially, to which extent are the normative 
criteria of party politics different from those of political liberalism? Do they not 
simply impose analogous political constraints upon the promotion of perfectionist 
views in the public political realm? 
 
I believe that a crucial aspect distinguishes the two sets of normative criteria. 
Rawls’s political liberalism is a substantially exclusionary theory. According to 
Rawls, unreasonable views (i.e. views which cannot i clude political liberalism as 
one of their parts) ought to be excluded from those areas of the public political realm 
subject to the constraints of public reason. In those areas in which, for Rawls, 
political decisions ought to be justified only in political terms, unreasonable 
comprehensive views would be unable to comply with this criterion and therefore 
they would be excluded a priori from deliberation con erning such political 
decisions. At most, for Rawls, unreasonable views can be tolerated and, as they risk 
undermining political justice, contained “like war nd disease”.79 On the contrary, 
the normative criteria of party politics that I have defended so far only represent the 
constraints comprehensive views ought to comply with once they have been 
introduced into the political realm by citizens who ave formed political parties. This 
has two main implications. First, as these citizens have voluntarily decided to form a 
party, that provides us with stronger normative reasons for stating that they ought to 
abide by the normative constraints of party politics. Their explicit choice to embark 
in party politics (e.g. rather than in terrorist activity or interest groups advocacy) 
makes it legitimate to expect their compliance with the principles of loyal opposition 
and regulated rivalry, the commitment to pursue power only through legal means and 
                                                      




the respect for pluralism.  
 
These criteria might resemble those established by Rawls’s political liberalism. 
However, in Rawls’s account it is unclear why citizens ought to abide by the 
constraints of public reason when acting in the public political realm of liberal 
democratic polities. On the one hand, reasonable citizens, in Rawls’s account, 
already endorse political liberalism, and therefore th y do not represent a problem. 
As Rawls himself states, “[t]he conflicts between democracy and reasonable 
religious doctrines and among reasonable religious doctrines themselves are greatly 
mitigated and contained within the bounds of reasonble principles of justice in a 
constitutional democratic society”.80 Therefore, even citizens who endorse 
irreconcilable but reasonable comprehensive views may share a political conception 
of justice which may help them to resolve any conflict among each other. On the 
other hand, unreasonable citizens promote views which, according to Rawls, cannot 
include political liberalism (i.e. as one of their parts) and therefore cannot be part of 
a reasonable overlapping consensus. They represent “a threat to democratic 
institutions, since it is impossible for them to abide by a constitutional regime except 
as a modus vivendi”.81 For Rawls, they represent a limit to the implementation of an 
ideal reasonable democratic society based on public reason.  
 
My normative theory of party politics, instead, does not distinguish between 
reasonable and unreasonable comprehensive views. The normative criteria of loyal 
opposition, respect of pluralism and commitment to legal means for obtaining power 
apply in the same way to all those citizens who have decided to enter party politics, 
regardless of the comprehensive views that they endorse. Those criteria might at first 
sight appear analogous to the constraints of public reason illustrated by Rawls. 
However, they crucially do not require citizens to only justify their policy proposals 
in political (i.e. non-comprehensive) terms when presenting them in the public 
political realm. We should remember that, as I showed earlier, the constraints of 
public reason ought to apply in full to political parties and party members, in Rawls’s 
analysis, and that parties, for him, are just appendic s of the state basic structure. My 
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account, instead, implies that even those comprehensiv  doctrines which do not 
contain political liberalism as one of their parts (e.g. religious doctrines with no 
account of free faith) should be welcomed into the realm of party politics.   
 
Within my normative theory of party politics, members of parties which convey 
perfectionist (e.g. religious) views would therefore be allowed to present their policy 
proposals based only on comprehensive arguments. Neverth less, they ought to 
accept the provisional character of political power and the reversibility of policy 
decisions, both linked to electoral politics. Within l beral democratic polities, they 
also ought to endorse the fundamental underlying values of the regime in which they 
operate, i.e. liberal democratic values. This paradoxically represents a stricter 
requirement than the one imposed by Rawls, who onlyrequires reasonable people to 
endorse political, not comprehensive liberalism. At the same time, thought, it is not 
grounded in a pre-commitment to either comprehensiv or political liberalism. Loyal 
opposition is somehow a relational normative criterion, implying that parties ought to 
endorse the fundamental values of the regime in which they operate, i.e. not 
necessarily a liberal democratic regime. It is therefore party politics itself, with its 
normative criteria and constraints, grounded in the unique bilingual nature of parties, 
which may play an important role in enhancing liberal democratic values and 
institutions (or whichever values underlie the constitutional and institutional 
framework of the specific polity in which parties operate). Furthermore, my 
normative theory of party politics does not aim to say anything about what citizens 
ought to do outside the realm of party politics. It is limited to assessing the 
importance of parties for liberal democracies on the basis of the normative criteria 
that I have devised but it does not aim to say anythi g about the intrinsic value of 
liberal democracy or the constraints citizens ought to abide by outside the realm of 
party politics.    
 
My account therefore underlines the importance of plitical parties for fostering 
comprehensive views (both reasonable and unreasonable, in Rawls’s terms) into the 
public political realm of liberal democratic polities, in a way compatible with liberal 




political parties, intending parties as defenders of the status quo, I will show in the 
fourth chapter how certain parties (e.g. anti-system ones) might actually play a much 
more innovative role within liberal democratic regimes. What I would like to stress 
here, however, is that Rawls crucially overlooks the important mediating role parties 
play in liberal democratic polities, a role grounded in their unique bilingual nature. 
Despite the distinction that he makes between constitutional and ordinary politics, 
and his attempt to distinguish between various layers of political activity, his account 
is substantially centred on a two-layered conception of political society, with the 
state on one side and civil society (i.e. the associati nal realm) on the other. This is 
one of the reasons, I believe, why he places politica  parties entirely within the 
former.  
 
Contrary to Rawls, I believe that the bilingual nature of parties, and their 
intermediate position between state and civil society, can act as a filter between civil 
society and political realm. On the one hand, it provides an inclusive framework 
where all comprehensive views ought to be welcomed, however radical or extremist 
their might be at the pre-partisan level. On the other hand, the normative criteria of 
party politics allow us to decide whether such views can be allowed to become the 
grounds for policy decisions. By assessing whether political parties comply with the 
normative criteria of party politics, we would be able to decide whether the views 
they promote ought to be excluded from the public realm (e.g. by banning such 
parties) or whether they should be accepted as legitimate grounds for potential policy 
decisions, however reasonable or unreasonable they might be in Rawls’s sense. What 
is crucial is that, by being inclusive in the first instance, party politics allows any 
comprehensive view to be openly challenged in the public political realm. When 
presenting their views during electoral campaigns or in the parliament, political 
parties ought to let them be subject to potential critiques and, eventually, to the 
judgement of elections. This might help in fostering a process of democratic 
acculturation (an empirical claim) and, more crucially, it might prevent the 
marginalization of such comprehensive views and their resulting radicalization and 
increased dogmatism. As I will extensively illustrate in the sixth chapter, parties are 




moderating perfectionist views in a way compatible with democracy. I will instead 
deal in the fourth chapter with the problem represented by those political parties 
which do not openly present their views in public and have a hidden undemocratic 
agenda they aim to implement once they have been democratically elected.  
                      
It can therefore be argued that political parties, n Rawls’s political liberalism, are 
ideally unable to express the plurality of comprehensive views present within society 
(as they are banned from conveying many of these views into the public political 
forum) and, consequently, unable to help in fostering dialogue and reciprocal 
understanding among them. This also renders the scope of Rawls’s own theory self-
defeating. By limiting, via the public reason restriction, what can be admitted into 
political debate and deliberation, political liberalism interferes with the process by 
which people endorsing unreasonable or “not-always reasonable” comprehensive 
doctrines may come into line with the overlapping consensus, and thus contribute to 
the self-reinforcing of political liberalism. 
 
Public Reason and Party Manifestoes 
In order to understand more clearly the implications of the constraints of public 
reason for religious parties, it might be worth looking at the specific issue of state 
support for religious schools. Rawls illustrates the situation in which one group of 
people within society favours state support for public education only, whereas 
another group endorses state support for church schools as well.82 The main problem 
in this case, according to Rawls, is not merely the pr sence of conflicting policy 
options, and of incompatible underpinning values, but rather the fact that the two 
groups “may come to doubt the sincerity of one another’s allegiance to fundamental 
political values”.83 The solution to this problem, according to Rawls, is “for the 
leaders of the opposing groups to present in the public forum how their 
comprehensive doctrines do indeed affirm those values”.84 In other words, Rawls is 
not worried by the presence of divergent views (which he would explain on the basis 
of the burdens of judgement and of the consequent fact of reasonable pluralism) but 
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by the instability that this may cause, where there is a lack of support for a shared 
political conception of justice. Therefore, the solution that he advocates aims not so 
much to explain the roots and the merits of the divergent views in themselves, but 
rather to reconcile them with the liberal political onception, making them appear as 
different perspectives from which political liberalism can and should be sustained.85  
  
In the light of Rawls’s conclusions, then, it is difficult to see which and how many 
issues of ordinary politics would in fact not be subject to the constraints of public 
reason that he advocates. As Bhikhu Parekh rightly notes, “Rawls makes the basic 
structure of society the primary subject of justice pr cisely because it profoundly 
shapes the rights, liberties, and life-chances of its citizens”.86 Parekh underlines how 
religious people, within this framework, “should not speak in their native conceptual 
language, invoke their sincerely held beliefs, and ppeal to their deeply held values. 
If some of them were to do so…they [would] risk being branded ‘cruel and 
oppressive’”.87 We should remember here that religious parties, as I defined them in 
the first chapter, must only appeal to religious values in order to ground their policy 
proposals, even when the latter could be justified on non-religious grounds.  
 
Rawls’s strategy is particularly difficult to undermine as it does not openly forbid 
invoking comprehensive conceptions of the good in the public political realm. 
However, although it often seems to encourage different groups and individuals to 
present their comprehensive views in the public forum, this should be only insofar as 
these views are consistent with a political conception which has already (according 
to Rawls) been agreed upon. This contrasts with a truly inclusive polity where 
comprehensive views are genuinely advocated by eachgroup in order to justify the 
proposal and implementation of certain legislative provisions, and are judged on the 
basis of their intrinsic merit. Also when Rawls illustrates, for example, the cases of 
the abolitionists and the civil rights movement ledby Martin Luther King, Jr., in the 
United States, his strategy is unchanged. Quite significantly, he argues that these 
people “did not go against the ideal of public reason…provided they thought, or on 
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reflection would have thought…that the comprehensive reasons they appealed to 
were required to give sufficient strength to the political conception to be 
subsequently realized”.88 This confirms that, in Rawls’s view, the normative priority 
of the political conception involves the “highly questionable”89 idea that any appeal 
to comprehensive views (religious or non-religious) should be intended and allowed 
only insofar as it contributes to enhancing political liberalism. Rawls seems to 
choose those examples which help to confirm and sustain his political liberalism, 
without considering alternative comprehensive views hich might challenge it.90 
This excludes, above all, those comprehensive doctrines which do not include 
political liberalism and that therefore Rawls considers unreasonable. 
 
Indeed another controversial case illustrated by Rawls is that of the anti-abortionist 
who, on the basis of her religious (or philosophical, or moral) comprehensive 
doctrine denies women’s right to abortion except in extreme cases. Rawls simply 
rules out such a position as unreasonable, or even “cruel and oppressive”91 and as not 
providing appropriate justificatory grounds for citizens voting in the public forum 
and deciding on matters of basic justice. I believe that Rawls could apply the same 
reasoning to many other policy issues concerning the basic structure of society. For 
this reason, as emphasized by Parekh, Rawls’s political liberalism is unable to 
accommodate the demands of cultural minorities, religious communities, indigenous 
people etc. who ask for differential treatment, often incompatible with the full 
endorsement of Rawls’s political liberalism, which s still “largely individualist, and 
meant to be uniformly applied throughout society”.92 
 
These considerations have further implications for p litical parties. Parties always 
convey whole sets of values, usually synthesized in their manifestoes and ideologies. 
Apart from some isolated cases, they are not mere vhicles for promoting single, 
contingent and temporary issues.93 Therefore, as parties are for Rawls fully subject to 
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the constraints of public reason and mere appendices of the state basic structure,94 
and as those constraints rule out certain policy positions, because they are grounded 
in (what Rawls considers) unreasonable comprehensiv views, this may prevent the 
existence itself of those parties which convey such policy positions and ground them 
in exclusively religious values (i.e. religious parties).   
 
For example, a religious political party may include in its manifesto or electoral 
programme, among other measures, certain crucial policies such as an anti-abortion 
law, or public funding of religious schools and public holidays based on religious 
celebrations. The crucial point, as I explained in the first chapter, is that religious 
parties, in order to qualify as “religious”, must ground such policy proposals solely 
in religious principles (however broadly intended). If public reason prevents all or 
some of these measures from being advocated in the public political forum (and 
implemented through government policy), whenever the comprehensive views in 
which they are grounded do not include political liberalism, then it is difficult to 
understand what would be left of that party’s manifesto. Those issues may be so 
essential to the existence and aims of that party that, prevented from advocating them 
in the public political forum, the party would no lnger have much reason to exist. 
Rawls could certainly highlight, in response to this critique, that such a party would 
not be prevented (in political liberalism) from advocating these policies, but only 
from advancing specifically religious arguments forthem in the public sphere. As 
long as the party was able to present political (i.e. non-religious, non-comprehensive) 
arguments for sustaining them, they would be fully acceptable. Yet this raises further 
issues.  
 
Due to Rawls’s expansive conceptions of public reason and reasonableness, the 
number of unreasonable comprehensive doctrines which may be unrelated to 
political liberalism is potentially very broad. This will often prevent their promoters 
from being able to find parallel political arguments for policy positions originally 
grounded in comprehensive (e.g. religious) doctrines. This imposes an unfair 
cognitive burden upon some citizens (i.e. those endorsing unreasonable doctrines) 
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who, contrary to those endorsing comprehensive doctrines more attuned to political 
liberalism (i.e. reasonable doctrines such as Kantian, utilitarian etc.) may struggle to 
find the required political arguments for advancing their views and their policy 
positions in the public political realm. As Rawls’s definition of reasonableness, as I 
explained, is circular and already loaded with a strong political liberal meaning, 
Rawls does not seem to provide valid and independent arguments for imposing this 
cognitive requirement upon (those he considers) unreasonable individuals.       
 
Consequently, as unreasonable doctrines may include not only extremist ones (e.g. 
neo-Nazi, religious fundamentalist etc.) but also, for example, non-fundamentalist 
religious faiths (as Rawls’s own doubts suggest), this renders political liberalism 
particularly limited in scope and inhospitable to a true and inclusive party pluralism 
and especially to the presence of religious political parties, or at least to those 
religious parties whose unreasonable comprehensive views do not contain an account 
of free faith. For these reasons I will defend, in the second section of my thesis, a 
more inclusive model of public deliberation, grounded in pragmatist epistemology 
and not discriminating against the epistemological and deliberative character of 
religious views in the public political realm. For now, it is sufficient to say that, by 
openly imposing the full constraints of public reason upon political parties, Rawls’s 
political liberalism seems unable to accommodate div rse conceptions of the good 
and their institutionalization through a genuine party pluralism.  
 
This defies Muirhead and Rosenblum’s conclusion that “[p]olitical liberalism 
embraces…‘quasi-great’ parties of principle committed to constitutional 
democracy…[which]…stand not for rival societies or regimes, but for rival 
interpretations of political freedom and equality”.95 According to them, political 
liberalism rejects “small parties”, i.e. those parties which act as mere interest groups 
fostering particularist instances, and “great parties”, i.e. those “arising from rival 
fundamental claims about the best regime”.96 Nevertheless, they argue, it is 
hospitable to those intermediate kinds of parties which display what Rawls himself 
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defines as “loyal opposition”,97 namely an opposition which is respectful towards 
constitutional principles and political adversaries. Certainly I agree with Muirhead 
and Rosenblum that party politics ought not to concer  disagreement over the 
fundamental values of a polity, and over its constitutional and institutional 
settlement. Sometimes this happens, though, and certain parties (e.g. anti-system 
parties) reject the foundations of the polity in which they operate and invoke its 
complete renewal. These parties are on the borderline of loyal opposition and, as I 
will argue in the fourth chapter, they often (but no always) ought to be banned.  
 
Parties which do comply with loyal opposition, however, are not always welcomed 
in Rawls’s political liberalism, as Muirhead and Rosenblum argue. As I have tried to 
show throughout the chapter, loyal opposition does not require that citizens 
participating in party politics forego merely comprehensive views when advocating 
certain policy proposals in the public political realm. Loyal opposition therefore does 
not require the exclusion of unreasonable (i.e. in Rawls’s terms) views from the 
public political realm. Rawls’s political liberalism in fact prevents the politicization, 
via political parties, not only of particularistic nterests and extremist worldviews, 
but also of all those comprehensive conceptions of the good which are simply not 
consistent with the narrow scope of the Rawlsian thick and expansive idea of public 
reason. By being excluded from the public political realm and from the sphere 
subject to the normative constraints of party politics, these views risk being relegated 
to the margins of political life and becoming therefo  a greater threat for liberal 
democratic polities.          
 
Yet an important clarification must be made at this point, also to do justice to 
Rawls’s account. As I explained in the first chapter, in order to qualify as “religious”, 
a political party must ground its manifesto and policies in religious views, even when 
such policies (e.g. bans on abortion, funding of religious schools etc.) can be 
defended without appeal to religious values. It was for this reason that I decided to 
engage with the analysis of Rawls’s political liberalism, in order to understand to 
which extent it would allow this link between religious and political conceptions. 
                                                      




However, in the first chapter, I also explained that religious parties may be inspired 
by religious values to different degrees and in order to support very different kinds of 
political frameworks. The minimalistic definition of “religious party” that I provided 
there is very inclusive and can be applied both to fundamentalist religious parties and 
to denominational mass parties (e.g. Christian Democratic ones).    
 
We could therefore argue that many religious parties (i.e. those closer to the 
“moderate” end of the spectrum) may actually be compatible with political 
liberalism. The religious comprehensive doctrines (.g. Christian, Muslim etc.) in 
which their political platforms are grounded, that is, are likely to contain an account 
of free faith and, therefore, to be reasonable (on Rawls’s terms) and be included in 
Rawls’s overlapping consensus. Certainly, as I have explained throughout this 
chapter, Rawls’s own doubts regarding the reasonable ess of both fundamentalist 
and main historical religions98 (and, consequently, regarding their compatibility with 
political liberalism) still leaves his account open to the critique of being too 
exclusionary. This is a grey area in Rawls’s analysis, and perhaps one which needs to 
be assessed on a case by case approach. In other words, e need to examine religious 
views individually in order to assess whether they qualify as reasonable and, 
therefore, whether they can be part of the overlapping consensus. Consequently, also 
the religious parties which convey such views must be assessed on a case by case 
basis.  
 
Nevertheless we might argue that most mainstream religious parties (e.g. Christian 
Democratic ones, the Islamist AKP in Turkey etc.) operating within Western liberal 
democratic polities normally appeal to religious doctrines which are reasonable on 
Rawls’s definition and therefore compatible with political liberalism. Yet this does 
not detract from the importance that religious parties can have within liberal 
democratic polities. As I explained earlier, preventing citizens with contrasting 
reasonable views from conveying their full reasons into public deliberation might 
inhibit them from taking into account different perspectives and therefore partly 
revising their own positions, thus resulting in dogmatic attitudes. Political parties 
                                                      




(including religious ones) are vital tools for sustaining this kind of inclusive and 
critical public deliberation. Furthermore, the present clarification still leaves 
unresolved the problem of dealing with those religious parties which convey 
unreasonable religious views and which, we should stres  once again, may 
potentially be many. By excluding them from the overlapping consensus, Rawls’s 
political liberalism risks subtracting them from the criticisms they may deserve. 
Consequently, it might also prevent them from undergoing the process of democratic 
acculturation that religious parties can trigger, when they comply with the normative 
criteria of party politics. Preventing unreasonable religious views from entering the 
public political realm implies that these views “may be passively tolerated rather 
than being subjected to the condemnation they deserv ”.99 Indeed Rawls himself 
argues that, as they risk undermining political justice, unreasonable doctrines ought 
to be contained “like war and disease”.100    
 
This may represent a loss not only for such parties but also for the “reasonable” 
parties operating within the same polity and for the polity itself. By shielding 
reasonable comprehensive views and constitutional consensus from the challenges 
and critiques unreasonable citizens and parties might raise within the public political 
realm, political liberalism might result in encouraging “the very dogmatic attitudes 
Rawls wants to avoid”.101 Religious parties, acting as channels of the pragmatist 
model of deliberation that I will endorse in the fifth and sixth chapters, can 
contribute instead in providing a more inclusive public political realm, where all 
views can democratically and critically be assessed regardless of whether they are 
reasonable or unreasonable. 
 
Conclusion 
Rawls’s political liberalism, I have argued in this chapter, is not able to fully 
accommodate political parties which convey religious and other perfectionist claims. 
This signals the partial incompatibility between party politics and state neutrality, as 
intended by Rawls. Yet my critique of Rawls’s political liberalism in relation to 
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political parties (especially religious ones) does not intend to deny the need for 
imposing certain burdens upon party politics. Given their public role, political parties 
ought to always justify public policies across a variety of diverse groups and 
individuals, both religious and non-religious, as those policies, if implemented, are 
likely to affect everyone. This requires that parties acknowledge the presence of a 
plurality of opinions and political positions and tha , given the general implications 
of their views for the whole of society, the burdens of justifications that they must 
face must be especially high. Therefore, after having examined in the next chapter 
the incompatibility between monistic perfectionism and party politics, and 
highlighted instead the link between the latter andvalue pluralism, in the subsequent 
chapters I will illustrate the legitimate limits that ought to be imposed upon the 









Chapter 3 – Monism, Pluralism and Political Parties 
 
In the introduction, I highlighted and rejected the id a that, in choosing between 
regimes of political neutrality and political perfectionism, we would in fact have to 
choose between pluralistic neutrality and monistic perfectionism. Against these two 
alternatives, I envisaged a third one represented by pluralistic perfectionism, i.e. the 
idea that there are several values and conceptions of the good and that the state may 
allow many of them to enter the public political realm through political parties. 
Having therefore rejected, in the previous chapter, he suitability of political 
neutrality (in the emblematic form of Rawls’s political liberalism) for the ideal 
presence and functioning of (religious) political prties, in this chapter I will reject 
the alternative paradigm, namely monistic perfectionism. A perfectionist state, I will 
argue, may only sustain a monolithic conception of the good by repressing or hiding 
(but at the same time implicitly acknowledging) the inevitable multiplicity of 
substantive (i.e. ethical, moral, religious etc.) con eptions of the good endorsed 
within society. In order to clarify this conclusion, I will examine totalitarianism in 
relation to ethical monism, by focusing on the theories of value pluralism devised by 
Isaiah Berlin1 and George Crowder.2  
 
I will not focus on the distinction, usually drawn, between totalitarianism, on the one 
hand, and authoritarian, dictatorial and single-party regimes, on the other.3 Instead, I 
will consider alternative political institutionalizations of ethical monism (e.g. single-
party regimes) as different in degree, but not in quality, from totalitarian regimes. 
Totalitarianism, in this sense, should be seen as the ideal expression of political 
monism, “an ideal type to which concrete cases can only approximate, since no 
government can control every instance of social interaction”.4 Examining its ideal 
nature will thus help me to disclose more clearly its connection with ethical monism. 
I will conclude the chapter by arguing that political parties provide the institutional 
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embodiment of value pluralism. Yet, I will argue, citizens participating in party 
politics only ought to acknowledge and respect political pluralism, not 
comprehensive value pluralism. This, I will conclude, renders party politics open to 
political parties which convey monistic comprehensive conceptions of the good, both 
religious and non-religious.  
 
Totalitarianism: A Conceptual Framework 
Totalitarianism can be defined as a political regime grounded in a monistic 
conception of the good and aiming for the total control of society.5 The former aspect 
refers to the ethical grounds of totalitarianism, the idea of “a complete ethical code in 
which all different human values are allotted their due place”.6 The totalitarian 
regime considers itself as the depository of the only truth and of a “closed intellectual 
system”7 and therefore feels legitimized to enact the moral indoctrination of the 
people.8 In totalitarian regimes, political coercion is directly grounded in ethical 
demands9 and this implies a total control upon everyday life, encompassing all 
human activities.10 
 
However, total control often presents an artificial character.11 Totalitarian regimes, 
that is, do not reflect an existing ethical consensus within society. They arise from 
partial demands and aim to artificially construct such a consensus. Yet, as F. A. 
Hayek argues, they do not simply impose a unitary conception of the common good 
enabling the ranking of ethical values (a conception which, for Hayek, is utopian).12 
Their deeper aim is to bring people “to agree not only with the ultimate aims but also 
with the views about the facts and possibilities on which the particular measures are 
based”.13 For this purpose, totalitarian regimes devise pseudo-scientific theories 
enabling them to achieve a systematic control of factu l information, functional to 
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the control of values.14 This process reveals one of the intrinsic contradictions of 
totalitarian regimes, namely their attempt to “‘plan’ or ‘organize’ the growth of 
mind”15 rather than allowing the interaction, dissent and spontaneity which may 
contribute to it.  
 
Hans Buchheim highlights how the idea itself of a “totalitarian state”16 is a 
contradiction in terms. A state, he argues, represents by definition the “law-bound 
institutionalization of public life”17 which guarantees the limitation of political 
authority. Totalitarian regimes, instead, are characterized by the “unlimited…claim 
to control society”.18 Furthermore, Buchheim argues that totalitarian parties esemble 
“movements”.19 The totalitarian movement, he argues, reverses “the natural 
subordination of a part to the whole”.20 It does not think of itself as a part among 
other parts, making up a whole, but rather as a “‘germ cell’ of a new element within 
the old whole”.21 Totalitarian parties, therefore, aim to impose their partial, factional 
will upon the old polity and see the state as a mere institutional tool for 
implementing their monistic ideas. In this sense, th n, they contravene the normative 
criteria of party politics that I presented in the first chapter. Parties always ought to 
act within the limits of the constitutional and institutional framework in which they 
operate. Totalitarian parties (e.g. the Nazis), instead, pursue the destruction of the 
existing institutional framework, if necessary through civil war. They are essentially 
anti-system. They may act as parties but only in an artificial, exterior sense, as “their 
aims lay beyond what [in ideal terms] a...political p rty may establish as its goal”.22  
 
Sigmund Neumann23 provides an ideal and normative account of parties analogous to 
the one I presented in the first chapter. According to him, parties ought to pursue 
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their specific interests while acting within a common whole and recognizing 
themselves as parts of that whole. Furthermore, he argues, factionalist and 
disintegrative tendencies can only be prevented “when essentials can be constantly 
reaffirmed, uniting political adversaries”,24 and when parties share a “common 
language”.25 Neumann therefore seems to endorse a conception of parties intended as 
bilingual agents, mastering both a common institutional and constitutional language 
and particular idioms expressing partial conceptions of the good. However, he 
highlights how totalitarian parties display an essential disagreement on the 
fundamentals and ultimate ends of the polity in which they act. Even when they act 
within a democratic party system, they “make use of its ‘instruments’ without 
abiding by its principles”.26 Rather than embracing the ideas of regulated rivalry and 
loyal opposition, they fight the existing political nd institutional framework and aim 
to replace it with a new order; they behave like factions in a religious war.27 The 
totalitarian party, according to Neumann, conceives th  state as the mere executor of 
the party’s will,28 using it as an instrument for the monistic implementation of its 
partial ends. By subordinating the state to the party, nd therefore the whole to the 
part, totalitarian parties become mere appendices of the state29 and contravene the 
normative criteria of party politics that, in the first chapter, I drew from party 
bilingualism. 
 
Interesting elements also emerge from Hannah Arendt’s30 analysis of totalitarianism. 
As well as distinguishing parties from movements, Arendt also illustrates the 
emergence of the “party above parties”31 which, behind its apparent concern for the 
public good, only aimed “to promote one particular interest until it had devoured all 
others, and to make one particular group the master of the state machine”.32 Arendt 
agrees that parties never ought to identify with the whole in which they operate or 
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even ignore or attempt to destroy other parties.33 This claim is in line with the 
normative criteria of party politics that I defended in the first chapter. By not 
complying with those criteria, parties would resemble those factional movements 
which, according to Arendt, aim for the destruction of the state.34 For example Nazi 
and Soviet parties, she argues, relegated the state to  subsidiary role, subordinated to 
the party,35 and therefore, I would argue, infringed the normative criteria of party 
politics.         
 
All the authors mentioned so far seem therefore to agree on an ideal conception of 
political parties, intended as bilingual intermediaries between state and civil society, 
promoting particular interests within a common shared framework. This 
characterization of parties corresponds with the on that I illustrated and endorsed in 
the first chapter and the normative criteria that I drew from it are clearly 
incompatible with the nature and goals of totalitarian parties. These display both 
factionalist and unitarist tendencies in their approach towards the existing 
institutional framework. On the one hand, they do not aim to promote the interests 
and values of the whole polity but only the partial instances of a fragment of society. 
On the other hand, they aim to impose this partial set of values upon the entire polity, 
without respecting the procedures and limits of democratic politics.  
 
Totalitarian parties “confront both the political puralism that is the universal 
circumstance of parties and the actuality of parties. Their party is a means to erase or 
repress the rest”.36 They aim to re-establish a whole without parts, a polity without 
parties. On the basis of their philosophical holism, totalitarian parties aim “to erase 
pluralism, above all partisan political pluralism”.37 As they infringe the normative 
criteria of party politics, totalitarian parties, which are expressions of ethical and 
political monism, ought to be banned from the public political realm of liberal 
democratic polities. Nevertheless, totalitarian parties no longer represent a real threat 
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in contemporary liberal democratic regimes.38 The kind of political extremism 
embodied by the old totalitarian ideologies of the 1920s and 1930s has nowadays 
faded.39 As I will show in the fourth chapter, this makes it almost paradoxical that 
most European liberal democracies still choose a “militant” approach when dealing, 
for example, with extremist or allegedly antidemocratic parties. However, in that 
chapter I will also explain how new forms of ethical and political monism are often 
promoted, within contemporary liberal democracies, by extreme right parties. Such 
parties aim to replace liberal democracy with populist and strongly majoritarian 
versions of democracy, in which individual rights would no longer be safeguarded by 
the checks and balances and the constitutional norms present in liberal democratic 
regimes. When examining those parties, I will illustrate how the normative reasons 
that justify their banning should be weighed against the arguments for including 
them into liberal democratic polities.       
 
Totalitarianism, Ethical Monism and Utopianism 
Totalitarianism, I explained earlier, is a kind of political regime grounded in a 
monistic conception of the good and aiming for the otal control of society.40 
However, I also explained how totalitarianism represents the ideal (and therefore 
unattainable) expression of political monism. The ultimate goal of totalitarianism is 
“the subjugation of both state and society under a utopian, unpolitical claim to 
rule”.41 The utopian character of totalitarianism, and the fact that its ideal goal can 
never be realized, is rooted in its appeal to an ethical monism which does not 
recognize the plural nature of the good. Certainly, as I showed in the previous 
section, many attempts have been made, especially in the recent past, to implement 
the utopian ideal of totalitarianism, with tragic results for the polities in which such 
experiments have been conducted. However, a normative nalysis must examine 
totalitarianism in ideal terms, in order to unveil its ideal inconsistency with value 
pluralism and, consequently, with the pluralism of party politics and its normative 
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criteria. A critique of the ethical (monistic) foundations of totalitarianism will 
therefore be the theme of the second part of this chapter. 
 
The connection between totalitarianism and ethical monism is one of the central 
aspects of Isaiah Berlin’s42 theory of value pluralism. According to Berlin, the 
crucial feature of totalitarian regimes is their attempt to reconcile value differences 
by tracing them back to a single ethical source to which all values can be 
subordinated. In this kind of ethical framework, achieving the final goal of a perfect 
society justifies “the slaughter of individuals on the altars of the great historical 
ideals - justice or progress or the happiness of future generations, or the sacred 
mission or emancipation of a nation or race or class, or even liberty itself”.43 Ethical 
monism, therefore, leads to the utopian project of “a inal harmony in which all 
riddles are solved, all contradictions reconciled”44 and aims to justify the authority of 
that individual, or group of people, who knows what the single unifying value is.   
 
Given the lack of such a unifying ethical principle, Berlin argues, we must rely on 
our everyday experience and admit that “we are faced with choices between ends 
equally ultimate, and claims equally absolute, the realization of some of which must 
inevitably involve the sacrifice of others”.45 The necessity of having to choose 
among this multitude of incompatible ends is what, according to Berlin, leads men to 
cherish freedom of choice as “an end in itself”.46 Berlin emphasizes that the attempt 
to impose a monistic and utopian conception of the good upon a society is bound “to 
encounter some unforeseen and unforeseeable human development, which it will not 
fit”. 47 This will result in the use of oppressive means in order for that single view to 
be implemented, and in “the vivisection of actual human societies into some fixed 
pattern dictated by our fallible understanding of a largely imaginary past or a wholly 
imaginary future”.48 Totalitarianism, with its apparatus of physical, psychological 
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and scientific tools, is the result of this monistic conception of the good, and of the 
utopian attempt to impose a single truth upon an irremediably plural society.  
 
It must be highlighted that, according to Berlin, totalitarianism is rooted not only in 
ethical monism but also in the idea of “positive liberty”. Contrary to “negative 
liberty”, which Berlin defines as “liberty from” or “non-interference”, in other words 
“the area within which a man can act unobstructed by others”,49 positive liberty 
denotes the idea of self-mastery and self-realization, the individual’s will to depend 
on herself, to be guided by her own reasons, rather t an by external causes or 
agents.50 The idea of positive freedom, Berlin argues, may esily lead to the 
distinction between an empirical, heteronomous self, driven by passions and instinct, 
and a real, autonomous self, associated with reason nd with a higher nature.51 The 
main risk, according to Berlin, arises when the tru self is identified with a collective 
self, with “a social ‘whole’ of which the individual is an element or aspect: a tribe, a 
race, a Church, a State, the great society of the living and the dead and the yet 
unborn”.52 This eventually leads to the idea “that it is possible, and at times 
justifiable, to coerce men in the name of some goal (let us say, justice or public 
health) which they would, if they were more enlightened, themselves pursue, but do 
not, because they are blind or ignorant or corrupt”.53  
 
Yet the main problem, in Berlin’s view, is not raised by positive liberty as such but 
rather by its connection with value monism. As Georg  Crowder also highlights, 
“[t]he authoritarian view becomes more compelling on the assumption that moral 
considerations form a monist unity, such that a single end or principle resolves value 
conflicts in every case regardless of the circumstances”.54 According to Berlin, 
instead, fundamental moral and political values are intrinsically plural and 
incommensurable. Consequently, “the possibility of c nflict - and of tragedy - can 
never wholly be eliminated from human life, either p rsonal or social. The necessity 
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of choosing between absolute claims is then an inescapable characteristic of the 
human condition”.55 
 
Contrary to Berlin, Crowder emphasizes that the connection between monism and 
totalitarianism is not logical or necessary. Certain monistic views (e.g. 
utilitarianism), he argues, do not lead to the establishment of authoritarian or 
totalitarian regimes. Nevertheless, according to Crwder, due to its emphasis on a 
utopian total convergence of values which blinds us from alternative views, value 
monism is more likely (i.e. than value pluralism) to lead to totalitarian outcomes.56 
From the idea that goods are plural and incommensurable, instead, “it follows that 
each has, in a rough sense, an equal claim on our attention”.57 Ranking of plural 
values, according to Crowder, is only possible in particular circumstances and 
contexts, rather than on the basis of an “abstract or utopian super-value or 
formula”.58  
 
Political Parties and Value Pluralism 
In order to clarify the relation between party politics and value pluralism, it is 
important to distinguish the latter from the reasonable disagreement that we 
encountered in Rawls’s Political Liberalism. As I explained in the previous chapter, 
Rawls’s account aims to justify a liberal political arrangement to those individuals 
and groups who do not sustain a comprehensive libera  doctrine. The price paid by 
Rawls for that purpose is to limit the legitimacy of his theory only to those societies 
whose public culture already implicitly displays the principles and values entailed by 
political liberalism. However, once the hidden comprehensive grounds of Rawls’s 
political doctrine have been disclosed (as I hope they were in the second chapter) his 
theory seems to reveal a further loss. Given its comprehensive controversial (liberal) 
foundations, political liberalism might in fact not be endorsed by all citizens, not 
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even within those specific societies to which it is meant to apply (i.e. Western liberal 
democratic ones). Therefore, as well as lacking universal scope, it also loses the 
legitimacy that it could have derived from a genuine political turn. Unlike Rawls’s 
reasonable pluralism, value pluralism, as endorsed by Crowder and Berlin, is instead 
a universalistic outlook. However, it also implies that “human values are universal 
only at a high level of generality, and are interprted and applied in different ways in 
different contexts, both historical and cultural”.59 This clarification, together with 
Crowder’s aforementioned idea that ranking values is possible in specific 
circumstances and contexts, reveals a kind of particularism which is much more 
suitable for understanding the pluralistic agency of political parties.  
 
In the first chapter I explained how parties ought to remain “parts” and, therefore, 
they ought to acknowledge and respect party pluralism, i.e. the presence of other 
parties, beside them, within the polity in which they operate. Totalitarian parties, we 
have seen, contravene this normative criterion; they no longer provide the 
intermediate channel between civil society and state, particularistic idioms and a 
common institutional and political language. Parties ought to acknowledge party 
pluralism in order to remain bilingual. In ideal terms, party bilingualism could not 
even be conceived without party pluralism. In the same way that totalitarianism 
represents the ideal political expression of ethical monism, party politics represents 
the ideal political expression of value pluralism. Political parties ought to behave like 
parts-of-a-whole and therefore respect party pluralism. Parties which convey 
monistic ethical views and aim to forcefully impose “the single truth” upon other 
parties and their voters are therefore infringing oe f the crucial normative criteria 
of party politics. However, as I will explain later in the chapter, parties’ respect for 
party pluralism does not require the endorsement of value pluralism as such. Political 
parties, that is, can preserve their monistic conceptions of the good while adhering to 
party pluralism.  
 
The normative criterion which requires parties to respect pluralism is, given its ideal 
nature, universal. Whenever and wherever they are formed, parties always ought to 
                                                      




comply with it as “political pluralism...is...the universal circumstance of parties”.60  
This is in line with Crowder and Berlin’s universali tic conception of value 
pluralism. However, I explained, Crowder also argues that ranking of values is 
possible in specific circumstances and contexts, alhough not on the basis of abstract 
and general ethical standards. Ranking of values, for example, provides the rationale 
for establishing a constitutional order within a polity. In deciding for certain 
constitutional principles we give them priority over l ss fundamental values so that, 
whenever a conflict arises, the former must be given precedence. This conclusion 
presupposes the belief, which I will extensively defend in the fifth and sixth chapters, 
that there is no qualitative difference between moral and ethical values, i.e. between 
the right and the good. In principle, this framework also applies to Rawls’s political 
liberalism. Yet in Rawls’s theory, as I explained in the previous chapter, the ranking 
of values implies in fact the unwarranted subordination of every comprehensive view 
to the political liberal conception of justice. As William Galston explains, “while 
Rawls does not reduce what we rightly care about to a single measure of value, he 
gives some values (those in the first principle of justice) lexical priority over 
others”.61 I explained in the second chapter what consequences this implies for 
political parties, especially for religious ones. 
 
On the contrary, a universal value pluralism accompanied by a particularistic 
interpretation of its context-related implementations, as in Crowder’s theory, permits 
a ranking of values which may vary from one set of circumstances to another. This 
implies that the constitutional framework present in a certain polity may legitimately 
differ from the one that we encounter in a different country without this undermining 
value pluralism and its political expression, i.e. party pluralism. Yet this difference 
cannot be unlimited. Indeed Crowder does mention a minimum set of moral 
standards including “respect for universal values, r cognition of incommensurability, 
promotion of diversity, and acknowledgement of reason ble disagreement”.62 These 
criteria indicate the idea of “a domain of basic moral decency”,63 i.e. a set of minimal 
moral standards which any lexical ordering and constitutional arrangement must 
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respect.64 Within the limits posed by these criteria, the common constitutional 
language parties ought to respect, in order to display loyal opposition and preserve 
their bilingualism, is likely to vary, depending onthe values and principles which are 
prioritized in different contexts. In liberal democratic polities, as I explained in the 
first chapter, this means that parties ought to respect liberal democratic values. I will 
address in the next chapter the problem of dealing with those parties which 
contravene the normative criteria of party politics and, within liberal democracies, 
fail to comply with the constitutional and institutional frameworks and their 
underlying values. 
 
Value Pluralism and Reasonable Disagreement 
Value pluralism is more suitable than reasonable disagreement for making sense of 
party politics. It is more in line with the universal ideal normative criterion that 
parties always ought to respect pluralism, while providing the rationale for the 
presence of diverging ranking of values, and therefore constitutional arrangements, 
in different polities. Yet value pluralism seems to be a much more controversial 
moral position than the reasonable disagreement in which Rawls, we have seen, 
grounds his political liberalism. Reasonable disagreement, we saw in the second 
chapter, results from the so-called “burdens of judgement”, i.e. “the many hazards 
involved in the correct (and conscientious) exercis of our powers of reason and 
judgement in the ordinary course of political life”.65 It therefore represents a form of 
epistemic abstinence about the good. Indeed, in order to preserve the neutral 
character of political liberalism, Rawls abstains from considering any perfectionist 
doctrine objectively “true”. Value pluralism is, for him, nothing but one of the many 
reasonable comprehensive conceptions of the good (e.g. as well as Kant’s moral 
theory, religious views with account of free faith etc.) from within which political 
liberalism can be endorsed.  
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This has two important implications in Rawls’s analysis. First, value pluralism is 
clearly distinct from reasonable disagreement and is subject to the constraints of 
public reason, which pose limits to the use of perfectionist arguments in the public 
political realm. Second, and most importantly, value pluralism is one of the many 
comprehensive conceptions of the good on which we can reasonably disagree. This 
means that, in Rawls’s political liberalism, there might be space, for example, for 
those individuals or groups who endorse value monism and reject value pluralism. 
As it does not pronounce any judgement on the truth of either monism or pluralism, 
political liberalism seems to have room for monistic conceptions of the good (e.g. 
utilitarianism, comprehensive liberalism, Catholicism etc.) which endorse the idea of 
a hierarchy of values and reject value pluralism. Both monistic and pluralistic views, 
as long as they are reasonable, can participate in he overlapping consensus. This 
seems to render political liberalism much more accomm dating, than substantive 
value pluralism, of ethical and religious pluralism. By considering value pluralism 
not as its ethical basis but as only one among several comprehensive conceptions of 
the good, it might leave more room, for example, for religious citizens who endorse 
reasonable monistic conceptions of the good (e.g. Catholicism with an account of 
free faith). As long as these citizens can agree on a political conception of justice, it 
does not matter whether they embrace monistic or pluralistic comprehensive views.   
 
I already explained in the second chapter the reasons why political liberalism is 
actually not very inclusive towards perfectionist claims (including religious ones) 
and, consequently, towards those political parties which convey them. Due to 
Rawls’s expansive conceptions of public reason and reasonableness, I argued, the 
number of unreasonable comprehensive doctrines which may be unrelated to 
political liberalism is potentially very broad. This may imply their exclusion from the 
overlapping consensus devised by Rawls. By being excluded from the public 
political realm (or, at least, from those areas which involve constitutional matters, 
directly or indirectly) and from the sphere subject to the normative constraints of 
party politics, I explained, these views risk being relegated to the margins of political 





Now, however, I need to address the important question concerning the potential 
limits of value pluralism in guaranteeing ethical and religious pluralism (and, 
implicitly, religious party pluralism). The problem seems to be that, if we endorse 
comprehensive value pluralism and base the political framework of a polity on it, we 
risk excluding those individuals or groups or parties which endorse monistic 
conceptions of the good. Their comprehensive monistic views, that is, would be 
incompatible with comprehensive value pluralism. This would also have serious 
implications for political parties and party pluralism. Parties conveying monistic 
religious views, that is, would be excluded from a fr mework grounded in 
substantive value pluralism.66 Paradoxically, therefore, a conception of value 
pluralism, more substantive than the idea of reasonble disagreement, might lead to a 
more radical exclusion of religious views and parties than Rawls’s political 
liberalism. How can we overcome this almost paradoxical implication of value 
pluralism? 
 
First, I would like to show that value pluralism is not in fact more controversial than 
reasonable disagreement, and therefore not more problematic for parties which 
endorse monistic (religious and non-religious) conceptions of the good. It is true that, 
as Crowder highlights, value pluralism involves theconviction that there are certain 
objective universal values endorsed across cultures but instantia ed in different ways 
depending on the circumstances. Value pluralism, that is, is not a mere form of 
subjectivism or relativism but the idea that values are plural in an objective sense. 
However, contrary to what Rawls argues, Crowder claims that value pluralism is not 
a (controversial) comprehensive conception of the good life67 but rather “a meta-
ethical theory of the good which implies a politics of accommodation”.68 Value 
pluralism, that is, does not tell us which things are good and which not, but only that 
there is a plurality of values and conceptions of the good and that we cannot 
reconcile them under a superior value or set of values. Yet this still leaves open the 
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problem of reconciling value pluralism with those monistic conceptions of the good 
which dot not actually agree with the meta-ethical cl ims of value pluralism. Even if 
we assume that value pluralism does not entail any absolute ranking of values in 
itself, it might still be the case that monistic con eptions of the good simply reject the 
idea that values are plural. In the end value monism, like value pluralism, is 
ultimately a meta-ethical conception. By simply shifting from an ethical to a meta-
ethical level of analysis, therefore, we do not overcome the irreconcilability of value 
monism and pluralism. The problem reappears in meta-ethical terms.    
 
Nevertheless, we might still be able to prove that value pluralism is not less inclusive 
than Rawls’s idea of reasonable disagreement, by showing that the latter depends on 
the former. Indeed, according to Crowder, the burdens of judgement, which Rawls 
defines as “the many hazards involved in the correct (and conscientious) exercise of 
our powers of reason and judgement in the ordinary course of political life”,69 
presuppose a comprehensive conception of value pluralism, entailing the idea of a 
substantive plurality of goods incommensurable with each other.70 More specifically, 
Crowder refers to two of the burdens of judgement mentioned by Rawls, namely e) 
and f). The former establishes that “[o]ften there a different kinds of normative 
considerations of different force on both sides of an issue and it is difficult to make 
an overall assessment”.71 Here, Rawls envisages a link between his argument and 
Thomas Nagel’s idea of the “fragmentation of value”, i.e. the idea that “values are 
incomparable: they are each specified by one of the several irreducibly different 
perspectives within which values arise...Put another way, these values have different 
bases and this fact is reflected in their different formal features”.72 As Crowder notes, 
Rawls does acknowledge that the kind of view proposed by Nagel is a 
comprehensive conception of the good, and that political liberalism should avoid 
relying on such controversial claims. However, “since he [i.e. Rawls] suggests no 
alternative account of e)”, Crowder argues, “one must s ppose that this is the best he 
has to offer”.73 Furthermore, Crowder highlights how ethical monism would 
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certainly be incompatible with e) and therefore the latter must imply pluralism. 
 
The other burden of judgement examined by Crowder, i.e. f), states that in setting up 
“any system of social institutions...[we are] forced to select among cherished 
values...[and] we face great difficulties in setting priorities and making adjustments. 
Many hard decisions may seem to have no clear answer”.74 Indeed Rawls explicitly 
refers to Berlin’s theory of value pluralism. He hig lights that “[a]s Berlin has long 
maintained...there is no social world without loss: that is, no social world that does 
not exclude some ways of life that realize in special ways certain fundamental 
values”.75 Rawls even states that the impossibility of having a social world without 
loss “is rooted in the nature of values and the world, and much human tragedy 
reflects that”.76 These are Rawls’s own words and, as Crowder rightly emphasizes, 
they testify how Rawls’s conception of reasonable disagreement is clearly rooted in 
value pluralism, intended as a theory of the objectiv  nature of the good, not in the 
idea of a mere epistemic abstinence about the good.  
 
This makes it even more difficult to accept Rawls’s proposed solution. His implicit 
endorsement of substantive value pluralism, that is, may not easily coexist with his 
idea that reasonable comprehensive views can overlap on the basis of a shared 
political conception of justice. In the case of mere reasonable disagreement, 
reasonableness might be the glue holding diverse (but not in principle irreconcilable) 
conceptions of the good together. In the case of value pluralism, however, given the 
idea of irreconcilability between diverse conceptions of the good, it becomes more 
difficult to understand how an overlapping consensus might be achieved.  
 
However, as I explained in the second chapter, Rawls’s conception of reasonableness 
is unwarrantedly biased. Instead of adopting a neutral epistemological notion of 
“reasonableness”, Rawls loads this concept with a political liberal connotation, thus 
rendering his political liberalism circular insofar s it excludes unreasonable views 
from public debate just because they are not politica ly liberal. Perhaps Rawls does 
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need such a strong conception of reasonableness as a counterweight to the value 
pluralism on which his idea of reasonable disagreement implicitly relies. Unveiling 
the substantive grounds of Rawls’s conception of reasonable disagreement might 
help us to break this vicious circle between his ideas of reasonableness and political 
liberalism. However, this might also make it more difficult to find a point of 
convergence for substantially plural conceptions of the good. 
 
This analysis has therefore both positive and negative implications for the problem I 
am addressing here. On the one hand, it reduces the gap between reasonable 
disagreement and value pluralism, showing how the former is ultimately grounded in 
the latter. It is therefore not legitimate to consider value pluralism more controversial 
and more problematic than reasonable disagreement, and therefore more unlikely to 
be accepted by those individuals or groups which endorse monistic (religious or non-
religious) conceptions of the good. On the other hand, nd consequently, this makes 
it even more necessary to explain how a political framework grounded in the idea of 
substantive value pluralism can be inclusive towards monistic conceptions of the 
good and monistic parties, including religious ones. Although value pluralism 
renders explicit the metaphysical assumptions of Rawls’s theory, it also leaves us 
with the difficult task of reconciling value pluralism itself with the presence of 
monistic conceptions of the good and of the parties which convey them.        
 
It is here, I believe, that my ideal conception of p litical parties, including religious 
ones, and the normative criteria that stem from it, may play an important role. 
Parties, I explained in the first chapter, ought to acknowledge and respect party 
pluralism. In order to preserve their unique bilingual nature, that is, parties ought to 
accept that they are parts among other parts, and that each of these parts conveys a 
specific (or a set of) comprehensive conception(s) of the good. By foregoing their 
specific idiom, I argued, parties would inevitably forego also their bilingualism and 
would no longer be able to distinguish themselves from other parties. I also 
explained that the party pluralism parties ought to acknowledge is, in ideal terms, of 
a permanent kind. Any idea that this pluralism was temporary, and that party 




party politics and party bilingualism.  
 
In this sense, we should be careful in endorsing, for example, Nancy Rosenblum’s 
statement that “[w]ith political organizations and especially partisanship, the ‘fact of 
pluralism’ is made concrete for democratic purposes”.77 This statement suggests that 
parties institutionalize the mere “fact” of pluralism, i.e. that they bring a contingent 
plurality of ethical, religious etc. perspectives into the public political realm and 
translate them into policy proposals which are debated during electoral campaigns 
and within parliaments, submitted to voting and then, sometimes, implemented. Yet 
the mere “fact of pluralism” seems to imply the idea of a temporary situation due to 
contingent circumstances but not preventing, in priciple, the possibility of a single 
overarching good reconciling the plurality of values. This is not consistent, ideally 
speaking, with the kind of pluralism parties ought to comply with. 
 
Indeed it is Rosenblum herself who highlights very clearly the contrast between the 
ineliminable pluralism of party politics and those conceptions analogous to Rawls’s 
idea of reasonable disagreement. She emphasizes how the idea of regulated rivalry, 
that parties ought to respect, “makes no appearance in democratic theory today 
(where often enough conflict is tamed, renamed ‘disagreement’, and ideally 
transformed into consensus, and where in any case prties are ignored)”.78 The 
reference to Rawls’s ideas of reasonable disagreement and overlapping consensus, 
although not explicitly made by Rosenblum, seems clear in this instance. Given that 
regulated rivalry and party politics presuppose the idea of an ineliminable pluralism, 
then, how can we reconcile value pluralism, party pluralism and religious pluralism? 
In other words, how can we ground a political framework in the idea of substantive 
value pluralism without rendering it inhospitable to monistic religious conceptions of 
the good? 
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First of all, I am not arguing that value pluralism should shape the political 
framework in which parties have to operate. This framework ought to presuppose 
value pluralism, i.e. it ought to be devised so as to be open to a plurality of 
conceptions of the good, in a more inclusive way than Rawls’s political liberalism. In 
itself, however, it ought to be thin and inclusive, without persistently reflecting one 
or many comprehensive conceptions of the good. I will explain, in the fifth and sixth 
chapters, how a liberal democratic framework embodying these features can be 
provided by a model of democratic deliberation grounded in pragmatism. This 
framework would not in principle exclude parties conveying monistic conceptions of 
the good, religious or non-religious. As it would only establish the basic liberal 
democratic principles regulating deliberation among citizens and parties, it would not 
be intrinsically hostile to monistic parties.     
 
Indeed the institutionalization of value pluralism would not be represented, in ideal 
terms, by the constitutional and institutional framework of this ideal liberal 
democratic polity but by the political parties operating within it. Furthermore, value 
pluralism would acquire a novel qualitative shape when conveyed by political 
parties. As I explained in the first chapter, the translation of societal values and 
cleavages into political ones is the unique contribu ion that parties can provide 
thanks to their bilingual nature. Parties do not to simply mirror pre-existing societal 
interests and demands. Instead, they are “opportunistic responses to political 
possibilities”.79 Social cleavages have to be actively politicized by political parties in 
order to become politically relevant. Parties, therefore, possess a creative agency 
which helps to transform pre-political values. In ideal terms, the plural values which 
are politicized by political parties become subject to he normative criteria of party 
politics, i.e. loyal opposition, respect of party pluralism and use of legal means to 
obtain power. Yet in no way do these criteria require parties to forego their 
comprehensive conceptions of the good, whether these are monistic or not. Parties, 
including those carrying monistic views, are only required to acknowledge and 
respect organized political pluralism, not value plura ism. 
 
                                                      




This distinction is crucial for my analysis. By lifting value pluralism on to the 
political level, political parties allow citizens who endorse monistic ethical 
conceptions of the good to maintain them while abiding by the normative constraints 
of party politics. These constraints only apply to the political, not the ethical realm. 
Therefore, although party politics is expression of value pluralism, the normative 
constraints which, ideally speaking, regulate it, only concern the political sphere. As 
Rosenblum highlights, parties need not renounce a metaphysical understanding of 
truth and values but only acknowledge “that they are parts and will always be seen as 
partial…All that is necessary is acknowledging that organized political disagreement 
is ineliminable and party conflict its form”.80 Parties, that is, need not endorse ethical 
value pluralism.  
 
In the seventh chapter I will also show how political parties, ideally intended, are the 
institutional embodiments of the idea that the metaphysical (e.g. religious) 
understanding of truth need not entail epistemological authoritarianism. Indeed, in 
ideal terms, “partisans do not look to liquidate, eras  or permanently disorganize the 
opposition…[P]artisans do not see minority status as irreversible…Partisans in the 
majority, too, recognize that their standing is partial and temporary…[P]artisanship 
entails commitment to the provisional nature of political authority”.81 These features, 
I will argue, correspond to the central aspects of a pragmatist model of epistemology 
and deliberation. What this tells us, in relation t my present analysis, is that parties’ 
respect for political pluralism is closely linked to the idea that they ought to accept 
the provisional nature of political authority. Within the limits of the political 
framework in which it operates (e.g. a liberal democratic one), a political party has 
the chance to obtain control of government via legal means (e.g. elections) and, once 
in power, to implement its specific policy agenda. However, respect for political 
pluralism requires this party (and any other party) to accept that its governing status 
is provisional and subject to the legal rules which, n the polity in which it operates, 
regulate the procedure for re-election.    
 
This normative criterion of party politics is consistent with the idea that parties can 
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preserve their metaphysical (monistic or pluralistic) conceptions of the good. Party 
pluralism is an expression of value pluralism and iividual parties might convey 
either pluralistic or monistic views (both religious and non-religious). The latter, 
however, only ought to acknowledge and respect political pluralism, i.e. the 
ineliminable plurality of political parties, not the idea that values are intrinsically 
plural. This might still be a tough requirement forcertain parties but it is only a 
political, not an ethical requirement. Indeed, as I briefly showed in the first chapter, 
there are examples of religious groups which, by entering party politics, have 
managed to combine the upholding of their monistic religious faiths with the 
acceptance of political pluralism. For instance, confessional parties which operated 
in Western Europe between the end of the 19th century and World War II (WWII), 
and which endorsed monistic religious views, “eventually relaxed their antipluralist, 
antipolitical ambitions, and…were integrated into the political systems they loathed 
and had intended to subvert”.82 The members of these parties did not abandon their 
monistic religious (e.g. Catholic, Protestant) faiths. Yet they gradually reconciled 
them with respect for political pluralism. Certainly whether this kind of process 
might actually succeed is a mere empirical matter. What matters for my present 
analysis is that, in ideal normative terms, the endorsement of monistic conceptions of 
the good and the acceptance of party pluralism are compatible as the latter does not 
require endorsement of value pluralism.       
 
Party politics, intended in this sense, can therefore provide an inclusive arena for 
both pluralistic and monistic conceptions of the good which have been politicized via 
political parties. The irremediable pluralism of party politics ought to be 
acknowledged and respected by all parties, in order for them to preserve their 
bilingualism. Yet parties ought not to acknowledge value pluralism as such but only 
its political expression. There are no reasons for thinking that this conception of 
party politics might be in principle difficult to accept for those parties that channel 
monistic conceptions of the good. It only establishes that, if they do decide to embark 
in party politics, individuals and groups ought to abide by the normative criteria of 
party politics, which include respect for party pluralism. Parties which promote 
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monistic conceptions of the good (e.g. religious, utilitarian, Marxist etc.) ought to be 
banned only if they aim to destroy party pluralism, e.g. by establishing a one-party 
(e.g. totalitarian) or even a “party-less” regime. I will examine some examples of 
these kinds of parties in the fourth chapter.       
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have provided a normative defence of value pluralism against 
monistic totalitarianism, and shown its relationship with party pluralism. I have 
especially focused on the distinction between value pl ralism and Rawls’s idea of 
reasonable disagreement, and shown that the latter ul imately relies on the former. I 
have also argued that, although party pluralism is grounded in value pluralism, it 
allows the presence of political parties which convey monistic conceptions of the 
good. As long as these parties acknowledge and respect party pluralism and the 
provisional character of political authority, they may preserve their monistic 
comprehensive views and need not embrace value pluralism. Having rejected both 
monistic perfectionism and pluralistic neutrality as normative frameworks for 
making sense of party politics, and having endorsed instead pluralistic perfectionism, 
in the fourth chapter I will deal with the problem of establishing the legitimate limits 
of party politics within liberal democratic polities. I will therefore examine various 
normative arguments for banning political parties which may represent a threat for 
liberal democracies and weigh them against alternative rguments for including such 
parties in democratic politics. This analysis will then allow me to introduce the 
theme of the fifth and sixth chapters, where I will conduct an analysis of the 
relationship between parties and democratic deliberation and defend a pragmatist 
conception of deliberative democracy, arguing that this is the most suitable 
theoretical framework for making sense of the perfectionist and pluralistic agency of 



































Chapter 4 – Liberal Democracy and the Limits of Party Politics 
 
In the first chapter, I provided an ideal conception of political party involving the 
principles of “loyal opposition”, “regulated rivalry” and respect for pluralism. These, 
I explained, are the normative criteria of party politics and are grounded in the 
unique bilingual nature of political parties. I also explained that only the presence of 
an institutional and constitutional consensus, preceding partisan divisions, allows 
parties to abide by these criteria and therefore be “a subdivision compatible with 
unity rather than a division that disrupts it”.1 I also provided an extensive analysis of 
the history and prehistory of the term “party”, in order to illustrate how my 
normative ideal of party politics is neither unusual nor entirely new, but reflects 
instead a certain way political parties have come to be intended since they first 
appeared on the political landscape of Western polities.  
  
In the present chapter, I am going to focus on the normative problem concerning the 
acceptable limits and restrictions which ought to be imposed upon political parties 
within liberal democratic polities. In the first part of the chapter, I will critically 
assess the accounts of Nancy Rosenblum2 and Samuel Issacharoff,3 who are possibly 
the only scholars who have addressed this research area from a theoretical point of 
view. I will therefore analyse the limits and constraints of party politics by focusing 
on the criteria on the basis of which a liberal democratic state may legitimately ban 
political parties. I will argue that the normative criteria for condemning a party’s 
disloyalty to the democratic game and excluding it from party politics should be 
grounded in the ideal of political party that I presented in the first chapter. There is 
no need, that is, to justify them by appealing to values or principles outside party 
politics, e.g. the intrinsic valuableness of liberal democracy or pluralism. Such 
justifications would indeed make it necessary to prvide normative arguments to 
sustain the view that liberal democracy and pluralism are in fact valuable, thus 
potentially leading to an endless regressive process of justification. Furthermore, this 
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approach would implicitly disregard the normative relevance of party politics which 
I am illustrating in this work.       
 
In the second part of the chapter I will show that, although the normative criteria of 
party politics may in principle justify the banning of certain parties within liberal 
democratic polities, there may sometimes be stronger normative reasons for 
justifying the inclusion of antidemocratic or semi-loyal parties into the democratic 
political game. On the one hand, the presence of such parties may often signal certain 
flaws in the democratic legitimacy of the regime in which they operate. Therefore 
they function as warning agents which may help in fostering a debate on the 
constitutional and institutional consensus of the polity. On the other hand, party 
politics might contribute in triggering a process of democratic acculturation in those 
groups (even extremist or antidemocratic ones) which decide to create political 
parties to pursue their goals. By complying with the normative criteria of party 
politics, parties can channel and moderate particularistic claims, including extremist 
ones, in a way which favours democracy. Furthermore, excluding extremist or even 
antidemocratic groups from the democratic game would relegate them to the margins 
of political life, where they would most likely radicalize their claims and therefore 
become an even greater threat for democracy.        
 
Justifying the Banning of Political Parties: Nancy L. Rosenblum 
In the first chapter, I highlighted how political parties ought to aim to obtain power 
and be willing to be voted out of office only through legal means (e.g. in liberal 
democracies, through elections rather than by means of terrorist attacks). In a similar 
way, Rosenblum starts from the stipulation that parties “are presumptively 
committed to a ‘free and fair’ electoral process - to obtaining a share of offices by 
legal means, by persuasion in public competition…[and that therefore]…outlawing 
parties is not easily justified”.4 Yet I believe that this conclusion is internally 
inconsistent. If we interpret Rosenblum’s statement as concerning ideal parties, then 
the commitment to the democratic electoral process that real parties ought to display 
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makes it easier, rather than more difficult, to provide legitimate reasons for banning 
those parties which do not comply with it. 
 
According to Rosenblum, parties are consistent with democracy if they are 
committed to trial by elections, if they do not aim to eliminate the opposition when 
they are in power and if, upon electoral defeat, they renounce their office without 
dispute.5 On these grounds, among the reasons for banning parties Rosenblum 
mentions, first, “[t]hreats of violent political opposition and revolutionary 
overthrow”.6 These conducts contrast with an essential feature of party politics, 
namely the “assurance that in situations of deep political division, conflict is 
restricted to the regulated rivalry of obtaining political office and influencing laws 
and policy by peaceful, electoral means”.7 Furthermore, Rosenblum emphasizes that 
“nonviolence is built into the definition [of political parties]”,8 thus rendering the 
idea itself of “violent party” self-contradictory.  
 
There are two problems in Rosenblum’s argument here. First, the criteria that, 
according to her, may help us to establish the compatibility between parties and 
democracy, are in fact the same normative criteria that I included in my ideal 
conception of parties that I presented in the first chapter. Therefore, rather than on 
the basis of their consistency with democracy, parties should be assessed in relation 
to the normative criteria of party politics. Second, Rosenblum’s assertion that 
political parties cannot in principle be violent isunwarranted. Certainly, as I 
explained in the first chapter, even a minimalistic definition of political party 
includes the idea that parties seek power through legal means (e.g. through 
elections). However, there have been and there are in fact parties which, while 
participating in elections, also use violent means in order to obtain power (e.g. by 
creating a terrorist arm) or others which, having obtained power through legal and 
nonviolent means, use violence to restrict the freedoms and rights of certain groups 
within society. If we include the idea of nonviolenc  in the general definition of 
“political party”, all those parties which use violence could not even be called parties 
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in the first instance. Instead, nonviolence should be traced back to the normative 
criteria of party politics that stem from the ideal conception of political parties that I 
presented in the first chapter.  
 
The second reason provided by Rosenblum for justifying the banning of parties, 
“inciting hate”, has analogous implications. Rosenblum endorses the idea that hate 
speech undermines democratic culture and wears down the tolerance and broad-
mindedness required in a multicultural society which s devoted to the idea of 
equality.9 This argument, presented in this way, seems to be grounded in the idea that 
tolerance, open-mindedness, equality etc. are valuable things in themselves and that 
this justifies banning those parties which deny or jeopardize them. However 
widespread this view might be, it requires explaining on what grounds these things 
can be considered good or even just desirable, thus leading to an endless regressive 
process of justification. In order to prevent this outcome, the rationale for the 
banning should then be firmly grounded instead in the ideal of party politics. This 
implies that, in liberal democratic polities, parties ought to resort only to legal and 
peaceful means (not to hatred or violence) for the promotion of the values and 
policies they endorse.  
 
Also in this case, as for the first criterion, carefulness is necessary for empirically 
identifying those cases of hatred which really represent a danger for society and 
which may lead to intolerance and close-mindedness. Yet this simply implies, in my 
view, that the second reason provided by Rosenblum can be traced back to the first 
one. Only insofar as incitement to hatred leads to ac ual violence can it be adduced as 
a justification for banning a political party. Establishing the presence of this 
connection is merely an empirical problem. The crucial point is that, once we can 
confirm, with a strong degree of certainty, the presence of parties which advocate 
genuine hatred leading to violence, they ought to be banned because hatred is bad or 
tolerance and open-mindedness are good (although these would probably be 
sufficient reasons for most people), but mainly because such parties do not comply 
with the normative criteria of party politics that I presented in the first chapter. 
                                                      




The third reason provided by Rosenblum is that politica  parties should be banned 
when they represent an existential threat to the state. I believe that this argument can 
also be easily traced back to the normative criteria of party politics, especially to the 
idea of loyal opposition. There are two problems ari ing from this third argument. 
One concerns the controversial implications of having to empirically assess the 
actuality of an existential threat to the state. The other is that the safeguarding of the 
identity of the state against those parties which am to modify it (by peaceful means) 
“conflicts with interpretation and reinterpretation f political identity as part of the 
business of democracy. Existential threat as a justification for banning is an opening 
for essentialism. It bears traces of holist antiparyism”.10  
 
Rosenblum briefly mentions, for example, the case of Turkey, where the 
Constitutional Court has often referred to the principle of secularism as a justification 
for banning Islamist political parties by considering them existential threats to the 
state.11 The crucial problem with this approach, Rosenblum highlights, is that 
“Turkish separation of state and religion is one-directional, though; government is 
protected from religion but not vice versa”.12 I do not intend to address this subject 
here as it will be the topic of the tenth chapter. For now, the main implication of 
Rosenblum’s analysis is that we might have to be car ful in establishing when there 
is a legal and legitimate contestation of the existing political framework and when, 
instead, there is a clear attempt to subvert that framework. Once again, this is an 
empirical issue, not a normative one. Once it has been ascertained that a party 
represents an existential threat to the state, then i  may be concluded that that party is 
not abiding by the principle of loyal opposition tha  political parties ought to comply 
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This critical analysis of Rosenblum’s account therefor  shows that normative 
arguments, concerning the acceptable limits of party politics, can be drawn from the 
ideal conception of political parties that I presented in the first chapter. Loyal 
opposition, acknowledgment of pluralism and commitment to gaining power only 
through the legal means established by the regime in which they operate (e.g. in 
liberal democratic polities, through elections but not through violence) are the 
criteria parties ought to comply with in order to preserve their unique bilingual 
nature. Those parties which fail to abide by them should be banned.  
 
A clarification is required at this point. A party does not need to infringe all the 
normative criteria of party politics, in order to be anned. Theoretically, in a liberal 
democratic polity there might be, for example, a party which uses violent means in 
order to gain power, while still displaying loyal opposition (e.g. by not aiming to 
subvert the system in which it operates) and respecting pluralism. There might also 
be a party which aims to gain power through elections, displays loyal opposition but 
then reduces the space for party pluralism once in power (e.g. by introducing further 
criteria for banning rival political parties). Finally, a party might aim to gain power 
through elections, while respect party pluralism, only in order to subvert the existing 
constitutional and institutional framework once in power, thus contravening loyal 
opposition. Certainly these three ideal situations are unlikely in the real world. Most 
of the time, parties which threaten liberal democrati  institutions are likely to display 
two or all these features. From a normative perspective, however, it is not necessary 
that a party contravenes all the three criteria. The infringement of only one of the 
normative criteria of party politics warrants the banning of a political party. 
 
The present analysis also reveals the importance of ontextualization when deciding 
whether a party should be banned. Perhaps only the first criterion illustrated by 
Rosenblum, i.e. violent opposition, does not require a specific contextualization 
unless, of course, we want to raise the question of what counts as violence in 
different historical, institutional and political contexts. In liberal democratic polities, 
for example, violence is certainly banned from party politics. However, we could at 




pursuing political power. Yet this would almost radically contravene the way we 
commonly intend political parties, as testified by the list of definitions that I provided 
at the beginning of the first chapter.    
 
The second and third criteria illustrated by Rosenblum, i.e. incitement of hatred and 
existential threat to the state, require instead a careful assessment before being used 
as reasons for banning certain parties. For instance, when we consider the third 
criterion (as the example of Turkey provided by Rosenblum shows), states may 
arbitrarily use the existential threat argument in order to prevent any questioning of 
the political status quo, and of the institutional and constitutional framework, even 
when the latter may have lost the support of a considerable section of society. It is 
therefore important to contextualize the criteria proposed by Rosenblum in relation 
to variables such as the institutional framework of the relevant polity, the solidity of 
its democratic institutions and the effective size and strength of the allegedly 
dangerous party. A small religious extremist party, questioning the existing state 
institutions, operating within a strongly democratic environment, is certainly less 
dangerous, for example, than a similar party of larger dimensions operating within a 
more fragile democratic regime. These contextual aspect  must be carefully 
considered each time the decision to ban a party is taken into account. Moreover, as I 
will show in the second section of this chapter, there may often be normative 
grounds for tolerating the presence of allegedly antidemocratic or anti-system parties 
within democratic polities. Such parties might often represent a minimal threat to 
democracy but, at the same time, they might contribute to its constant renewal and 
self-criticism as well as to the moderation of extrmist claims. Balancing the two 
elements of this trade-off may often be crucial in order to decide what action should 
be taken and, consequently, to decide the fate of a democratic polity.        
 
Justifying the Banning of Political Parties: Samuel Issacharoff 
Samuel Issacharoff13 is the only other author, apart from Rosenblum, to have 
examined the rationale for banning political parties from a normative perspective. 
Issacharoff highlights how democracies have usually dopted several responses to 
                                                      




the threat presented by antidemocratic parties. Themost common include the 
exclusion of extremist parties from electoral competition (but not their banning), the 
restriction of the views and values that parties may advocate (both within and outside 
electoral campaigning) and the complete banning of antidemocratic parties.14  
 
The prohibition of certain parties is a radical response to antidemocratic behaviour. 
Issacharoff also emphasizes how the set of criteria for excluding certain parties 
“generally reflects the birth pangs of that particular society”.15 By defining the 
legitimate limits of democratic politics, that is, the constitutional arrangement of 
most countries also sets the limits for legitimate party politics. Consequently, “many 
countries prohibit political participation by parties that do not share the fundamental 
aims of the constitutional order”.16 More specifically, Issacharoff distinguishes three 
rationales for the banning of parties: prohibitions concerning “terrorist or 
insurrectionary groups”,17 those regarding “parties that align themselves with 
regional independence forces…that take a political st nce opposing the continued 
territorial integrity of the country”18 and prohibitions directed to parties which 
challenge the liberal democratic values embodied in the constitution, while endorsing 
electoral competition and majority rule. Whereas the former two, Issacharoff argues, 
are nothing but “minority attacks on the polity”,19 the third represents the greatest 
danger for democratic polities.  
 
Terrorist, insurrectionary and separatist parties, according to Issacharoff, are very 
unlikely to come into power and any decision to ban them “must stand or fall in 
relation to their commitment to peaceable as opposed to paramilitary forms of 
struggle for national separatism”.20 This subtle distinction highlighted by Issacharoff 
can be traced back, once again, to the normative crit ria of party politics that I 
presented in the first chapter. In this sense, terrorist and insurrectionary groups 
clearly display an infringement of the idea that parties ought to pursue power via 
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legal means. In the case of separatist parties, what matters is not their goal of secede 
from the polity in which they operate but the way they pursue such a goal. A party, 
that is, may advocate greater autonomy for a determin d region (or even 
independence) while acknowledging the legitimacy of the political framework in 
which it operates and attempting to achieve its goal s lely through the legal means 
established by that framework.21 This kind of separatist party would be fully 
compatible with the normative criteria of party politics. In a liberal democratic 
polity, therefore, a party ought to accept the idea th t the region for which it 
advocates greater autonomy or independence can legitimately become more 
autonomous or acquire independence only if this decision is democratically approved 
by all political parties (as representative of the citizens) or, in any case, through the 
democratic legal procedures of ordinary and constitutional politics (e.g. a 
referendum). A party which does not embrace this approach, but rather pursues 
regional autonomy and independence through terrorism or war, may legitimately be 
banned as it does not comply with the normative criteria of party politics and 
renounces its bilingualism. A similar argument could be made regarding those parties 
which pursue a double-edged strategy, by participating in democratic party politics 
while supporting parallel terrorist groups.22 Also in this case, the behaviour of such 
parties would contravene the normative criteria of party politics.  
 
Besides insurrectionary and separatist parties, Issacharoff examines what he 
considers the most problematic case, namely parties which “seek to use majoritarian 
democratic processes to dismantle liberal democracy, as in the case of Islamic parties 
seeking majority status for purposes of imposing cleri al law”.23 He uses, as an 
example, the banning of the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi - RP) in 1997 by the 
Turkish Constitutional Court, on the basis of the party’s alleged Islamist political 
claims and anti-secular attitude. I will extensively analyse the relationship between 
religious parties and secular establishment in Turkey in the tenth chapter. For now, I 
would like to focus on what Issacharoff has to say regarding the approach to the case 
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of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). The ECHR, he explains, 
condemned both the RP’s intention to establish a plurality of legal systems based on 
different religious creeds, analogous to the Ottoman illet system, and its appeal to 
the Islamic Sharī’a (i.e. the body of Islamic religious law which regulates public and 
private aspects of the lives of Muslims). Both were s en by the ECHR as 
jeopardizing democracy. The crucial point, yet, is that “[a]t no point did the ECHR 
demand proof of the imminence of democracy’s demise”.24 In other words, the 
ECHR endorsed the RP’s banning ruled by the Turkish Constitutional Court without 
any evident proof that the party was in fact about t  challenge the democratic system.  
 
This aspect points to a crucial question which arises when dealing with 
antidemocratic parties, namely how a democracy should deal with a party that 
declares it is democratic but in fact looks suspiciously antidemocratic.25 This 
problem is even more evident when we consider that “[r]elatively few parties openly 
announce their antidemocratic objectives. More typically…the antidemocratic nature 
of the party must be inferred from subtle contextual clues”.26 Here Issacharoff seems 
to conflate two separate problems. The antidemocratic goals of a party may be 
hidden (and, therefore, may have to be inferred) in two different meanings. They 
may simply remain concealed under the party’s official line before or during 
electoral campaigns. In this case, Issacharoff is right in suggesting that such 
antidemocratic tendencies should be deduced from specific hints in the party’s 
behaviour. Yet the antidemocratic goals may be “hidden” in the sense that they are 
deferred until the party is in power. The party may thus campaign on the basis of a 
democratic platform, in order to be elected, and then use its legitimately obtained 
power to implement an antidemocratic agenda.27 This is the main risk that any 
genuine democratic regime runs. Having renounced monistic conceptions of truth 
and embraced pluralism, modern democracies contain “the possibility of failure”.28 I 
am going to address this problem in the next section.      
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Political Parties, Hidden Antidemocratic Agendas and Performative Self-
Contradiction 
Issacharoff argues that “[t]he real definition of democracy must turn on the ability of 
majorities to be formed and re-formed over time andto remove from office those 
exercising governmental power”.29 Therefore allowing a greater role for religion in 
the public sphere, Issacharoff claims, is compatible with the renewability of consent 
which is crucial for elections and democratic politics. Reversible democratic 
decision-making, willingness to be voted out of office and renewability of consent 
are, for him, the crucial traits of electoral and democratic politics. Elections, he 
argues are “the best mechanism for ensuring the consent of the governed”.30 Yet 
commitment to renewability of consent is also a normative criterion of party politics. 
As I explained in the first chapter, political parties ought to seek power only through 
legal rather than violent means (e.g. terrorism, war etc.)31 and ought to be ready and 
willing to be voted out of office on the same grounds. In ideal terms, “partisans do 
not look to liquidate, erase or permanently disorganize the opposition…[P]artisans 
do not see minority status as irreversible…Partisans in the majority, too, recognize 
that their standing is partial and temporary…[P]artis nship entails commitment to the 
provisional nature of political authority”.32 This implies that the crucial criterion for 
banning political parties must appeal not merely to their willingness to take part in 
elections and only obtain power through elections, but also and especially to their 
readiness to be voted out of office and democratically accept that outcome. The 
criterion of reversibility, according to Issacharoff, also applies to specific political 
measures. Certain policies proposed, for example, by religious parties admit 
reversibility (e.g. state support of church schools) whereas others do not (e.g. 
excluding nonbelievers from public office). Renewability of consent and reversibility 
of policies provide therefore an additional normative criterion, grounded in the 
normative ideal of party politics, for establishing whether a party ought to be banned 
from democratic politics.33     
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This has important implications when dealing with those parties which accept 
renewability of consensus, propose revisable policies while campaigning, and then 
refuse to be voted out or implement non-revisable po icies once in power. In order to 
judge the behaviour of such parties, it is not necessary to appeal, for example, to the 
intrinsic value of democracy as we would then have to justify the latter on further 
normative grounds. Instead, we should simply appeal to the ideal of party politics 
that I presented in the first chapter and the normative criteria that stem from it. This 
might not help to resolve the empirical issue involved here, i.e. to foresee whether a 
party, which rhetorically endorses democracy, will be faithful to its claims once in 
power. Yet it provides a normative criterion for explaining why it ought to remain 
faithful to those obligations. Certainly this does not eliminate the fact that we should 
provide, wherever possible, the “proof of the imminence of democracy’s demise”34 
that the ECHR, as shown earlier, did not seek when dealing with the RP case in 
Turkey. 
 
My analysis could also be reconceptualized in this way. Insurrectionary and 
separatist parties, which promote their goals through violence or without respecting 
the common framework in which they operate, do not comply with the ideals of loyal 
opposition and the fine balance between partiality nd unity, particular and general 
principles they ought to abide by in order to preseve their unique bilingual nature. I 
would like to define the behaviour of these parties “latitudinal factionalism” as it 
concerns the metaphorically “spatial” dimension of party politics. These parties are 
only concerned with representing a fragment of the political spectrum. They ignore 
the other parts and the unity of the whole. They either want to secede from the polity 
or impose their factional views upon it. They are intrinsically divisive and contribute 
to weakening the unitary polity.  
 
Parties which accept electoral competition but not renewability of consensus and 
reversibility of policy decisions are instead guilty of what I define “longitudinal 
factionalism”, i.e. a factionalism which invests the temporal dimension. Rather than 
promoting a factional interest and violently imposing it upon the whole polity, they 
                                                      




promote a partisan interest, which may even be widely and democratically endorsed, 
but through a “one-way” process. They forfeit the openness to challenges which the 
normative criteria of party politics impose and, most importantly, they disregard the 
temporary nature of both majority and minority status, the principle that, ideally 
speaking, “partisanship entails commitment to the provisional nature of political 
authority”.35 By preventing a return to the status quo ante, and refusing to face the 
unpredictable political challenges which come from the future, these parties lock 
themselves into a tiny perpetual present, thus foregoing the dynamism that political 
parties ought to display. Both forms of factional degeneration represent therefore a 
denial of the normative criteria of party politics. 
 
This confirms once more why it is so important that p rties ought to abide by the 
normative criteria of party politics that I presentd in the first chapter. Although we 
can sometimes assess with some confidence the probability that an apparently 
democratic party will become antidemocratic once in power, there is no way, it must 
be reasserted, to foresee this with certainty. Adolf Hitler himself, for example, 
“swore under oath in court that he would seek and exercise power only by 
constitutional means”.36 Rather than concentrating on assessing the probabilities of 
an undemocratic shift, then, a normative political theorist must above all attempt to 
establish on which grounds we can condemn this shift. Only this will help to justify 
any institutional measure (e.g. constitutional checks, police state, army intervention, 
banning of undemocratic parties etc.) suited to prevent this challenge or confront it if 
it arises.  
 
Antidemocratic, Anti-System and Populist Parties 
The analysis that I have conducted so far in the present chapter has therefore 
attempted to show the link between the ideal conception of political party that I 
presented in the first chapter and the normative question concerning the acceptable 
restrictions on party politics. My main line of argument, developed in relation to 
Rosenblum and Issacharoff’s accounts, has been that those parties which, within 
liberal democratic polities, do not comply with the normative criteria stemming from 
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that ideal, should be banned. By displaying what I have defined “longitudinal” and 
“latitudinal” factionalism, such parties renounce their bilingualism and therefore 
should be excluded from the realm of party politics. However, in the second part of 
this chapter I am going to examine whether there might be stronger normative 
reasons for tolerating such parties within liberal democratic polities. There is always 
a risk, it must be admitted, that an undemocratic party, presenting its views more or 
less openly in the public political realm, might obtain power through democratic 
means and then subvert democracy once in power. Yet we should balance this risk 
against the potential benefits of integrating “dangerous” parties into the democratic 
game. 
 
In order to examine these issues more closely, in the second part of this chapter I will 
focus on a broad area of party scholarship which clearly highlights the empirical, 
conceptual and normative issues which characterize the relationship between 
political parties and democracy. This area of research, broadly intended, 
comprehends extremist right-wing (and, to some extent, l ft-wing) political parties 
which display allegedly undemocratic features. Some authors highlight the openly 
undemocratic or antidemocratic character of these parties. Others emphasize their 
“anti-system” and “semi-loyal” character, i.e. the fact that they may observe 
democratic norms only rhetorically but aim to subvert them in practice. Other 
scholars stress instead their populist nature and their monistic conception of the 
political community.37 Analysing some of these accounts might help us to understand 
whether we should prevent such parties from operating within liberal democratic 
polities.  
 
Political parties and Democracy 
Many accounts of extremist or populist parties attempt to provide an exhaustive 
definition of the key features which characterize such parties. Disagreement is often 
present, between different authors, regarding the exact meanings of the labels 
                                                      
37 For these classifications, see Roger Eatwell, “Introduction: The New Extreme Right Challenge”, in 
Roger Eatwell and Cas Mudde (eds.), Western Democracies and the New Extreme Right Challenge 




“extremist”, “populist”, “radical” etc.38 Yet all authors normally agree on a 
minimalist definition of political parties, analogous to the one that I presented in the 
first chapter. Cas Mudde, for example, defines a party s “any political group 
identified by an official label that places candidates for public office through 
elections”.39 Piero Ignazi, instead, identifies parties with “those (somewhat stable) 
organizations that regularly compete for elections in Western Europe”.40 Indeed a 
narrow definition is potentially able to accommodate a greater number of party 
features and party typologies than a thicker one.  
 
Most accounts of anti-system, extremist and populist parties, however, fail to provide 
a clear and unbiased definition of democracy, often simply assuming that such 
parties are intrinsically undemocratic. I am not interested, at this stage, in 
distinguishing these different typologies of parties (e.g. radical, populist, anti-
system) from each other. These differences will hopefully emerge from my 
subsequent analysis. What I am stressing is that failing to provide a satisfactory 
definition of democracy may lead to inaccurate conclusions regarding the 
relationship between these parties and democracy, and the acceptable (democratic) 
boundaries of party politics. In other words, there might be normative reasons why 
allegedly undemocratic or antidemocratic parties might in fact contribute in 
enhancing certain aspects of liberal democratic regim s.     
 
Democracy has been defined in multiple ways throught the centuries and there are 
still several strands in democratic theory today.41 The basic definition of democracy 
as “the rule of the people”, which goes back to the semantic roots of the term, has 
been interpreted and implemented in endless different ways, often raising the 
question of whether democracy means anything at all. Both the term “rule” and the 
term “people” have been attributed diverse meanings, thus leading to the conception 
of very different models of democracy, e.g. direct vs. representative democracy, 
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elitist democracy, deliberative democracy etc.42 Although this may make it difficult 
to define democracy in an uncontroversial way, it can at least help to avoid 
identifying democracy tout court with a specific democratic model, e.g. 
liberal/representative democracy. The importance of this distinction will become 
clearer later in the chapter. 
 
The controversial and ambiguous meaning of democracy is also testified by the fact 
that even those political actors which are ordinarily considered undemocratic in the 
everyday political discourse emphasize the goodness and positive aspects of 
democracy. It is difficult to find political parties which openly reject democracy tout 
court, at least rhetorically. More often, these political actors simply aim to fight the 
“flawed” version of democracy in which they operate and to replace it with the 
“true” democracy that they represent. Certainly some extreme right parties (e.g. 
Fascist and National Socialist), at least in the past, have rejected not merely a 
specific (e.g. liberal) kind of democracy but democracy tout court, i.e. “the 
fundamental principle of the sovereignty of the peopl ”.43 Many contemporary 
extreme right and populist parties, however, claim to be the authentic representatives 
of the people, who are systematically ignored by the mainstream political 
establishment.44 For instance the French National Front (Front National - FN), an 
extreme right party, does not reject democracy tout court. Instead it invokes a 
democratic model alternative to representative democracy and characterized by a 
strong Presidency and by the systematic use of referenda as channels of expression 
for “the will of a re-forged holistic French people”.45 This may certainly be 
inconsistent with certain basic tenets of liberal democracy (e.g. individual and 
minority rights). Yet it might be more difficult to argue that the FN’s approach is 
undemocratic. It simply invokes a more direct model of democracy (than the one 
within which it operates), perhaps lacking some of the checks and balances which 
characterize liberal democratic regimes but not calling for the total demise of 
democracy itself. Several other extreme right parties, such as the German 
Republicans (Die Republikaner - REP), the Belgian Flemish Block (Vlaams Blok - 
                                                      
42 David Held, Models of Democracy (Cambridge: Polity, 2006), pp.1-8. 
43 Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, p.31. 
44 Eatwell, “Introduction: The New Extreme Right Challenge”, p.3. 




VB) and the Dutch Centre Party (Centrumpartij - CP) have constantly invoked direct 
democracy as a means for giving back the power to the people.46 
 
We might therefore argue that parties such as the FN or the REP do not intrinsically 
reject democracy. In fact, they instrumentally endorse representative democracy and 
use it to pursue a political agenda which would culminate with the establishment of a 
more direct democracy. This suggests that the antidemocratic label often attached to 
such parties is not entirely justified. These parties end to make a distinction between 
liberal (representative) and direct democracy, and to endorse the latter as it provides 
a better way of translating the will of the people into political power. However, most 
of them are willing to accept to work within the limits and through the mechanisms 
of representative democracy in order to pursue their direct democracy project.47   
 
This makes it difficult to consider such parties dangerous for democracy tout court. 
Yet it might plausibly be argued that it would be difficult to conceive a democratic 
regime lacking the check and balances, and the protecti n of individual rights from 
government power, which characterize liberal democratic polities. The kind of 
democracy these parties advocate can thus be considered incompatible with basic 
liberal democratic principles. As the polities in which the parties examined here 
operate are liberal democratic, it might be concluded that these parties should be 
banned as they do not comply with the normative criterion of loyal opposition 
political parties ought to abide by. Indeed, most extreme right parties invoke a 
“nativist democracy”, i.e. the idea that “a state should comprise ‘natives’ and that 
‘nonnatives’ are to be treated with hostility”.48 In this conception, the political 
community is identified with the indigenous ethnic community and therefore 
immigrants and strangers are excluded from democratic politics. The ideas of an 
“ethnic democracy” and an “ethnic referendum” crucially violate key elements of 
liberal democracy, such as individual and minority rights.49   
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However, there might be two answers to this argument. First, as I explained, such 
parties normally pursue their goals via legal means, i.e. they participate in elections 
rather than performing insurrectionary or terrorist activities. Furthermore, they 
acknowledge the legitimacy of the liberal democrati frameworks in which they 
operate, while aiming to replace them with more direct forms of democratic rule 
once in power. Therefore there are no normative grounds, we might argue, for 
excluding these parties from democratic politics onthe basis of an alleged 
undemocratic or antidemocratic attitude. We must accept that democracy is a 
multilayered concept which also includes the variants i voked by many extreme 
right parties. These parties should therefore be allowed into the public political realm 
of liberal democratic polities.     
 
Indeed, even if we consider non-extremist parties, different conceptions of 
democracy might lead to different classifications of antidemocratic parties. A 
minimal procedural conception of democracy, for example, characterized by free 
elections, full suffrage and civil liberties, would result in considering very few 
parties undemocratic. However, a more expansive conception, including economic, 
social and cultural rights, would certainly increas the number of antidemocratic 
parties.50 Differences would also emerge depending on the specific polity considered. 
A party opposing advanced welfare rights, for example, would certainly be 
considered antidemocratic in Norway, where the dominant conception of democracy 
involves also social and economic rights, but not in the United States, where 
democracy normally has a narrower meaning.51 Any attempt to individuate 
antidemocratic parties is therefore rendered problematic by the multilayered meaning 
of democracy and by the variety of models of democracy. Contextualization, in these 
circumstances, is very much needed.  
 
Furthermore, democracy is often attributed an intrinsically positive connotation and 
“a legitimacy-conferring capacity”;52 this makes it difficult to find political actors 
willing to completely reject it. Even dictators often appeal to democracy in order to 
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confer credibility and legitimacy to their rule, emphasizing how their regime replaces 
“fake” with “true” democracy.53 The by-product of this tendency to stretch the 
meaning of democracy is that the term has acquired a very broad and vague 
connotation. This makes it difficult to set the boundary beyond which claims to 
democracy cannot be accepted and prefixes can no longer be attached to it.54 It also 
shows that democracy is somehow a scalar value. We might be able to judge 
different parties or regimes more or less democratic but it might be difficult to draw 
a clear line to establish where democracy ends and undemocratic behaviour begins.  
 
Nevertheless, for the sake of my argument, I will take for granted that the kinds of 
parties examined here ought to be banned because they reject the basic tenets of the 
liberal democratic regimes in which they operate, th refore infringing the normative 
criterion of loyal opposition.55 Still the adoption of extreme pre-emptive measures 
(e.g. banning) against such parties might drastically restrict the boundaries of 
democratic partisan politics. Indeed the discrimination against a political actor (e.g. 
an extreme right party) on the basis of its ideology risks leading to authoritarian 
outcomes.56 Furthermore, the kind of political extremism embodied by the old 
totalitarian ideologies of the 1920s and 1930s has nowadays faded.57 This makes it 
paradoxical that most European democracies still decide to deal with extremist 
threats by adopting a “militant” approach, characterized by state repression and 
special legislation against such parties.58 Indeed in most European countries in the 
1920s and 1930s, democracy “was ‘killed from above’, rather than ‘taken from 
below’”.59 It was often the government in charge, or the institutional elites, that 
suspended democratic rights and guarantees in orderto prevent the rise of extremist 
parties. Only in a few cases (Fascists and Nazis) did extremist parties gain power by 
playing the democratic game. Furthermore, contrary to Fascist, Nazi and Communist 
parties in inter-war Europe, extremist parties in contemporary Europe have often 
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been integrated into the democratic game.60  
 
I would therefore argue that the adoption of pre-emptive (antidemocratic) legislation 
aiming to restrict the legitimate boundaries of party politics, in order to prevent the 
risk of extremist parties gaining power through democratic means, should be treated 
very carefully. On the one hand, it could lead to antidemocratic authoritarian 
outcomes, therefore defying the scope itself of such measures. On the other hand, it 
would prevent the process of moderation and democratization that extremist parties 
might undergo, if allowed to enter democratic politics. Pluralistic deliberation 
conducted through political parties can be a vital instrument for channelling religious 
claims into the public political realm in a way tha f vours democracy. Participation 
in party politics can have a formative effect upon societal demands, including 
extremist ones, originating a process of “democrati cculturation”.61 Once an 
extremist group has made the initial minimal effort f creating a party and entering 
the democratic game, this process might often contribute in increasing its compliance 
with the rules and constraints of democratic electoral politics. From a merely 
instrumental perspective, its members might soon realize that it is rewarding (e.g. in 
terms of consensus, public recognition etc.) for them to abide by the rules of party 
politics, unless they wish to abandon party politics and pursue their objectives 
through non-partisan means (e.g. terrorist movements, interest groups, church 
activity etc.). From a normative perspective, however, what matters most is that the 
members of the newly created party become subject to the normative criteria of party 
politics. They might soon learn that they ought to display loyal opposition and 
“recognize that they are ‘parts’ of an overarching system and that the elimination of 
others is neither possible nor desirable”.62 Through this learning process, parties 
might therefore become more respectful of liberal democratic institutions.63 
 
However, even before this learning process is enactd, we might argue that entering 
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party politics represents in itself “a minimal effort to cast goals in terms that apply 
beyond themselves, to argue that what is good for the group is also a public good”.64 
Especially if the founders of a party are aware of the normative criteria of party 
politics, by creating a party they implicitly commit to becoming subject to those 
criteria. Even if they decide not to comply with them, they provide us with strong 
normative grounds for criticizing their behaviour and, in extreme cases, for banning 
them from democratic politics. In this sense, parties cannot simply be imposed from 
above (e.g. by the state) in order to moderate religious or other particularist claims 
and convey them into the public political realm in a way that favours democracy. 
Only the minimal effort to create a religious party, and therefore the voluntary 
character of party politics, can justify the virtuous circle of democratic acculturation. 
The state may facilitate this process, e.g. by opening the public political realm to 
such parties or by providing them with financial support, but it cannot take the 
initiative of politicizing religious or other societal groups without undermining this 
process 
 
Liberalizing party politics, by allowing particularist (i.e. religious, ethnic etc.) parties 
to be formed, might lead to a “virtuous cycle” of democratization65 and to the 
gradual moderation of the comprehensive views and values conveyed by these 
parties. Democracy and electoral competition might have a formative role and trigger 
political integration. Allowing such parties to entr party politics, therefore, might 
contribute in moderating and democratizing their claims.66 Religious groups entering 
party politics, for example, might soon realize that they ought to “accept that they are 
not the one and universal faith”.67 Being subject to these normative constraints is 
certainly more likely to render such parties more moderate. If left to pursue their 
goals outside the realm of party politics, such groups might reinforce their 
idiosyncratic claims and therefore become more dangerous for democratic politics, 
as I will extensively illustrate in the seventh chapter. Party politics, I will explain 
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there, is especially valuable for conveying the transformative power of deliberation 
and guaranteeing an inclusive public debate open to particularistic (e.g. religious) 
claims 
 
Perhaps, though, we should not ground an argument for tolerating the presence of 
allegedly “dangerous” or extremist parties in liberal democratic polities in the mere 
hope that they will in fact undergo a process of moderation as this conclusion might 
be contested on empirical grounds. Yet we might safely argue, as I will extensively 
in the seventh chapter when analysing religious parties, that the exclusion of 
extremist groups from democratic party politics is likely not to enhance their 
eagerness to compromise and negotiate on political matters and therefore become 
accustomed to democracy. If excluded from the public political realm, their views 
are not going to be exposed to public scrutiny and challenges and therefore they are 
more likely to be reinforced by a limited and self-r erential deliberation. This may 
intensify divisions and render these groups even more disruptive of democratic 
politics. 
 
Given the reasons illustrated here, there might not often be sufficient normative 
grounds for adopting antidemocratic or authoritarian measures in order to protect 
existing democratic regimes from extremist, allegedly antidemocratic parties. Once 
we have clarified the complexity of the term “democracy”, and its broad meaning, it 
becomes difficult to use the protection of democracy s an argument for limiting 
democracy itself and excluding certain parties from the democratic game. 
Democracy is a complex and multilayered concept, it can be reconciled with the 
ideologies and manifestoes of most political parties, ncluding extremist ones. Unless 
a party rejects the basic democratic idea of electoral politics, we cannot exclude it 
from democratic politics simply because it endorses non-liberal forms of democratic 
rule.  
 
However, even assuming that the kinds of parties examined here represent a threat to 
the liberal democratic polities in which they operat , we should be careful in 




democratic game. Of course a party which openly invoked the total demise of 
political democracy, including the minimal criterion f electoral rule, should clearly 
be excluded from democratic politics, as soon as its goals were ascertained. This 
would be justified by the need to preserve the basic democratic framework. Yet, as I 
will illustrate more extensively in the next section, very few parties openly advocate 
this strategy, preferring instead to conceal their antidemocratic project behind an 
apparently democratic facade.  
 
Anti-System and Semi-Loyal Political Parties   
Several accounts in party politics literature focus on the so-called “anti-system”68 
and “semi-loyal” (or even “disloyal”)69 political parties. There are two main sets of 
meanings normally attached to these concepts. First, “an anti-system opposition does 
not share the values of the political order within which it operates”.70 Anti-system 
parties, that is, do not express an opposition on specific issues but an “opposition of 
principle”,71 i.e. a disloyal opposition, not complying with the normative ideal of 
party politics. They display an ideological distance from the other parties along the 
political space and aim to delegitimize the regime in which they operate. Anti-
systemness, in this sense, is a relational category.72 It indicates the relationship 
between a party and the regime in which it operates, i. . in principle also a non-
democratic regime. Anti-systemness, therefore, is not the same as anti-
democraticness. Second, in democratic polities anti-system parties may observe 
democratic norms rhetorically but aim to subvert them in practice, their democratic 
standard style being “in contrast with their ‘esoteric’ discourse and real 
behaviour”.73 The former aspect indicates the goal of anti-system parties, whereas 
the latter refers to the way such goals are pursued.  
 
These two elements may combine to different degrees. The former is certainly 
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indispensible for defining a party “anti-system”. Yet anti-system parties may present 
their anti-system views more or less openly. In liberal democratic polities, the 
greatest danger is represented by those parties which, as well as playing by the rules 
of the democratic game, do not present their (anti-system) views in public but aim to 
implement them once they have been democratically elected. Other parties, however, 
while preserving their anti-systemness and opposition of principle to the regime in 
which they operate, may also choose to fully present their views in public, therefore 
submitting them to the test of democracy and electoral politics. This may also confer 
greater legitimacy to their views, should they be endorsed on their merits by the 
electors.         
 
Giovanni Capoccia74 emphasizes how the label “anti-system”, within democracies, is 
especially used to describe those parties which play the democratic game with the 
objective of destroying it. Such parties may include older European totalitarian 
parties and contemporary radical Islamic fundamentalist parties in new 
democracies.75 Yet, according to Capoccia, the presence of such parties is “a 
fundamental logical necessity, in democracies”.76 As democracy represents the 
institutionalization of political dissent, “there can be, in abstract, no a priori 
limitation on the degree of dissent that an opposition can voice”.77 Democracy, that 
is, must allow the presence of parties which reject the basic principles themselves of 
democracy, including the right to dissent. Put in different words, “[n]o regime, least 
of all a democratic regime, which permits the articulation and organization of all 
political positions, is without a disloyal opposition”.78    
 
This conclusion seems to entail that, contrary to what I have argued so far throughout 
the thesis, we should not ban those political parties which infringe the normative 
criterion of loyal opposition. However, we might have to distinguish, first, between 
those anti-system parties which present their views in public and those which conceal 
them until they are in power. The latter, I believe, contravene an important aspect of 
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democratic politics, i.e. the principle of publicity. Democracy certainly represents the 
institutionalization of political dissent. Yet, as deliberative democrats would 
certainly highlight, one of the crucial conditions of this is that dissenting opinions 
should be publicly expressed.79 Indeed publicity “can screen out narrowly self-
interested arguments”.80 As clearly stated by Immanuel Kant, a maxim “which I 
cannot publicly acknowledge without thereby inevitably arousing the resistance of 
everyone to my plans, can only have stirred up this necessary and 
general...opposition against me because it is itself unjust and thus constitutes a threat 
to everyone”.81  
 
Those parties which play the democratic game in order to impose their concealed 
undemocratic views once in power are therefore contravening one of the crucial 
tenets of democratic politics, i.e. the test of publicity. We can safely argue that such 
parties, should they openly present their views in the democratic arena, would most 
likely be rejected by the voters in a democratic electoral context. The fact that they 
choose to keep their views hidden from public view, ith the intention of 
implementing them once in power, is a signal of their awareness that they would not 
pass the test of publicity. Therefore, although democracy “permits the articulation 
and organization of all political positions”,82 these parties are not actually articulating 
their views and positions. Articulating one’s views means expressing them and, 
consequently, offering them to public scrutiny. Capoccia’s argument might therefore 
have some weight for justifying and accepting, within democratic regimes, the 
presence of those anti-system and disloyal parties which are willing to present their 
views in public and to offer them to the test of public opinion. Yet it does not seem 
to provide valid arguments for accepting or justifying, on democratic grounds (i.e. as 
a logical necessity of democracy), those parties whose hidden agenda aims to destroy 
democracy by playing the democratic game.  
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However, as I already suggested in the previous section, a democratic regime should 
be ready to take the risk of tolerating such parties. Democracy involves “the 
possibility of failure”83 and pre-emptive measures to prevent the rise of anti-system 
parties with a hidden antidemocratic agenda should be carefully evaluated as they 
might risk leading to antidemocratic and authoritarian outcomes. Furthermore, any 
political party might theoretically adopt antidemocratic measures once it has gained 
power through democratic means. Therefore, if we had to pursue the pre-emptive 
measures route consistently, we ought to ban all political parties in democratic 
regimes, due to the potential risk that they might turn antidemocratic once in power. 
Moreover, we should always put emphasis on the process of democratic 
acculturation that party politics might contribute in fostering. By providing an 
inclusive political realm, and allowing party pluralism to flourish, we might render a 
greater service to democracy than by preventing “suspicious” parties from entering 
democratic politics and relegating them to the margins of political life, where their 
members would most likely pursue more dangerous and democracy-threatening 
avenues to achieve their goals.  
 
There might also be another reason why we should not always ban anti-system 
parties, despite their lack of compliance with the normative criterion of loyal 
opposition which characterizes my ideal conception f party politics. Loyal 
opposition, I explained in the first chapter, presupposes in ideal terms a pre-existing 
constitutional and institutional democratic consensus. Only this makes it possible, for 
political parties, to promote particularistic conceptions of the good while respecting 
the political framework in which they operate, thus preserving their bilingualism. In 
the absence of this framework, parties may end up fighting each other over the very 
foundations of the regime in which they operate. They would be reduced to 
monolingual factions, with no common institutional idiom to share.    
 
Sometimes, however, the constitutional and institutional consensus in which loyal 
opposition is grounded might weaken and the fundamental values of the polity might 
no longer be recognized as legitimate by the whole s ciety. This might happen due to 
                                                      




various reasons (social, historical, economical etc.). It is in these cases that anti-
system parties are most likely to arise. They are the signals that the segment of 
society they represent no longer shares the institutional and constitutional consensus. 
Most importantly, the presence of anti-system parties may often signal that what had 
always been considered as the legitimate constitutional and institutional order of the 
polity, had in fact always lacked the support and consensus of a part of the 
population and, therefore, democratic legitimacy. This shows that parties can be 
important agents of democratic change. I will illustrate a clear example of this in the 
tenth chapter when I assess the case of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve 
Kalkinma Partisi - AKP) in Turkey. The AKP, more than any other Islamist party in 
Turkey, has been trying to foster a democratization of Turkey’s institutional 
framework by questioning the democratic legitimacy of Turkey’s strongly secular 
constitutional arrangement.  
 
Excluding anti-system parties from the political game of liberal democratic polities 
would therefore mean excluding one of its logically necessary components and 
preventing the political consensus from being reassssed in the light of these 
dissenting voices and of societal changes. Certainly in a genuinely democratic 
regime this kind of political reassessment is going to be an almost continuous 
process. This means that anti-system parties are likely to be present virtually at all 
times in democratic regimes, and to question the democratically established political 
consensus of the polity. Anti-system parties are therefore very much necessary for 
the health of democracy and for guaranteeing the pluralistic unanimity of party 
politics. 
 
Once again, we should also recall that the process of democratic acculturation that I 
highlighted in the previous section, and which represents an important implication of 
party politics, might often contribute in integrating anti-system parties into the 
mainstream democratic framework of a polity. For example, the former Italian 
Communist Party (Partito Comunista Italiano – PCI), initially considered an anti-
system party, especially after 1956 became increasingly committed to the principles 




conceive the socialist transformation of the Italian polity only as the result of a 
democratic process, not of an armed revolution.84 This also led the PCI to rethink its 
long-term project of a socialist society in terms compatible with democracy. The 
leadership of the PCI, that is, gradually became more c nvinced that a democratic 
socialism would be possible in Italy.85 Perhaps if the PCI had been excluded from the 
democratic game, rather than being allowed to integra  and undergo a process of 
democratic acculturation, the Italian democracy would have been seriously 
undermined.  
 
Non-participation in party politics and the exclusion of particularistic claims from 
the democratic game is likely to lead to their radic lization. Political parties can 
contribute in providing a pluralistic deliberation able to channel and moderate 
religious and other perfectionist claims in a way that favours democracy. This was 
the main reason why I criticized Rawls’s political liberalism in the first chapter. By 
excluding unreasonable views from the public political realm, I argued, his theory 
prevented the parties conveying such views from contributing to enhancing liberal 
democracy.  
 
Monism, Populism and Political Parties 
I would like to conclude this chapter by focusing on two further features which are 
usually attributed to extremist parties, especially right-wing ones, i.e. monism and 
populism. Extreme right parties are often considere carriers of holistic worldviews; 
they are “‘monist’ rather than ‘pluralist’, believing that there is only one true way”.86 
This approach can be traced back to the ancient Greece’s holistic conception of the 
political community, which involved a rejection of divisions and factions.87 As I 
extensively illustrated in the third chapter, monism is likely to lead to authoritarian 
forms of politics and, consequently, to prevent theinstitutionalization of political 
dissent, of which democracy and party politics are the clearest expressions.  
 
In the ideology of extreme right parties, monism is tightly linked to the concept of 
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“populist democracy”, i.e. the belief, already examined in this chapter in relation to 
direct democracy, “that the volonté générale should be implemented without any 
restrictions”.88 This conception of democracy is rooted in the famous Rousseauian 
statement that the general will cannot “bind itself for the future”.89 Populist radical 
right parties combine this view with their monistic outlook and, consequently, 
criticize established political parties, which are th clearest expressions of pluralistic 
dissent as well as of the mediated kind of politics which characterizes representative 
liberal democratic regimes.90 Indeed many populist parties manifest an explicit anti-
party attitude, they “are paradoxical in the sense that they are political parties that 
reject the legitimacy of parties”.91 In this sense, they “confront both the political 
pluralism that is the universal circumstance of parties and the actuality of parties. 
Their party is a means to erase or repress the rest”.92 They aim to re-establish a 
whole without parts, a polity without parties (except one). The one-party system that 
they aim to impose relies on philosophical holism and aims “to erase pluralism, 
above all partisan political pluralism”.93  
 
Populist parties endorse the following principles: the idea of plebiscitary politics (i.e. 
all decisions should be scrutinized by the people through referenda and people’s 
initiatives); the personalization of power and the call for a more personalized 
political system based on direct democracy, rather an on intermediate bodies and 
artificial divisions based on special interests; the primacy of the political, i.e. the idea 
that rule of the people should not be hindered by the rule of law (e.g. constitutional 
rights).94 The result is “an extreme form of majoritarian democracy, in which 
minority rights can exist only as long as the majority supports them”,95 a view 
certainly not compatible with the basic tenets of liberal democracy. Due to its 
monistic and plebiscitarian character, direct democracy may undermine the tolerance 
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and compromise which characterize representative liberal democracies, as it does not 
provide guarantees for minorities and dissenting indiv duals. The systematic use of 
referenda may also weaken those intermediate bodies placed between state and civil 
society, such as political parties.96  
 
These points signal a crucial clash between populist parties’ goals and the normative 
criteria of party politics. Their plea for a pure direct democracy, lacking any check 
and balances as well as the constitutional protection of individual rights, radically 
conflicts with the basic tenets of the liberal democratic regimes in which they 
operate. Furthermore, the unmediated kind of democracy they advocate irremediably 
conflicts with the mediating function party bilingualism ought to provide. As the 
almost paradoxical “anti-party” sentiment, displayed by these parties, testifies, their 
goals are in principle incompatible with the scope its lf of party politics. The pure 
direct democracy they aim to establish once in power would no longer need political 
parties. Given their endorsement of political monism, and the essential 
irreconcilability of their conception of democracy with basic liberal democratic 
principles, it might therefore be concluded that populist parties ought to be banned 
from liberal democracies.  
 
Nevertheless, as I have already explained earlier in this chapter, there might be 
normative grounds for treating any decision to ban such parties carefully. Any 
measure aiming to exclude certain parties from the political game of liberal 
democratic polities would potentially risk jeopardizing democracy from above. 
Furthermore, the parties considered here often havevery small chances of gaining 
control of government within liberal democratic polities. Banning them might imply 
undermining democracy from above as well as relegatin  them to the margins of 
political life. This would prevent their views from being challenged and checked in 
public, thus precluding any potential process of democratic acculturation. 
 
Furthermore, as in the case of anti-system parties, also populist parties might provide 
a positive contribution in liberal democratic polities. As highlighted by Margaret 
                                                      




Canovan,97 populist parties often remind us that even contemporary liberal 
democratic polities are characterized by both a “redemptive” and a “pragmatic” side. 
On the one hand, that is, politics is the everyday business of running complex 
societies in a complex world, by using institutions to limit power and make it 
effective. On the other hand, politics is a means of alvation, its ideal being that of 
direct popular government. When these two dimensions become too distant from 
each other, Canovan argues, populists enter this empty territory and promise to 
renew democratic politics.98 Populist parties, that is, are there to remind us that
democratic politics does need some occasional upsurge of faith as a means of 
renewal.  
 
Populism, in this sense, makes similar claims to participatory and deliberative 
democracy, by emphasizing the importance of grassroot  political participation, and 
of a transparent and direct relationship between popular will and political decisions.99 
Therefore populist parties might simply remind us of the potential flaws that liberal 
democratic regimes may sometimes present. These may include the lack of 
opportunities, for citizens, to channel their demands into the public political realm, 
the excessive concentration of power in the hands of an elite of representatives and, 
more generally, the lack of a transparent relationship between popular will and 
political decisions. Despite all their flaws, therefor , populist parties might still play 
an important role, as warning agents, for liberal democracies. We should take this 
aspect into account when deciding whether we should simply ban them because they 
partly contravene the normative criteria of party politics.  
  
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have examined the normative problem of establishing the acceptable 
limits of party politics. In the first part, I focused on the relationship between my 
ideal conception of party politics and the criteria for banning political parties. In the 
second part, I focused more closely on antidemocratic, nti-system and populist 
parties which may represent a threat to democratic regimes. I concluded that, 
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although these kinds of parties infringe the normative criteria of party politics, and 
therefore may represent a real threat for liberal democratic polities, there might often 
be stronger normative reasons for tolerating them. Allowing “dangerous” groups to 
create parties and enter democratic politics might therefore be the best way of 
reinforcing democracy itself. Excluding them may lead, on the one hand, to the 
radicalization of such groups, which may therefore become a greater danger for 
democracy and, on the other hand, to the adoption of antidemocratic and 
authoritarian measures which may destroy democracy f om above.      
 
In the fifth and sixth chapters, I will devise a normative theory of “deliberative 
perfectionism” and defend a model of democratic deliberation grounded on 
pragmatist epistemology. By analysing and playing against each other the work of 
Jürgen Habermas,100 George Sher101 and Cheryl Misak,102 I will unveil the normative 
connections between a meta-ethical theory of pluralistic perfectionism and 
democratic deliberation. Sher, I believe, provides one of the most convincing and 
comprehensive contemporary defences of political perfectionism, also thanks to his 
systematic analysis and rejection of political neutrality. Habermas’s work is instead 
quite useful to my aim both for his pragmatist and deliberative account of the 
concept of “intentionality”, alternative to Sher’s, and for the distinction that he 
makes between ethical and moral discourses in public de beration, a distinction that 
I will reject. Finally, Misak devises an innovative theory which, despite some flaws 
that I will highlight, provides interesting normative grounds for and inclusive and 
democratic conception of political deliberation. Despite its highly abstract character, 
this analysis will help me: a) to justify why deliberation is required for legitimizing 
the promotion of perfectionist values in the public political realm; b) to formulate an 
inclusive model of deliberation, overcoming the distinction between moral and 
ethical discourses defended by Habermas; c) to establish an intrinsic conceptual (and 
normative) link between perfectionism, deliberation and partisan identity.  
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I will subsequently endorse a specific model of democratic deliberation grounded on 
pragmatist epistemology as it provides a more inclusive character than other 
deliberative models and offers sounder justifications for democratic deliberation. By 
establishing an intrinsic connection between truth, inquiry and experience, I will 
conclude, pragmatism provides the rationale for a democratic deliberation which 
mirrors some of the crucial characteristics of political parties, namely their tendency 
to submit themselves to the trial of elections and their inclination to present, assess 
and modify their policy proposals before other parties and the public. In this sense, 
this model provides the theoretical explication of certain democratic features that 
parties intrinsically possess, on the basis of the definition that I provided in the first 
chapter. Moreover, this model guarantees the presenc  of a set of basic rights 
establishing the legitimate limits of democratic delib ration and of the policy 
proposals that parties may be able to implement once i  power. These basic rights 
are built within the process itself of deliberation, rather than being an insulated set of 






Chapter 5 - Deliberative Perfectionism: Why Should We Talk About 
the Good? 
 
In contemporary political theory, perfectionists believe that the state should promote 
substantive conceptions of the good through its legislative action. Perfectionists 
provide various reasons for their claims: some of them emphasize the intrinsic value 
of certain human goals, traits and activities; others nvisage a connection between 
the promotion of substantive conceptions of the good and the nurturing of individual 
autonomy. Supporters of neutrality, instead, claim that the state should refrain from 
legislating on the basis of substantive conceptions of the good. Some of them argue 
that the individual is the only or best judge of her interest; others claim that 
conceptions of the good are too controversial and cannot constitute valid grounds for 
political action; others, finally, emphasize that state perfectionism may threaten 
individual freedom and autonomy.1  
 
In this chapter I will analyse perfectionism in relation to Jürgen Habermas’s2 theory 
of communicative action. First, I will briefly examine Habermas’s conception of 
deliberative democracy and the distinction that Habermas draws between moral and 
ethical forms of deliberation. Subsequently, I will analyse Habermas’s idea of 
discourse in relation to the perfectionist model proposed by George Sher.3 In this 
way I will attempt to illustrate the convergence betw en the two perspectives and to 
provide the rationale for universal ethical discourses. I will argue that, by shifting 
from an ethical to a meta-ethical dimension, we can establish the legitimate grounds 
of a model of deliberation encompassing ethical matters (that is, questions 
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concerning the good life) not confined to the limits of specific communities or forms 
of life. Therefore, I will claim, political perfectionism must be conducted and 
legitimated through deliberation and discourse because discourse itself is involved in 
the way in which we establish, at the meta-ethical level, why and on which grounds 
something is valuable.  
 
I will then argue, in the next chapter, that Cheryl Misak’s4 pragmatist conception of 
democratic deliberation helps in overcoming some of the difficulties arising from 
George Sher and Jürgen Habermas’s accounts. This theory, I will show, establishes 
an intrinsic connection between truth, inquiry and experience, and between 
perfectionism, pluralism and democracy. On the one hand, it offers normative 
grounds for endorsing an inclusive conception of the public political sphere. On the 
other hand, it provides the rationale for a democratic deliberation which mirrors 
some of the normative criteria of party politics, namely parties’ requirement to 
submit themselves to the trial of elections and to present, assess and modify their 
policy proposals before other parties and the public. 
 
Jürgen Habermas: Deliberative Politics and the Distinction between Ethical and 
Moral Discourses 
Habermas5 intends to overcome two common paradigms of deliberative politics: the 
liberal one, in which “the government is represented as an apparatus of public 
administration, and society as a market-structured n twork of interactions among 
private persons”,6 and the republican model, in which “politics is con eived as the 
reflective form of substantial ethical life”.7 The former, according to Habermas, 
conceives the dualism between state and civil society as almost inescapable, due to 
the notions of justice and basic principles on which it is grounded. The latter relies 
instead on a pre-existing convergence of established ethical principles and conceives 
deliberative action as a mere means for self-understanding by an already identified 
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ethical community. This is not compatible, Habermas argues, with the social 
pluralism which characterizes modern societies.8 Against liberal and republican 
paradigms, Habermas proposes therefore a discursive mod l of deliberative politics. 
In this model, what is institutionalized is not a set of basic rights insulated from 
opinion- and will-formation but a set of communicaton rules and procedures, 
different from substantive principles but still able to establish a common ground for 
intersubjective understanding and potential agreement.9 According to Habermas, 
reasonable pluralism can coexist with a shared referenc  to a common 
institutionalized vocabulary of communicative rules and procedures. 
 
The main aspect of Habermas’s conception of deliberative politics on which I would 
like to concentrate here is the distinction that he draws between moral and ethical 
discourses. The former, Habermas argues, concern questions of justice (“the right”), 
they can be entirely conducted through rational argumentation and admit the 
possibility of a universal consensus achieved by an (ideally) universal audience. The 
latter, instead, concern what is valuable (“the good”) and, according to Habermas, 
can only be conducted within the horizon (cultural, historical etc.) of a specific 
community or form of life of which they express the specific “self-understanding”.10 
 
Habermas’s main criticism towards the republican paradigm of deliberative 
democracy relies on the idea that modern societies do not really offer a uniform 
cultural and social background. Reasonable pluralism, according to Habermas, 
makes it difficult to identify political discourses with the self-understanding of a pre-
existing ethical community. In a modern, deliberative democracy, according to 
Habermas, moral discourses and questions of justice hould therefore have priority 
over ethical ones as they are not related to the specific milieu of a determinate 
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community. Instead, they refer to those matters which can be legally regulated 
according to an equal consideration of all, on the grounds of (and in harmony with) 
moral principles claiming universal validity.11 The relationship between deliberation 
and ethical questions, in the kind of deliberative democracy that Habermas depicts, is 
therefore an indirect one. In plural and diverse societies, Habermas seems to argue, 
we cannot deliberate about the good as such but about the necessity of dealing with 
value pluralism (i.e. the fact that people endorse diff rent conceptions of the good). 
This is the dimension of morality and justice in which, according to Habermas, 
discourses can claim universal validity.  
 
Habermas highlights how, for Aristotle, “ethics could still provide orientation 
concerning the ontological conditions and the institutional framework of the good 
life”. 12 Yet post-conventional modern societies, he argues, no longer offer the same 
cultural homogeneity grounded in an uncontroversial metaphysical background and 
the possibility to establish a hierarchy of conceptions of the good on the basis of an 
ethical realism claiming universal validity.13 Moral discourses, instead, can claim 
universal validity on the grounds of rational arguments.14 In post-conventional 
societies, according to Habermas, we cannot agree upon a conception of the good (or 
a set of conceptions of the good) but only achieve a universal moral consensus for 
dealing with ethical diversity.  
 
In order to devise the normative grounds for a more inclusive model of deliberation, 
I will now attempt to challenge Habermas’s strong distinction between moral and 
ethical discourses by focusing on the perfectionist theory devised by George Sher.15 
While beginning from very different premises and questions, Sher, like Habermas, 
focuses on the discrepancy between an Aristotelian model of ethics and the 
postmetaphysical milieu of modern societies. Sher’s perfectionist model represents a 
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serious attempt to reconcile a universal model of ethical perfectionism with the 
absence of the metaphysical background necessary for justifying an essentialist 
ethics. While emphasizing some of the weaknesses of Sher’s conclusions, I will 
attempt to replace the empirical grounds of his meta-ethical perfectionism with a 
discursive re-interpretation of the concept of “fundamental human goals” that he 
poses as the basis of his theory. This will enable me to reinterpret Habermas’s idea of 
discourse by extending it beyond the limits of moral questions to include ethical 
matters. The realm of meta-ethics, I will conclude, represents the source from which 
both political perfectionism and deliberation stem and provides independent grounds 
for their legitimacy and reciprocal dependence in plural societies.          
 
George Sher: a Critique of Political Neutrality 
In Beyond Neutrality: Perfectionism and Politics, Sher pursues a twofold aim. In the 
first part, he carries out a critique of both consequentialist16 and deontological17 
arguments for state neutrality, criticizing the idea of “prophylactic neutrality”18 as 
well as anti-perfectionist arguments grounded in the skepticism about the good.19 In 
the second part of his work, on which I will focus, Sher attempts instead to construct 
a non-communitarian perfectionist theory.20 His purpose is to provide a version of 
plural perfectionism21 endorsing not one but several goods (i.e. knowledge, rational 
activity, close and valuable human relationships, moral goodness, developing one’s 
abilities and awareness of true beauty) while tracing them back to a single, primary 
and independent source of value.  
 
Sher believes that traditional attempts to provide a unifying meta-ethical source of 
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value present various inconsistencies. On the one ha d, he examines nonteleological 
unifying theories of value, both subjective and objective. The former, according to 
Sher, are usually identifiable with hedonistic models; they are nonteleological as they 
locate the source of value in purely qualitative experiences (e.g. subjective pleasure). 
For this reason, Sher argues, they cannot in princile explain why certain things have 
value independently from the fact that experiencing them is pleasant for someone.22 
Nonteleological objective theories, instead, envisage certain intrinsically valuable 
human activities and traits and seek to individuate a single property which belongs to 
all of them and may constitute the unifying source of their value.23 Yet, Sher argues, 
the fact that some properties belong to every human bei g does not tell us anything 
about what human beings ought to do; it does not seem to have normative 
implications and it cannot provide valid unifying grounds for pluralistic 
perfectionism.24  
 
Contrary to nonteleological ones, according to Sher, teleological theories have the 
advantage of linking value to certain human goals thu  establishing, at the same time, 
certain criteria of success that the pursuit of these goals must involve. In the case of 
subjective teleological theories, the goals are “emb dded in (actual or hypothetical) 
desires or choices”.25 For this reason, according to Sher, such theories “shed far less 
light on which traits, activities, and the like are more or less valuable”.26 Even though 
they surely represent an improvement on hedonism, their being grounded in 
subjective desires and choices prevents them from establishing objective (or at least 
non-merely-subjective) criteria for value judgments.27  
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The last major unifying doctrine of value analysed by Sher is Aristotelian 
essentialism, the clearest example of objective telological theory. Instead of 
underlining certain human “properties”, Aristotelianism emphasizes that “some goals 
[i.e. not mere capacities] are essential to our nature”28. The main problem with this 
teleological model is, for Sher, that “when Aristotle advanced his essentialist 
conception of human nature, it was part of a much larger world-picture that was 
teleological throughout”.29 Aristotle’s objectivist perfectionism, then, needs to be 
contextualized within the historical and social milieu in which it developed; it cannot 
bear, according to Sher, a universal and a-historical validity. Sher emphasizes how 
“when claims about essential goals are advanced without metaphysical backing, their 
content and justification become obscure”.30       
 
Sher attempts to overcome the dichotomy illustrated so far and, as Thomas Hurka 
emphasizes,31 to find a “continuum” between subjectivist and objectivist theories of 
value. According to Sher, knowledge, moral goodness, developing one’s abilities, 
close human relationships, rational activity and awareness of true beauty are 
fundamental human activities.32 More precisely, they are the internal goals of certain 
fundamental human capacities. For example, Sher writes, one of our fundamental 
teleological capacities is that of understanding the world. This capacity always aims 
for the goal of true belief. Therefore, knowledge (intended as “reason-based true 
belief”33) is a fundamental human goal as it represents the uccessful exercise of the 
fundamental human capacity “understanding the world”.34   
However, as well as individuating a number of human activities and traits valuable in 
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themselves, Sher emphasizes that a greater achievement would be that of envisaging 
a unique source and explanation to which these plural valuable human traits and 
activities could be traced back. In fact, he argues, a kind of “maximal pluralism”35 
content with admitting the existence of plural valuable goods seems to rely on mere 
“brute facts…that cannot be explained” and therefore it “may seem incapable of 
rational defence”.36 For Sher, a sound perfectionist theory needs to explain why 
certain things are valuable.37  
 
Beyond Objectivist and Subjectivist Theories of Value: Intentional Value-
Claims 
In constructing his own unifying theory of value, Sher endorses a teleological 
conception analogous in some way to the Aristotelian model. He believes that 
fundamental human capacities are teleological in character and that what is valuable 
is not their mere exercise but rather their “successful exercise”, their actually 
achieving their defining goals.38 On these grounds, not everyone possessing these 
capacities, but only those who exercise them successfully through certain activities, 
can be judged as having a good life. 
 
However, in spite of his endorsement of a teleological theory, Sher also aims to find 
an alternative model to the subjective and objectiv ones that he criticizes. While 
defending the idea that values must bear a non-experi ntial, objective character, Sher 
also wants to explain how and why experiential (i.e. subjective) occurrences must not 
be overlooked.39 This is where Sher’s theory, in my view, offers a radical change of 
perspective in comparison to traditional perfectionist approaches. Sher envisages a 
parallel between the structural features of teleological states and the implications of 
value-claims. Having rejected subjective and objectiv  accounts of the unifying 
source of value, he detects a possible alternative source of value in those intentional 
                                                      
35 Ibid., p.218. 
36 Ibid., p.218. 
37 Ibid., p.219. 
38 Ibid., p.202. 
39 See Hurka, “Review: Beyond Neutrality: Perfectionism and Politics”, p.189. Sher claims indeed 
that “even if a goal is independent of an agent’s desires and choices, it need not similarly be 
independent of the agent himself …it may belong to him so deeply that it lies beneath, or is 
presupposed by, all of his specific desires and choices” (Beyond Neutrality: Perfectionism and 




states by which individuals claim that something is valuable.40  
 
Value-claims are certain intentional states of the form “I (attribute) value (to) x” 
where x represents the intentional object (i.e. the valued thing, activity, trait etc.). 
According to Sher, intentional value-claims are thems lves teleological; they do not 
refer to some state of things in the world but rather to something which should be 
brought about in the world. Furthermore, their intentional character differs from that 
of nonteleological intentional states (e.g. beliefs). Although both teleological and 
nonteleological states are directed towards intentional objects, their “direction of fit” 
is radically different. Nonteleological states are such that their unfulfilment (e.g. in 
the case of a false belief) always calls for a change of the state itself (e.g. the belief). 
On the contrary, when a teleological intentional stte (e.g. a desire or a value-claim) 
is unfulfilled, what is called for is a change in the world rather than in the intentional 
state.41  
 
As Sher writes, “claims about value must be understood as singling out types of 
occurrences whose instances would have some special status, or would in some way 
be especially appropriate, if they did exist”.42 The object of an intentional attribution 
of value would be “a kind of further state”43 somehow “fitting” that intentional 
value-claim. Moreover, according to Sher, the intentional objects of value-claims 
need not actually exist in the world. At the same time, however, “the world’s failure 
to contain a thing of the valuable type requires that it [i.e. the world] be altered to 
                                                      
40 Sher, Beyond Neutrality: Perfectionism and Politics, p.231-32. In order to avoid confusion, 
“intentionality” needs to be clearly distinguished from “intention”. Intentionality does not refer to he 
mere fact that we plan, or intend to do something. I stead, as Sher himself explains, it is a property of 
human consciousness by which every intentional state (e.g. every desire, choice, belief etc.) is always 
directed towards an intentional object (e.g. the thing desired, chosen, believed etc.). For an earlier 
account of “intentional mental states” see George Sh r, “Sentences in the Brain?”, Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research, Vol.36, No.1, September (1975), pp. 94-99. 
41 Sher, Beyond Neutrality: Perfectionism and Politics, pp.231-33. For example, if I erroneously 
believe that the earth is flat, once I find out that my belief does not correspond to reality, I need to 
change my belief. On the contrary, if I desire, for example, that today it rains, the fact that it does not 
actually rain does not invalidate my desire. Even though I may decide to surrender it, the desire as 
such does not lose any of its validity. Similarly G. E. Anscombe, in reporting Aquinas’s view, 
underlines how “practical knowledge is ‘the cause of what it understands’, unlike ‘speculative’ 
knowledge, which ‘is derived from the objects known’” [Anscombe, Intention, p.87]. 
42 Sher, Beyond Neutrality: Perfectionism and Politics, p.232. 




bring a thing of that type into existence”.44 Given their intentional status, then, value-
claims represent for Sher “the factual sources of value”, they “give valuable things 
their special status”.45 This helps Sher to find the bridge between experiential (i.e. 
subjective) and non-experiential (i.e. objective) dimensions that the unifying theories 
of value he had previously rejected could not offer.    
 
Inherent Value and Fundamental Human Goals 
Yet the problem is that although intentional attribut ons of value provide the source 
for the valuableness (in general) of human traits and ctivities, therefore introducing 
a subjective, experiential dimension in Sher’s perfectionism (a dimension absent 
from essentialist theories), they do not specify which human traits or activities are to 
be considered inherently valuable. Intentional value-claims, that is, are not sufficient 
for identifying the fundamental goals of human nature in relation to which the 
inherent value of other goals and activities can and should be ascertained.46 In other 
words, Sher’s account of the sources of value risks being question-begging, if it is 
not complemented by an analysis able to establish why certain human goals are 
fundamental (rather than others) and, therefore, why certain human activities are 
valuable (rather than others). In order to preserve an “objective” dimension in his 
theory, Sher attempts therefore to individuate certain nearly-universal and nearly-
unavoidable human goals which may help to establish a limited set of inherently 
valuable human activities.  
 
While rejecting Aristotelian essentialism, Sher endavours to uncover the formal 
properties that fundamental human goals must fulfil. According to him, these 
requirements concern “depth” and “distance”. The former criterion requires that a 
fundamental goal must belong to a human being in a somehow deep sense. This 
excludes those “whims, impulses and spur-of-the-moment decisions”47 whose 
                                                      
44 Ibid., p.233 (italics in original). 
45 Ibid., p.232 (italics in original). 
46 In theory, intentional value-claims can be directed owards several human activities (e.g. “I value 
knowledge”, “I value counting tiles on the pavement”, “I value killing” etc.). People can attribute 
value to anything they wish. This, in spite of taking into account experiential occurrences (i.e. 
subjective choices, desires etc.), is not enough for establishing which, among the many things to 
which human beings attribute value, must be considered inherently valuable. 




superficiality cannot constitute a valid ground for establishing or evaluating the 
goodness of a person’s life. The latter indicates that a fundamental goal must be at 
some distance from the individual perspective of a single human being or of a limited 
group of individuals (e.g. a family, a nation etc.), in order for it to be attributed to 
humanity in general.48 Given these criteria, Sher concludes that near-universal and 
near-unavoidable goals represent a fixed feature of human life. “When it is a goal”, 
Sher writes, “that virtually no one can void pursuing - then questions about whether 
any or all of those persons ought to pursue it, or whether it is worthy of their pursuit, 
simply do not arise”.49 The importance of a similar kind of goal (near-universal and 
near-inescapable) is that it “is indeed a suitable touchstone for the evaluation of all 
other goals, including all other near-universal ones, whose pursuit is not similarly 
fixed”.50 For this reason, Sher claims, “the proposed theory represents the smallest 
philosophically acceptable departure from subjectivism”.51 Once fundamental human 
goals (relative to fundamental human capacities) have been thus individuated, it is 
possible to establish the inherent value of those activities which consist in the 
successful exercise of those capacities, that is, in the achievement of those goals.      
 
Sher also emphasizes how “[his] theory is perhaps best viewed as an empirical 
substitute for a teleological essentialism - a kind of poor man’s Aristotelianism”.52 
According to him, indeed, “barring a return to a broadly teleological world-view, 
there is little a priori reason to believe that any particular goals are essential to 
humans, but much a posteriori evidence that various g als are at least near-universal 
and near-unavoidable”.53 It is interesting that Sher considers this “a posteriori 
evidence” as “supplied by introspection, by our own a d others’ verbal and 
nonverbal behaviour, and by many relevant background theories”.54  
                                                                                                                                                    
for providing the unique source of valuable human goals, as “the goals of evolution cannot be 
attributed to individuals in any straightforward sen ” (ibid., p.239). 
48 Ibid., pp.234-42. 
49 Ibid., p.238 (italics in original). 
50 Ibid., p.239. 
51 Ibid., p.239. 
52 Ibid., p.240. 
53 Ibid., p.242. 
54 Ibid., p.242. If intended in the sense of a phenomenological enquiry grounded on the intentional 
character of our value-claims, “introspection” can indeed become the source of a posteriori evidence, 
not stemming from essentialist sources of validity. Yet one might envisage, as Sher himself does, the 




Habermas: Intentionality and Discourse 
Sher’s approach presents some difficulties which emerge clearly from the list of 
goods that he draws. Knowledge, rational activity, close and valuable human 
relationships, moral goodness, developing one’s abilities and awareness of true 
beauty are surely intuitively appealing human activities. However, as Thomas Hurka 
suitably notes,55 this list could in principle be extended to include also less intuitively 
attractive activities such as the pursuit of violenc  and aggression. Given the 
“empirical” grounds that Sher himself poses at the basis of his theory, we could at 
least imagine a world in which most men would in fact pursue violence, murder and 
other unattractive ends. This would also imply the paradox that if most men, 
hypothetically, did not pursue those goals achievable through knowledge or 
appreciation of art, then, according to Sher’s theory, we would have to stop 
considering those activities good.56 I believe that Hurka’s critique is well-founded. In 
spite of the coherent and systematic way in which he constructs his theory of value, 
Sher partly misunderstands the implications of conceiving intentional value-claims 
as the factual sources of value.57    
 
In order to highlight the main difficulties in Sher’s theory, and especially in his 
conception of intentional states, I will refer to the second of Habermas’s Christian 
Gauss Lectures, delivered at Princeton in 1970/1971,58 which partly deals with 
Edmund Husserl’s59 theory of intentionality. Habermas underlines how every 
                                                                                                                                                    
if fundamental human goals were considered expression  of a broader encompassing worldview, as in 
Aristotelian essentialism, the valuableness of such goals would always be comprehensible and 
relevant for human beings only as the intentional correlate of intentional value-claims. The 
unfeasibility, in principle, of exiting the terrain of intentionality makes Sher’s account appropriate to 
the finitude of human nature. 
55 Hurka, “Review: Beyond Neutrality: Perfectionism and Politics”, p.190. 
56 Ibid., p.190. 
57 In fact Sher seems to acknowledge potential problems implied by the idea of intentionality, when he 
writes that “there has, of course, been much controversy about how naturalists can best account for 
intentional content; but the very urgency of the contr versy (and the unattractiveness of the 
eliminative alternatives) suggests that they must accommodate it somehow” (Sher, Beyond Neutrality: 
Perfectionism and Politics, p.232n). 
58 The title of the French translation that I will refer to is Sociologie & Théorie du Langage (translated 
from the German to French by Rainer Rochlitz) (Paris: Armand Colin Éditeur, 1995). The French title 
of the second lecture is “Phénoménologie de la Constitution de la Société” (“Phenomenology of the 
Constitution of Society”). Whenever I quote directly Habermas’s text, I will use my own English 
translation of the French text. I will also provide the French text of the relevant passages in the 
footnotes. 




intentional state, for Husserl, is always constituted as “consciousness of 
something”.60 Husserl distinguishes two main kinds of intentional states: those in 
which the intentional object is given to us directly, in itself, and those, instead, in 
which the object is only mediately offered.61 The main problem, according to 
Habermas, is that Husserl interprets this distinction as the difference between 
intuitive and non-intuitive “givenness” of an intenional object.62 The presence of an 
intentional object given in intuitive evidence, Habermas emphasizes, represents for 
Husserl the only source of truth. This implies that every intentional state can be 
fulfilled, according to Husserl, in the way representations, perceptions or similar 
intentions are fulfilled, that is by an intuition.  
 
Husserl extends this cognitive model of intentionality also to those intentions which 
belong to the volitive or emotional sphere.63 In this sense, then, he seems to overlook 
one aspect that Sher clearly underlines, that is, the different “direction of fit”, that I 
have previously illustrated, between nonteleological and teleological intentional 
states. However, for Habermas the problem is not merely that intuitive evidence can 
only satisfy certain kinds of intentional states (cognitive, representational etc. but not 
emotional, volitive etc.). It is, in addition, that even the former kinds (what Sher 
defines as “nonteleological intentional states”) cannot in fact be fulfilled and verified 
through mere intuition.  
 
According to Habermas, every intuition, even mere perception, always involves a 
categorical interpretation which “exceeds” what is immediately given (for example, 
the sensorial data).64 In this sense, he argues, we can in theory always proceed in 
more depth in order to find more elementary sensorial data as the primary grounds of 
our perceptual experience. The reason why intuition always appears to be evident, 
according to Habermas, is because in fact we have gen rated the categorical and 
symbolic objects that we encounter even in our mere p ceptual experience; they are 
                                                                                                                                                    
by W.R. Boyce Gibson) (London: Allen & Unwin New York: Humanities Press, 1931). 
60 My translation of “conscience de quelque chose”, Sociologie & Théorie du Langage, p.34 (italics in 
original). 
61 Ibid., p.34. 
62 Ibid., p.35. 
63 Ibid., p.38. 




never given to us “in flesh and bones”65 as Husserl believes. The lack of an 
intuitively given final foundation of truth offering to us an object in flesh and bones 
implies, according to Habermas, the need to switch from a “theory of consciousness” 
to a “theory of language”.66 Embracing the pragmatist epistemology of Charles 
Sanders Peirce,67 Habermas argues that the kind of validity claimed by intentional 
states can only be fulfilled not by a possible intuition which would give us truth-as-
evidence, but by an unconstrained discourse aiming for a consensus achieved 
through rational argumentation.68  
 
From Empirical to Discursive Foundations: A New Theory of Value 
Habermas’s discursive theory of the fulfilment of intentional states provides an 
important conceptual key for reinterpreting Sher’s notion of teleological intentional 
states, such as value-claims (i.e. attributions of value). Sher still conceives 
intentional value-claims as allowing a somehow intuitive fulfilment. However, it is 
not clear to me how a valuable thing would have to be given in the world in order to 
fulfil the intentional value-claim which provides the source of its value. I believe that 
this is not clear to Sher either. This is why his theory runs into the difficulties 
emphasized by Hurka. Once he has identified the factual source of valuable human 
activities with intentional value-claims, Sher is then constrained to adopt an 
empirical approach in order to select those goals which can be granted a near-
universal status and therefore help to establish the in erent value of certain human 
activities and traits.  
                                                      
65 My translation of “en chair et en os” (ibid., p.41). If this is relevant for cognitive and 
representational intentions, it will be even more significant, I believe, for all those non-cognitive 
intentional states to which Husserl improperly extends the “intuition-as-evidence” paradigm. As we 
have already seen, the direction of fit of these kinds of nonteleological intentional states (e.g. desires, 
attributions of value etc.) entails, for Sher, that the “independent variable” is in the states themselves 
and the “dependent” one in the world. 
66 My translation of “d’une théorie de la conscience…à une théorie de la communication linguistique” 
(ibid., p.33, italics in original). 
67 “The real, then”, Peirce writes, “is that which, sooner or later, information and reasoning would 
finally result in, and which is therefore independet of the vagaries of me and you. Thus, the very 
origin of the conception of reality shows that this conception essentially involves the notion of a 
community, without definite limits, and capable of a definite increase of knowledge” [Charles S. 
Peirce, Collected Papers, Vols. 1-6 (edited by C.Hartshorne and P.Weiss) (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1931-1935, Vol.5), quoted in Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, p.15]. 
For an analysis of Peirce’s logic of inquiry see Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests ( ranslated 
from the German by Jeremy J. Shapiro) (London: Heinma n, 1972): pp.91-139. 




Contrary to Sher, and following Habermas’s conception of intentional states, I claim 
that there cannot be an intuitively given object or “adjustment in the world”69 able to 
satisfy intentional value-claims in an evident, intu tive manner. Only argumentative 
and discursive agreement, intended in the pragmatist sense of the result of a 
cumulative process of inquiry, can provide the criterion for establishing which 
human goals are fundamental and, consequently, which activities are inherently 
valuable because they are “implicated” in the pursuit and successful realization of 
those goals. In this sense, discourse substitutes the empirical grounds through which 
Sher attempts to individuate those near-universal and near-unavoidable human goals 
which he then considers the original, meta-ethical touchstones for the evaluation of 
every human activity and trait.  
 
Rather than looking at the empirical fact that most people pursue this or that goal, 
Habermas’s theory of discourse helps therefore in rei troducing an “objective” 
notion of value grounded in the idea of communicative rationality70 and in the related 
concepts of “ideal assertability” and “ideal speech situation”.71 Only those human 
goals which participants in an unlimited communication community would agree 
upon on the grounds of rational argumentation are fundamental. In synthesis, then, 
while Sher individuates fundamental human goals in an empirical way (i.e. as those 
goals that most people unavoidably pursue), I conceive them as the objects of an 
ideal discursive agreement. Consequently, I also consider the activities pursuing 
those goals as (derivatively) potential objects of an ideal discursive agreement, as 
they are internally linked to those goals susceptible of discursive agreement.  
 
 
                                                      
69 Sher, Beyond Neutrality: Perfectionism and Politics, p.233. Sher also defines it as “a kind of further 
state whose instances would be especially appropriate to it [i.e. to the intentio al value-claim] if any 
of them were to exist” (ibid., p.232, italics in original). 
70 This refers, in Habermas’s words, to the “unconstrained, unifying, consensus-bringing force of 
argumentative speech, in which different participants overcome their merely subjective views and, 
owing to the mutuality of rationally motivated conviction, assure themselves of both the unity of the 
objective world and the intersubjectivity of their lifeworld” (Habermas, The Theory of Communicative 
Action, Vol.1, p.10). 
71 See ibid., pp.24-26. Habermas argues that argumentatio  involves “the intention of convincing a 
universal audience and gaining general assent for an utterance;…the intention of ending a dispute 
about hypothetical validity claims with a rationally motivated agreement; and…the intention of 




Overcoming the Distinction between Moral and Ethical Discourses 
Having illustrated how Sher’s perfectionist theory can be enhanced through 
Habermas’s theory of discourse, I would now like to clarify in what sense Sher’s 
theory can help us to overcome Habermas’s distinctio  between moral and ethical 
discourses, and therefore provide a more inclusive model of democratic deliberation. 
First, Sher emphasizes that his perfectionist theory is an explicit attempt to replace 
Aristotelian essentialism with an empirical substitute which, while preserving the 
teleological dimension of Aristotelianism itself, is constrained to abandon its 
metaphysical presuppositions. This mirrors Habermas’s view that, without the same 
metaphysical background on which Aristotle could rely, any attempt to provide a 
unique answer to the question of “what is the good life” is bound to fail. In modern 
societies, different, sometimes incompatible forms of life may generate deeply 
contrasting answers to this question. In the end, for Habermas, “all attempts at a 
historicist revival of Aristotelian ethics on a postmetaphysical footing are beset with 
insuperable difficulties”.72  
 
Instead of acknowledging the “anachronistic” character of classical Aristotelianism 
in order to reject it, Sher replaces its objectivism by identifying the factual source of 
value with intentional value-claims. He then integrates this (partially) subjective 
dimension with the objective one provided by fundamental human goals which, I 
have argued, should be worked out through rational discourse. In this way, I think, 
Sher does in fact manage to reconcile the idea of a hier rchy of ethical values with a 
modern postmetaphysical setting (in the way that I have illustrated), therefore 
eluding Habermas’s critique. 
 
Second, as well as embracing the teleological charater of Aristotelianism, Sher also 
attempts to delineate a perfectionist theory alternative to contemporary models of 
communitarian perfectionism. In this sense, he aims to envisage universal (or at least 
“near-universal”) goals which, in his own words, are not “supplied by a pervasive 
culture”.73 This helps him to overcome Habermas’s idea that, within a 
postmetaphysical milieu, ethical discourses can only be carried out within the 
                                                      
72 Habermas, Justification and Application, p.125. 




horizon of specific forms of life. While offering apostmetaphysical substitute of 
classical moral realism, Sher still aims to establish the universal (or at least near-
universal) validity of fundamental human goals, notrooted in particular forms of life 
but intended rather as fixed aspects of human nature. This helps in bridging the 
divide between norms and values, and between moral and ethical discourses. Due to 
their universal character, I argue, the fundamental human goals illustrated by Sher 
can be objects of an (ideally) universal consensus achieved through the same rational 
discourse which, for Habermas, only applies to theoretical and moral questions.             
 
Finally, the fundamental human goals envisaged by Sher do not really bear an ethical 
value. As Sher emphasizes, being both “near-universal” and “near-unavoidable”, 
such goals are not good or bad in themselves but rather fixed features of human 
nature and therefore they are the meta-ethical (not ethical) criteria for evaluating 
every other human goal. This contributes still furthe  to the idea that discursive 
rationality can be applied to ascertaining these fundamental meta-ethical human 
goals. Habermas’s view that ethical discourses are always context-related and unable 
to claim universal validity becomes irrelevant at this meta-ethical level. By providing 
the grounds for delineating which human goals are fundamental, discourse indirectly 
offers also the foundations for establishing which human activities and traits are 
inherently valuable in relation to those goals. Meta- hical discourses reduce the gap 
between moral and ethical spheres and reveal a model of liberative and inclusive 
perfectionism appropriate to the postmetaphysical milieu and to the ethical pluralism 
of modern societies.        
 
Political Perfectionism and Deliberation: Stemming from the Same Meta-
Ethical Sources 
This has important consequences for both political perfectionism and deliberative 
politics. Extending the dimension of discourse from the moral to the ethical sphere 
makes it easier to understand how deliberation may legitimize state promotion of 
perfectionist (i.e. ethical, religious, cultural etc.) values and on which grounds such 
values might be admitted into the deliberative aren. I deed, if deliberation is limited 
to the moral issue of dealing with ethical diversity,  seems difficult to envisage its 




envisaged by Habermas provide a procedural model of deliberative democracy which 
overcomes the limits of a mere modus vivendi. Nonethel ss, I believe, the 
importance of discourse within a meta-ethical dimensio  provides the justification 
and the rationale for extending discursive practice o ethical matters. As I have 
attempted to explain, it is the way in which we establish why (and not merely which) 
things are good itself that tells us why we should ta k and deliberate about the good. 
 
Political perfectionism, in this sense, can be legitimate if intended not as the mere 
implementation of substantive goods whose intrinsic value is taken for granted, as in 
the Aristotelian polis or in the republican model of deliberative politics. The lack of a 
common set of unproblematic ethical values which characterizes modern plural 
societies determines an inevitable connection between state perfectionism and 
deliberation. What the state can legitimately promote are not substantive (liberal, 
religious, communitarian etc.) values in themselves but rather those values which 
would emerge from deliberation. This is not because deliberation is good in itself but 
rather because, in a postmetaphysical setting, it provides the only way in which we 
can determine which human goals are fundamental and, consequently, which things 
are universally (and inherently) good. If we renounce the kind of teleological 
objective unifying source of value which Sher illustrates and refuses, we are then left 
with either embracing (like Sher does) a purely empirical method for determining 
what is universally valuable or instead adopting the pragmatist epistemology 
endorsed by Habermas, which I have attempted to apply to Sher’s conception of 
intentional value-claims.  
 
Admitting the possibility of ethical discourses (in the light of meta-ethical ones) 
claiming universal validity provides important grounds for enhancing the prospects 
of democratic deliberation. The non-universalizability of ethical claims emphasized 
by Habermas would in fact threaten the possibility of a true dialogue within pluralist 
polities. Posing “impartial” fundamental goals as the foundations for ethical claims 
would instead change the quality of ethical discourses. Deliberating about the good 
would mean at the same time (probably mostly) deliberating about what goals we 




from any value judgment, we would finally have a stble ground for establishing 
what is good, for different individuals and groups, in relation to those common goals.           
 
One might ask, at this point, if establishing which human goals are fundamental is 
really less problematic than directly determining what is good (as theories of intrinsic 
value do). Sher avoids answering this question by simply identifying fundamental 
human goals with those which most people unavoidably pursue. However, as I have 
already illustrated, this empirical approach leads him to obvious difficulties. The 
pragmatist epistemology endorsed by Habermas allows instead the maintenance of 
the objective status of fundamental human goals intended as the regulative ideals of a 
cumulative process of deliberation not confined to the limits of specific communities. 
This does not imply that an actual consensus needs to be achieved but rather that we 
can in principle talk about ethical matters and that this talk can in principle be 
extended to a universal audience. Fundamental goals are fluid enough to allow a 
variety of inherently valuable goods which could (directly or indirectly) contribute to 
their realization. Although ethical disagreement would surely remain, referring to 
fundamental goals would constitute at least a common ground for conducting a 
dialogue about ethical matters.  
 
A major problem which I have not addressed yet concerns the way in which 
deliberation about the good should be conducted. In other words, once it has been 
argued that political perfectionism must involve delib ration, this does not explain 
yet the character (e.g. democratic, undemocratic etc.) of such a deliberation. 
Habermas’s conception of deliberative democracy, for example, implies that a 
system of rights (i.e. negative rights, rights of political participation and social-
welfare rights) is needed not on the basis of some (lib ral) substantive conception of 
the good but merely in order to guarantee effective communication and discursive 
opinion- and will-formation.74 This involves a set of problems75 (including the risk of 
a circular justification of such rights) which can be avoided by focusing more closely 
on the pragmatist dimension of Habermas’s theory rathe  than on his conception of 
                                                      
74 Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, pp.133-5. 





communication. Indeed the Christian Gauss Lectures precede Habermas’s full 
development of his theory of communicative action ad only emphasize the 
pragmatist dimension of his conception of truth, especially evident in his analysis of 
intentional states. In this sense, the idea of discursive consensus, which Habermas 
introduces in his analysis of intentionality, does not presuppose yet a developed 
theory of language and communicative action.   
 
Conclusion 
My conclusion in this chapter, therefore, is that some kind of ethical deliberation 
(rather than the unproblematic and direct promotion of substantive goods) is both 
possible and necessary for the legitimacy of political perfectionism. Deliberation, 
intended primarily in the pragmatist sense of a cumulative process of inquiry aiming 
for an ideal consensus, enters the very meta-ethical foundations of perfectionism. In 
post-conventional modern societies, we should talk about the good in politics 
because only through discourse we can in principle establish what is good. This 
prevents, I believe, both the risk of a recursive infin ty (as deliberation should not be 
affirmed because it is good but simply because it is necessary) and the need for 
metaphysical foundations, while at the same time providing sufficiently objective 
grounds for meta-ethical, ethical and political perfectionism.  
 
In order to illustrate a possible normative foundation for a democratic kind of 
deliberative perfectionism, in the next chapter I will examine Misak’s attempt to 
ground moral and ethical discourses in pragmatist epist mology. I believe that 
Misak, despite being quite critical towards Habermas, in fact spells out more 
explicitly certain features implicit in the pragmatist aspects of Habermas’s approach, 
without entering the controversial sphere of communicative action. However, while 
substantially endorsing her conclusions, I will also argue that her attempt to provide 
the rationale for epistemological holism (i.e. the id a that there are no substantial 
qualitative differences between religious and nonreligious reasons in public 
deliberation) is not entirely successful and that te kinds of meta-ethical discourses 
that I have illustrated in this chapter offer better grounds for understanding and 




Chapter 6 - Political Parties and Pragmatist Deliberation  
 
Embracing Charles Sanders Peirce’s1 pragmatist theory, and in line with Jürgen 
Habermas’s Christian Gauss Lecture that I examined in the previous chapter, Cheryl 
Misak underlines how “[w]e do not have access to anythi g raw, unconceptualized, 
or ‘given’ in experience”.2 According to her, even our perceptual experience does not 
offer to us a “cognition-independent world”;3 instead, it always involves some 
judgements, it is categorically shaped. Misak also highlights how, following Peirce’s 
fallibilist epistemology, every experience, including perception, can always in 
principle be revised in the light of new findings. According to Peirce, and to 
pragmatism more generally, true belief does not correspond to an infallible 
conviction or to a metaphysical entity placed in some noumenal realm. Instead, 
Misak emphasizes, “a true belief is such that, no matter how much further we were to 
investigate and debate, the belief would not be overturned by recalcitrant experience 
and argument”.4  
 
There is a tight connection, in pragmatism, between truth and inquiry. On the one 
hand, truth should not be located above or beyond inquiry; on the other hand, it 
should not even be identified with the “end” of inquiry. According to Peirce, indeed, 
inquiry is in principle endless, we can never say when arguments have run out. 
Although we can never in principle reach the end of inquiry, we can at least 
establish, from the nature itself of the process, that a true belief would be one which 
no further experience or argument would defeat or inval date, a belief which would 
“survive the trials of inquiry”.5 According to Misak, the role of truth is thus “to set a 
direction and provide a focus of criticism for actual arrangements”.6 On the one 
hand, then, pragmatism intends truth as a “regulative ideal of inquiry”7 rather than a 
                                                      
1 Charles Sanders Peirce, Collected Papers (edited by Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss; Vols. 7-8 
edited by A.W. Burks) (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1958-
1966). 
2 Cheryl Misak, Truth, Politics, Morality: Pragmatism and Deliberation (London: Routledge, 2000), 
p.78. 
3 Ibid., p.79. 
4 Ibid., p.49. 
5 Ibid., p.56. 
6 Ibid., p.99. 




“thing-in-itself” which we may be able to unveil and grasp directly through an 
intuitive or cognitive process. In this way, it does not forsake completely the idea of 
objective criteria of truth and it prevents moral scepticism.8 On the other hand, by 
acknowledging the importance of experience and inquiry, it prevents dogmatism, that 
is, the idea that one’s belief is the only right one, independently from what other 
people may think.9 
 
Misak draws two important conclusions from her endorsement of pragmatist 
epistemology. First, she notes, since truth is always related to inquiry and experience, 
and since a belief could be true only in relation t (and in spite of) all the potential 
experiences and arguments which could in principle be raised against it, then truth 
entails a “democratic” attitude. In fact, if a belief must be responsive to all 
experiences (and withstand them) in order to manifest its soundness and to be 
considered true, then an inquirer who refused to take account of certain experiences 
(or of the experiences of certain kinds of people) would in fact choose an inadequate 
method for attaining truth.10 For pragmatism, indeed, we always need to start from 
experience, and since experience always shows that one’s beliefs are continuously 
challenged (by other people’s beliefs, by natural facts etc.), it would be difficult to 
conceive a true belief if not as a belief able to somehow “resist” all these trials. 
Therefore, a believer must at least take into account the beliefs of others (especially 
when they challenge her convictions), even just to display and confirm the strength 
of her own belief. Since these challenging beliefs do exist, she cannot just ignore or 
dismiss them. In order to be considered a genuine beli ver, she must confront them 
in a democratic fashion. 
 
This pragmatist justification of democratic deliberation differs from other models of 
deliberative democracy. Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, for example, argue 
that commitment to deliberation and to taking into account others’ views relies on a 
                                                      
8 In this sense, Misak emphasizes how “the best kindof pragmatism replaces the old dichotomy 
between neutral standards and no-standards-at-all with a substantive, low profile, conception of truth 
and objectivity, a conception which nonetheless can guide us in inquiry” (ibid., p.14). 
9 According to Misak, “once…illiberal opponents are brought into the epistemic fold, they can be 
criticized as failing to really hold beliefs - things which are responsive to reasons. For they refuse to 
take the reasons of all seriously” (ibid., p.105). 




prior endorsement of liberal values (such as accountability, publicity and reciprocity) 
which are “partly independent” from the process itself of deliberation.11 This poses 
problems of normative justification that Misak attempts to avoid by grounding her 
conception of liberal democratic deliberation upon the practice itself of seeking and 
providing justification for one’s moral and political contentions, rather than on pre-
existing (unwarranted) principles.12 Yet I will show how Misak’s pragmatist model 
still relies on some kinds of unjustified substantive grounds (underlying, for 
example, her definitions of “belief” and “dogmatic opinion),13 thus replicating the 
problems raised, for example, by Rawls’s idea of “reasonableness” and by 
Habermas’s restricted notion of communication.14 However, I will also argue that 
political parties help to integrate her account by providing the normative rationale for 
and the institutional embodiment of pragmatist deliberation.  
 
For now, I would like to stress that Misak’s theory differs from Habermas’s version 
of deliberative democracy. First, for Habermas democratic deliberation is grounded 
in the nature itself of communication which demands that “participants coordinate 
their plans of action consensually, with the agreemnt being reached at any point 
                                                      
11 Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement (Cambridge, MA: The 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1996), p.366, n.18. See also Robert Talisse, D mocracy 
After Liberalism: Pragmatism and Deliberative Politics (New York: Routledge, 2005), p.105 and my 
analysis in chapter 5. For a proceduralist account of democratic deliberation see Joshua Cohen, 
“Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy”, in A. Hamlin and P. Pettit (eds.), The Good Polity 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), pp.17-34. For critiques of proceduralism see David Estlund, 
“Making Truth Safe for Democracy”, in David Copp, Jean Hampton and John E. Roemer (eds.), The
Idea of Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp.72-100 and Thomas 
Christiano, “The Significance of Public Deliberation”, in Bohman and Rehg, Deliberative 
Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics, pp. 252-253. 
12 Misak, Truth, Politics, Morality, p.105. 
13 Ibid., p.74. Misak argues that “what it is to be a belief, as opposed to some other mental state, such 
as entertaining an interesting but idle thought, a lie bout what one believes, or a dogmatic opinion, is 
that there must be something that can speak for or against a belief and that belief must be responsive 
to what can speak for or against it…Believing is a pr ctice which is, by its very nature, linked to 
reason-giving or justification-giving” (ibid., p.74). According to Misak, if a belief must be responsive 
to all experiences (and withstand them) in order to manifest its soundness and to be considered true, 
then an inquirer which refused to take account of certain experiences (or of the experiences of certain 
kinds of people) would in fact choose an inadequate method for attaining truth. Believing therefore 
entails, for Misak, a democratic attitude to deliberation. 
14 For Misak’s critique of Rawls’s theory, see ibid., pp.18-29. For a detailed critique of Habermas, see 
ibid., pp.35-47. Against Rawls, Misak explicitly states that he “does not provide us with an 
independent or neutral justification of the liberal or democratic virtues; he just assumes those virtues” 
(ibid., p.25). For Habermas’s model of communication see The Theory of Communicative Action 
(Vol.1: Reason and the Rationalization of Society) (translated from the German by Thomas 
McCarthy) (London: Heinemann, 1984) and Between Facts and Norms (translated from the German 




being evaluated in terms of the intersubjective recognition of validity claims”.15 This 
implies that an antidemocratic attitude is intrinsically inconsistent with the nature 
itself of communication. However, according to Misak, “[i]t seems that people do 
communicate – do speak and utter statements to others – without presupposing the 
things that [for] Habermas…are undeniable”.16 By refusing the kinds of 
transcendental arguments adopted by Habermas, Misak manages therefore to avoid, 
it seems, the risk of a justificatory recursive infinity which characterizes Habermas’s 
account.   
 
Second, Misak also argues that pragmatist epistemology helps to overcome the 
divide between “external” and “internal” experiences and that this may lead to a 
form of “epistemological holism”.17 According to Misak, once we embrace 
pragmatist epistemology, there is no longer a qualitative difference between, for 
example, scientific and moral experiences. As in scientific research, Misak 
highlights, in our moral life we find many experienc s compelling and our own 
moral beliefs fallible. We are sensible to experience and sometimes we change our 
moral beliefs. “Moral inquiry – Misak states - is aimed at finding the right answer 
and at improving our beliefs through considering more evidence, argument and 
perspective”.18 In moral, ethical and political inquiry, this implies that we cannot 
arbitrarily exclude certain people from discussion. This would prevent our beliefs 
from being fully tested against any potential counterargument advanced, for 
example, by people of a different race, religion, party etc. Moreover, Misak argues 
that “[c]oming face to face with ‘the other’ might force us to modify our 
understanding of…them. A racist, for instance, might et to know a member of the 
despised group and see, at least, that his generalisation is wrong”.19 
 
An important aspect of Misak’s account (although she is not always entirely clear 
                                                      
15 Jürgen Habermas, “Discourse Ethics: Notes on Program of Philosophical Justification Discourse 
Ethics”, in Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
1990), p.58. 
16 Misak, Truth, Politics, Morality, p.41. Misak also argues that “[w]hile it might beplausible that 
communication is at the centre of the notions of truth, objectivity and personhood, it seems simply 
wrong to define communication in the restrictive way in which Habermas does” (ibid., p.42). 
17 See ibid., pp.84-90. 
18 Ibid., p.86. 




about this point) is that epistemological holism does not distinguish between moral 
and ethical discourses. As in the case of moral issues (i.e. questions of justice), 
Misak argues that also deliberation about conceptions of the good can be conducted 
by following the pragmatist model of inquiry.20 Contrary to Habermas, Misak 
believes that conceptions of the good are not irremediably linked to their specific 
cultural and historical contexts and that “countless predicates cross political and 
racial boundaries”.21 I will illustrate in the next section why this conclusion is too 
hurried and how it could be prevented in the light of my previous analysis.     
 
Methodological Foundations of Democracy and Inclusive Perfectionism 
The epistemological holism envisaged by Misak is not ecessary for establishing 
standards for ethical and moral judgements. We should not attempt to compare 
directly truth and value, theoretical and ethical inquiry. In trying to do this, Misak 
encounters several problems. Although Misak criticizes Habermas’s distinction 
between moral and ethical spheres, she then seems to employ the two terms 
interchangeably. This leads her to some inconsistencies. Misak rightly remarks, for 
example, that we are often compelled or conditioned by the experiences of others and 
that this proves that we must take them seriously if we want to achieve true moral 
judgments. I believe that this is true in the case of moral inquiry, and I consider 
Misak’s argument for a pragmatist epistemological foundation of democracy and 
basic rights a strong one. However, I also feel that Misak dismisses too quickly 
Habermas’s distinction. Ethical judgements, that is, judgments concerning 
conceptions of the good, do bear a certain connection with specific forms of life. 
Talking about the good, in this sense, quite often poses significant obstacles to cross-
cultural communication and inquiry. Therefore, rather than endorsing a radical 
epistemological holism of the kind depicted by Misak, it is more feasible to conceive 
a universal inquiry concerning the meta-ethical foundations of ethical values and, 
derivatively, conceptions of the good intended in their inherent value. As I argued in 
the previous chapter, Sher’s theory of inherent value provides the normative 
framework for addressing ethical judgments indirectly, via an inquiry which focuses 
on searching for those human goals that are fundamental. In this sense, it helps in 
                                                      
20 Ibid., p.80. 




reinterpreting ethical inquiry in the terms of an (lmost) theoretical inquiry.  
 
In spite of this difficulty, I believe that Misak’s account provides two important 
normative arguments which, if sufficiently developed, may help to enhance my 
analysis of Sher and Habermas. First, it supplies compelling normative grounds for 
establishing a liberal democratic polity without relying on substantive (and therefore 
controversial) grounds. Misak’s purely methodological approach implies that “[t]he 
pragmatist’s route to the preservation of autonomy, equal moral worth, and respect 
for persons is that preserving these things is a vital part of deliberation aimed at the 
truth”.22 Grounded, as I have already shown, in the pragmatist ccount of belief and 
inquiry, this model seems to avoid many of the difficulties involved, for instance, in 
Rawls’s political liberalism and its hidden substantive (liberal) assumptions, or by 
Habermas’s attempt to ground the principles of liberal democracy in the nature of 
communication. This provides a promising normative path for constructing the idea 
of a “common language” regarding the constitutional and institutional framework 
within which political parties operate, a framework that, as I argued in the second 
chapter, Rawls’s political liberalism is not able to provide. 
 
The second normative aspect which emerges from Misak’s account concerns instead 
the perfectionist character of a polity grounded in a pragmatist conception of ethical 
inquiry and deliberation. Addressing the issue of state neutrality and non-
interference, Misak emphasizes how “often an appeal to reasons which refer to one’s 
conception of what is valuable can and should be made in public deliberation”.23 The 
need to allow comprehensive views into the public sphere is driven, according to 
Misak, by the pragmatist requirement to test beliefs (including those about politics 
and ethics) against all possible perspectives and therefore against the particular 
                                                      
22 Ibid., p.115. According to Misak, “if we are to take seriously the experiences of all, we must let 
ways of life flourish so that they can be articulated and we must let people articulate them for 
themselves” (ibid., p.114). 
23 Ibid., p.109. The epistemological requirements of pragmatism also entail, according to Misak, the 
need to break the divide between private and public spheres. The need to “get a more complete take 
on matters” (ibid., p.109) implies that “[n]o aspects of life or of our practice should be in principle 
excluded from public debate or required to remain hidden and private” (ibid., p.119). Misak’s overall 
conclusion, then, is that “[t]he pragmatist voices the requirement that we try, at least until such 
attempts fail, to include rather than exclude others. This entails listening carefully to the marginalzed 




points of view of different individuals or groups.24 The normative framework 
provided by Misak’s theory, then, seems to complement my previous analysis of 
Sher and Habermas, and to provide the rationale for an inclusive deliberative 
perfectionism which well suits the normative criteria of party politics. Thanks to the 
methodological foundations of the basic rights and the constitutional essentials, the 
pragmatist account of deliberative democracy makes th  public sphere permeable to 
a plurality of conceptions of the good, while avoiding a retreat to a regime of 
prophylactic neutrality. 
 
Deliberative Democracy and Political Parties 
Political parties are usually neglected by deliberative democrats. They are often seen 
as aggregative agents of discrete interests and policy preferences, preventing the 
exchange of arguments and reasons25 a  well as the pursuit of the common good,26 
both central aspects of democratic deliberation. Yet, as Rosenblum highlights, 
“[r]emoved from party rivalry, the locus of deliberation in contemporary theory is 
ambiguous; the often invoked ‘public sphere’ is everywhere and nowhere”.27 Direct 
democracy experiments, such as Bruce Ackerman and Jmes Fiskin’s “Deliberation 
Day”,28 present many of the flaws usually attributed to party politics, without 
offering at the same time the institutional and normative constraints that party 
politics provides.29  
 
Another common critique raised against political parties is that they are single-
minded, unable to deal with a complex variety of issues and interests raised by 
                                                      
24 For Misak, however, the epistemological argument only provides a normative background on which 
we may rely if standard moral arguments do not persuade our interlocutor of the evil of her action 
(ibid., p.124). 
25 James Johnson, “Political Parties and Deliberative Democracy?”, in Richard S. Katz and William 
Crotty (eds.), Handbook of Party Politics (London: SAGE, 2006), p.48; Nancy Rosenblum, On the 
Side of the Angels: An Appreciation of Parties and Partisanship (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton 
University Press, 2008), p.147 and David M. Estlund, Democratic Authority: A Philosophical 
Framework (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), pp.202-203. 
26 Thomas Christiano, The Rule of the Many (New York: Westview, 1996), p.276. 
27 Nancy Rosenblum, “Glorious Traditions of Anti-Partyism and Moments of Appreciations”, Lecture 
1, “On the Side of the Angels”, The Storr Lectures at Yale Law School, Spring (2006) [online]. 
Available at: http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~nrosenbl/Storrs_Lecture1.pdf [accessed 4 June 
2008], p.42. 
28 Bruce Ackerman and James Fishkin, “Deliberation Day”, in James S. Fishkin and Peter Laslett 
(eds.), Debating Deliberative Democracy (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 2003), pp. 7-30. 




various groups within society.30 Yet, as my analysis in the first chapter explained, 
parties are not mere associations (or interest groups), they “must consider the balance 
of relations among interests”31 as well as “refashion and generalize groups’ highly 
particular claims”.32 Parties which comply with the normative criteria of regulated 
rivalry and loyal opposition might provide a formal locus for public political 
deliberation and overcome “the appalling ‘hypertrophy of pressure politics,’ the 
‘undemocratic and dangerous’ government by interest group.”33 Both deliberation 
and majoritarian politics are therefore necessary in modern polities.34 Parties 
“provoke one another to take up opposing positions a d offer reasons”.35 Most 
importantly, they “articulate positions, and their antagonism is the engine of ‘trial by 
discussion’”.36 Unlike single-issue organizations or interest groups, parties rearrange 
a mass of disorganized and discrete opinions and interests, they select and re-shape 
them in a way more suitable for deliberation.37   
 
It is important to stress, however, that some deliberative theorists do recognize the 
importance of both deliberation and electoral politics, the role of parties as vehicles 
of (rather than obstacles to) deliberation38 and the fact that institutional arrangements 
affect voters’ choices.39 Furthermore, some argue, parties prevent material 
inequalities from determining a lower status for cetain individuals or groups within 
the deliberative arena,40 thus helping to guarantee the “fair value of political 
                                                      
30 Ibid., p.206. 
31 E.E. Schattschneider, Party Government (New York: Holt, Reinehart and Winston, 1942), p.98. On 
the need for more formal institutions besides secondary associations, see James Johnson, “Arguing for 
Deliberation: Some Skeptical Considerations”, in Jon Elster (ed.), Deliberative Democracy, 
(Cambridge, U.K.; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p.175. Johnson also recognizes the 
need for both deliberative and non-deliberative processes. Quite surprisingly, though, he does not 
explicitly mention political parties 
32 Rosenblum, On the Side of the Angels, p.266. 
33 Ibid., p.272. 
34 Ibid., p.299. On this point, see also Gutmann and Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement, pp. 
57-58. 
35 Rosenblum, On the Side of the Angels, p.306. 
36 Ibid., p.307. See also Jürgen Habermas, “Popular Sovereignty as Procedure”, in James Bohman and 
William Rehg (eds.), Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics (Cambridge, Mass. 
And London: The MIT Press, 1997), p.48 and p.60. 
37 See Cohen, “Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy”, p.31 and Thomas Christiano, The Rule of 
the Many (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), pp.222-4 and pp.244-8. 
38 James Johnson, “Political Parties and Deliberative Democracy?”, p.50. 
39 Rosenblum, On the Side of the Angels, p.294. 




liberties”.41 This is especially evident when parties are publicly funded and are 
therefore more immune to the political and economic pressures exerted upon them by 
lobbies and interest groups.42  
 
As well as regarding the relationship between political parties and democratic 
deliberation, scholars of party politics also display contrasting opinions regarding the 
relationship between intra- and inter-party democracy. Some argue, for example, that 
internal democracy helps party members’ participation and control over elected party 
officials,43 as well as a further deliberative link between public political realm and 
civil society.44 Others, in contrast, argue that limited internal democracy is necessary 
for both parties’ electoral success45 and their external unity.46 Similarly, I believe that 
the presence of a clear party ideology ought to have priority over intra-party 
democracy and deliberation. Indeed if we granted internal democracy precedence 
over party ideology (leaving therefore their programmatic characterization too open), 
parties would lose their unique bilingual nature and, crucially, their connecting role 
between civil society and public political realm. They would no longer coagulate 
diverse interests into comprehensive and credible manifestoes and programmes and 
they would therefore lose their function of linkages between social and political 
domains.  
 
Yet one should not dismiss too quickly the importance of intra-party democracy and 
deliberation. First, although the sphere of inter-pa ty democratic deliberation is 
where political parties primarily display the distinctive traits and advantages of 
                                                      
41 Ibid., p.18. 
42 Ibid., p.18. See also Adam Przeworski, “Deliberation and Ideological Domination”, in Elster (ed.), 
Deliberative Democracy, p.148. 
43 Richard S. Katz, “Party in Democratic Theory”, in Katz and Crotty (eds.), Handbook of Party 
Politics, pp.35-36. 
44 Knut Heidar, “Party Membership and Participation”, i  Katz and Crotty (eds.), Handbook of Party 
Politics, p.311. For this aspect, see also Jan Teorell, “A Deliberative Defence of Intra-Party 
Democracy”, Party Politics, Vol.5, No.3 (1999), pp.363-82. 
45 Eric M. Uslaner, “Political Parties and Social Capital, Political Parties or Social Capital”, in Katz 
and Crotty (eds.), Handbook of Party Politics, p.383 and Rosenblum, On the Side of the Angels, 
pp.269-270. 
46 For this point see Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper, 1957), 
p.25 and E.E. Schattschneider, Party Government (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1942), 
p.60. For a critique of this argument, see Ian Budge, The New Challenge of Direct Democracy 




partisan identity (e.g. moderation, acceptance of pluralism etc.), intra-party 
deliberation might contribute to enhancing a deliberative habit and attitude in party 
members, thus rendering them more suited to engagin in inter-party deliberation 
and behaving like true partisans. Second, and most importantly, intra-party 
deliberation may help to prevent an excessive polarization of partisan advocacy and 
party pluralism. The dominance of polarized views, hich might result from the lack 
of internal debate, would certainly contribute to increasing the rigidity and 
polarization of inter-party politics. This would lead to a distorted party system, not 
reflecting the true positions of party members (as it would exclude those of the 
internally excluded members) and inevitably reinforcing an authoritarian way of 
managing political parties, by reducing the accountabili y of party leaders.47 Above 
all, a polarized party system would risk undermining the parties’ consensus on a 
common institutional framework, thus causing parties to infringe the normative 
criteria of loyal opposition and regulated rivalry, as they would no longer be parts-of-
the whole but parts against the whole.     
 
Pragmatist Deliberation and Political Parties 
I believe that deliberative democrats, even when thy do not disregard parties,  pay 
little attention to the specific way parties may influence, condition and shape the 
process itself of deliberation. Parties do not just provide new deliberative arenas, 
(alternative or additional to those provided by non-partisan associations within civil 
society) or prevent the economic disadvantage of some citizens from becoming a 
political disadvantage, limiting their opportunities of political participation. They do 
not merely select a range of political issues and a deliberative agenda. Parties which 
comply with the normative criteria of party politics that I presented in the first 
chapter reshape comprehensive conceptions of the good and present them as 
comprehensive-views-among-many-views, comprehensive-views-committed-to-
testing-and-trial and comprehensive-views-respecting-the-common-political-
framework. Rather than being distinct arenas within which deliberation can be 
carried out, such parties can therefore be the semi-institutional tools through which 
values and policy proposals are reshaped and conveyed into a broader deliberative 
                                                      
47 See, for example, Richard S. Katz, “Party in Democrati  Theory”, in Katz and Crotty (eds.), 




ground, be it the parliament or, during campaigns, a more informal public sphere 
(e.g. TV, newspapers, public debates etc.).  
 
Most importantly, the rationale for deliberation, conducted through parties, stems 
from the normative criteria of party politics. Parties ought to acknowledge pluralism, 
display loyal opposition and pursue power only through legal means. They therefore 
ought to submit their views and policy proposals to the trial of electoral politics and 
the challenges and scrutiny of other parties and of the public opinion. These 
challenges also become manifest in parliamentary debates and during electoral 
campaigns. Parties also ought to accept the reversibility of consensus and the 
provisional nature of political power. Parties ought not to pursue their goals in a way 
which ignores the challenges and the alternative views put forward by other parties. 
There is therefore a clear link between the normative d mension of party politics and 
the pragmatist model of deliberation illustrated by Misak.  
 
Indeed, in ideal terms, “partisans do not look to liquidate, erase or permanently 
disorganize the opposition…[P]artisans do not see minority status as 
irreversible…Partisans in the majority, too, recognize that their standing is partial 
and temporary…[P]artisanship entails commitment to the provisional nature of 
political authority”.48 These features correspond to the central aspects of a pragmatist 
model of deliberation. The provisional value of political power, the importance 
attributed to inquiry and testing and the acknowledgement of the partiality of one’s 
political perspective are all expressions of both pragmatist deliberation and of the 
normative criteria of party politics. Therefore the pragmatist model seems to be 
particularly suitable for making sense of party politics.  
 
Furthermore, the link between pragmatist deliberation and political parties also helps 
to resolve a normative problem which characterizes Misak’s account. Indeed, even 
though her pragmatist model contains important improvements on alternative models 
of deliberation and on Rawls’s political liberalism, it still appears to rely on some 
kinds of unjustified substantive grounds. Misak’s definition of “belief”, contrasted 
                                                      




with “dogmatic opinion”,49 seems to replicate the problematic presence of underlying 
unwarranted assumptions analogous to Rawls’s idea of “reasonableness” and to 
Habermas’s restricted notion of communication, both criticized by Misak.50 
  
However, I believe that this vicious circle of justification is only problematic if we 
focus on individual citizens. In this respect, we may have to acknowledge that the 
pragmatist model of deliberation is powerless for dealing, for example, with a neo-
Nazi citizen. The attempt to persuade her of the legitimacy of democratic principles 
by simply claiming that she is not behaving as a true believer seems to entail a 
circular argument. We would then need to explain, in fact, why a true believer is the 
one depicted by Misak and not a person holding dogmatic views. Furthermore, we 
should in the first instance find a legitimate argument for persuading the neo-Nazi 
citizen to engage in democratic deliberation and accept challenges to her views. 
Party politics, instead, already presents clear normative criteria. Parties ought to face 
the challenges to their views which emerge in electoral contests, campaigns, 
parliamentary debates etc., and which ought to be conducted within the constraints of 
the political framework within which they operate. Parties which contravene these 
criteria ought to be excluded from democratic politics. As well as providing the 
institutional embodiment of the model of pragmatist deliberation that I have 
endorsed in this chapter, parties thus also contribute to enhancing its normative 
soundness making it useful for concrete purposes. 
 
Finally, focusing on political parties helps to enha ce the rationale for the liberal 
democratic character of pragmatist deliberation emphasized by Misak, when she 
argues that “[t]he pragmatist’s route to the preservation of autonomy, equal moral 
worth, and respect for persons is that preserving these things is a vital part of 
deliberation aimed at the truth”.51 Political parties, we have seen, ought to comply 
with the normative criterion of loyal opposition. Within liberal democratic polities, 
this entails that they ought to respect the principles of autonomy, equal moral worth 
                                                      
49 See n.13 in this chapter. 
50 See n.14 in this chapter. 
51 Misak, Truth, Politics, Morality, p.115. According to Misak, “if we are to take seriously the 
experiences of all, we must let ways of life flourish so that they can be articulated and we must let 




and respect for persons. Therefore, even though it might be questioned whether 
deliberation aimed at the truth (conducted outside the realm of party politics) does in 
itself involve such principles, it can certainly be asserted that, when such a 
deliberation is conducted through political parties within liberal democratic polities, 
it ought to abide by these principles.    
 
Given this background, and the distinctive relationship between parties and 
deliberation, I believe that the pragmatist model of deliberative democracy that I 
have outlined in the present chapter provides a sounder common normative 
framework which may allow the flourishing and the open interaction of a plurality of 
political parties. Among the contributions provided by Misak’s theory (reinterpreted 
in the way that I illustrated) for a normative account of political parties, I would like 
to highlight its inclusive character, as well as the absence of a neat distinction 
between public and non-public spheres and between moral and ethical domains. I 
also endorse Misak’s attempt to renounce any referenc  to substantive values in 
order to justify the legitimacy of her democratic model. Although there are still some 
substantive premises at the basis of her normative framework, e.g. in her conception 
of “true belief”, I have shown how these can be integrated by the normative criteria 
of party politics.   
 
Conclusion 
The analysis of pragmatist deliberation that I have conducted in this chapter 
concludes the second part of my thesis, in which I have developed a normative 
framework for understanding the legitimate limits of party politics and the 
significance of political parties in the context of deliberative democracy. In the third 
part I will narrow the object of my analysis and focus on religious political parties, as 
these provide a paradigmatic example of the potential moderating implications of 
party politics. In the next chapter I will thus examine recent debates in contemporary 
political theory concerning the idea of public reason and the role of religious 
arguments in the public political forum. While endorsing the idea of a more inclusive 
public sphere than the one advocated by political lberals, I will argue that religious 




guarantee for an open but critically checked public deliberation, by conforming to 






































Chapter 7 - Secularism, Public Reason and Religious Political 
Parties 
 
The concept of secularism and the relationship betwe n political and religious realms 
have been extensively analysed in a variety of academic disciplines and from a 
number of different methodological perspectives. Particularly important, in this 
sense, is the sociological literature on secularism, whose central strand, since the 
early days of the social sciences, has been the so-called “theory of secularization”. 
The core meaning of the theory is the idea of “societal modernization as a process of 
functional differentiation and emancipation of the s cular spheres – primarily the 
state, the economy, and science – from the religious sphere and the concomitant 
differentiation and specialization of religion within its own newly found religious 
sphere”.1 This process, the theory suggests, has resulted in the gradual decline and 
privatization of religion.2 Systematized by Emile Durkheim and Max Weber,3 the 
theory was substantially revised during the 1960s, when several sociologists began to 
highlight more the process of differentiation between religious and secular spheres, 
rather than an actual decline of religion in the Western modern world.4 After the 
subsequent re-emergence of religion in the public sphere, during the 1980s the link 
between differentiation and privatization also began to falter. Indeed, as well as 
arguing against the identification of differentiation and privatization, Casanova also 
highlights the “deprivatization of modern religion”5 and the positive role that religion 
itself may have within modern societies, by inducing public reflection about 
society’s normative structure, questioning the functionalist logic underlying modern 
states and markets and providing an alternative to the dominant paradigm of liberal 
                                                      
1 José Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World (Chicago and London: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1994), p.19. 
2 Ibid., p.20. For a systematic critique of the three theses, see ibid., pp.25-39. 
3 Ibid., p.17. See Émile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life (translated from the 
French by Joseph Ward Swain) (New York: Free Press, 1965) and Max Weber, “Science as a 
Vocation”, in H.H. Gerth and C.W. Mills (eds.), From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1946), pp.129-156. 
4 See Peter Berger, The Sacred Canopy (Garden City, N.J.: Doubleday, 1967); David Martin, The 
Religious and the Secular (London : Routledge & K. Paul, 1969) and Thomas Luckmann, Invisible 
Religion (New York: Macmillan, 1967). 




individualism.6 Also Peter L. Berger,7 like Casanova, has recently highlighted the 
flawed assumptions and conclusions of the theory of secularization, highlighting the 
resurgence of religious movements (especially orthodox ones),8 even in Western 
Europe, and thus substantially rebuffing his own earli r work.9   
 
Political Parties and the Institutional Dimension of Secularism 
Despite the interesting implications that it may have for a sociological analysis of the 
relationship between religion and politics, the secularization theory is not particularly 
relevant for the normative scope of my inquiry. Indee , as Veit Bader rightly 
emphasizes, “[f]rom the perspective of liberal democratic politics and normative 
theory, the important question is not whether society and state are fully secularized 
or secular...What matters is whether [a state] is decent and liberal 
democratic…[and]…communications, arguments and opini ns…[are]...conducive to 
an agonistic democratic dialogue”.10 As the subject of my study is religious partisan 
politics, and as my perspective is that of a normative political theorist, I will 
disregard purely sociological accounts of secularism and focus instead on two 
specific strands of the literature on secularism, namely the philosophical and 
institutional strands.  
 
More precisely, in the present chapter I will examine recent debates in normative 
political theory concerning the relationship between politics and religion, and the 
constraints that should be imposed upon the use of r ligious arguments in the public 
realm. In my analysis, I will partly refer back to the critique of Rawls’s conception of 
public reason that I conducted in the second chapter. While endorsing the position of 
those theorists who invoke a more inclusive public sphere than that advocated by 
political liberals, though one still characterized by a set of deliberative constraints, I 
                                                      
6 Ibid., pp.228-229. 
7 Peter L. Berger, “The Desecularization of the World: A Global Overview”, in Peter L. Berger (ed.), 
The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics (Washington, D.C.: Ethics 
and Public Policy Center; Grand Rapids, Mich.: W.B. Eerdmans Pub. Co., 1999), pp.1-18. 
8 Ibid., p.6. 
9 Berger, The Sacred Canopy. For a comprehensive and up-do-date overview of the theory of 
secularization, see Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, Mass.; London: The Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, 2007). 
10 Veit Bader, Secularism or Democracy? Associational Governance of Religious Diversity 




will argue that religious political parties can be especially valuable in providing the 
institutional and normative guarantee for an open but critically checked public 
deliberation, by complying with the normative criteia of party politics that I outlined 
in the first chapter.  
 
In the eighth and ninth chapters, instead, I will move on to an analysis of the 
institutional dimension of secularism, examining various ideal models of church-
state relations and analysing their implications for religious political parties. 
Focusing on the institutional dimension is necessary fo  two main reasons, one 
exogenous and the other endogenous to the scope of my inquiry. The former, 
highlighted by Bader, is that “[o]ur interpretations and applications of moral 
principles and rights such as religious freedom(s) are massively influenced by 
respective predominant institutional regimes of religious governance in different 
countries”.11 The close relationship and interaction between normative and empirical 
dimensions render therefore necessary “a contextualized theory of morality, 
combined with an institutional turn in political philosophy and theory”.12 While 
endorsing this methodological shift, though, I also believe that the “institutional 
turn” in political theory must be accompanied by a parallel “normative turn” in the 
study of institutions and regimes of church-state relations. In other words, the need 
for a novel, hybrid perspective must help not only to contextualize normative 
findings but also to enlighten our understanding of existing institutional 
arrangements on the basis of ideal frameworks. Only if interpreted in this sense can 
the “institutional turn”, that I will discuss, be useful for both normative and empirical 
inquiry.    
 
The second reason for examining the institutional dimension of church-state relations 
is more directly grounded in the specific nature of religious parties and of parties in 
general. Due to their bilingual nature, and to their intermediate position between civil 
society and the political realm, parties are always ffected by the institutional 
framework within which they operate. Different regimes of religious governance 
institutionalize different (combinations of) normative values, including freedom of 
                                                      
11 Ibid., p.92. 




religious association and religious expression, right to religious education, equality 
between religious faiths etc. It is therefore crucial, in the case of religious parties, to 
look at the different levels of institutionalization of religious values which 
characterize various models of church-state relations as this conditions, in ideal 
terms, the extent to which religious parties may channel religious values and 
demands into the public political forum.  
 
Also in this case, however, it will be necessary to lo k at the relationship between 
ideal regimes of religious governance and ideal religious political parties, in order to 
unveil the normative implications of this analysis. Indeed, while endorsing, in the 
eighth chapter, a specific model of religious non-establishment as (ideally) the most 
suitable for the (ideal) presence and functioning of religious political parties, I will 
also highlight its flaws and suggest an alternative model which relies, normatively 
and institutionally, on religious political parties. Only by prioritizing the 
ideal/normative dimension can this critical account be feasible and help to provide an 
improved normative framework for making sense of religious partisan advocacy.     
 
Exclusivist Accounts of Public Reason 
In the second chapter, I addressed the problems involved in John Rawls’s analysis of 
public reason in relation to the bilingual agency of p litical parties. It emerged that 
the constraints of public reason invoked by Rawls would seriously jeopardize 
partisan advocacy for three main reasons. First, Rawls does not preclude the 
application of the limits of public reason to matters of ordinary politics, once such 
limits have been successfully applied to constitutional essentials and matters of basic 
justice. Second, Rawls clearly states that politica parties and their members (both in 
power and during electoral campaigns) are fully subject to the constraints of public 
reason when deliberating about matters involving constitutional essentials. Third, 
Rawls does not set a clear borderline between constitutional and non-constitutional 
matters, and between public and non-public realms. This makes it difficult to discern 
when and where the limits of public reason should apply and it implicitly signals that 




ordinary politics are discussed in the public political forum or within civil society.13 
 
As I extensively illustrated in the second chapter, Rawls envisages the possibility of 
an overlapping consensus of comprehensive conceptions of the good around a 
political conception of justice. The rationale for Rawls’s conclusion is what Cristina 
Lafont defines “overdetermination thesis”,14 i.e. the idea that “we are able to arrive at 
the same results by different epistemic paths”.15 Rawls’s strategy responds to the 
need to provide a neutral justification for political authority, given the fact of 
reasonable pluralism which characterizes liberal democratic societies. As I 
highlighted in the second chapter, and as Lafont also notes, in Political Liberalism 
Rawls emphasizes that, in order to guarantee the democratic legitimacy of political 
decisions, not only public officials (e.g. members of the constitutional court, of the 
parliament etc.) but also ordinary citizens ought to abide by the constraints of public 
reason, and therefore only appeal to political reasons, when voting in elections on 
matters concerning constitutional essentials and basic justice.16  
 
In truth, in “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited” Rawls seems to relax this 
requirement when he argues that the constraints of public reason should only apply 
to debates about fundamental issues in “the public political forum”.17 The latter, he 
argues, comprises judges, government officials and candidates for public office but 
not ordinary citizens, when they deliberate (even about fundamental matters) in the 
informal public sphere of civil society, what Rawls defines the “background 
culture”.18 Yet, even in this later statement, Rawls still endorses a “criterion of 
reciprocity”,19 namely the view that “ideally citizens are to think of themselves as if 
they were legislators and ask themselves what statutes…they would think it most 
reasonable to enact”.20 This seems to confirm that Rawls still supports an expansive 
                                                      
13 See my analysis in chapter 2. 
14 Cristina Lafont, “Religion in the Public Sphere: Remarks on Habermas’s Conception of Public 
Deliberation in Postsecular Societies”, Constellations, Vol. 14, No.2 (2007), p.240. 
15 Ibid., p.240 (italics in original). 
16 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (Expanded Edition) (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2005a), p.215. 
17 John Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited” in Political Liberalism, p.443. 
18 Ibid., p.444. 
19 Ibid., p.445. 




conception of public reason and, therefore, a narrow scope for public deliberation, 
both in the public political forum and within civil society.   
 
Even more radically than Rawls, Robert Audi21 endorses an exclusivist conception of 
public deliberation and openly characterizes public reasons as secular, i.e. those 
reasons whose normative justification does not rely upon the existence of God. Only 
these reasons, he argues, may provide the rationale for the state promotion of “laws 
or policies that restrict the scope, or even the de facto exercise, of liberty”.22 Besides 
this “principle of secular rationale” Audi also illustrates the “principle of secular 
advocacy”,23 which demands the exclusion of religious considerations from public 
debate unless absolutely necessary for elucidating one’s motives, and the “principle 
of secular resolution”,24 which establishes that “while any kind of factor may enter 
into the discussion…a final decision to adopt a policy should be fully warranted by 
secular considerations and promulgated in that light”.25 Furthermore, in order to 
prevent an exterior commitment to secular reasons from concealing the de facto 
endorsement of religious values, Audi endorses “a principle of partial secular 
motivation”,26 establishing that “[m]y conduct toward others can…be mainly 
coloured by my religious preferences, so long as I find a secular rationale strong 
enough in my own thinking so that I would not press my religious views without 
it”. 27 
 
One common critique raised against exclusivist accounts such as Rawls’s and Audi’s 
is that they impose undue cognitive burdens upon religious citizens, for whom 
religion represents a totalizing force, encompassing all aspects of their lives. As 
Nicholas Wolterstorff highlights, “it belongs to the religious convictions of a good 
many religious people in our society that they ought to base their decisions 
                                                      
21 Robert Audi, “The Separation of Church and State and the Obligations of Citizenship”, Philosophy 
and Public Affairs, Vol.18, No.3, Summer (1989), pp.259-296. 
22 Ibid., p.279. For this point, see also Robert Audi, “The Place of Religious Argument in a Free and 
Democratic Society”, San Diego Law Review, Vol.30, No.4 (1993) p.701. 
23 Audi, “The Separation of Church and State and the Obligations of Citizenship”, p.280. 
24 Ibid., p.280. 
25 Ibid., p.280. 
26 Ibid., p.286. 




concerning fundamental issues of justice on their religious convictions”.28 Moreover, 
quite often non-religious reasons may simply not be available to religious citizens. 
The latter may therefore not be able to endorse a political decision on grounds 
different from those which derive from their religious comprehensive doctrines.29 
This is also one of the main problems that I highlited in my critique of Rawls in 
the second chapter.   
 
The account recently provided by Jürgen Habermas30 seems in principle less 
vulnerable than Rawls’s (and Audi’s) to the so-called “split-identity objection”,31 i.e. 
the critique that, within secular regimes, religious citizens are forced to relinquish 
their religious views (and therefore separate their public identities from their non-
public ones) when engaging in public deliberation. Habermas clearly distinguishes 
formal from informal public spheres and invokes an “i stitutional translation 
proviso” implying that “only secular reasons count beyond the institutional threshold 
that divides the informal public sphere from parliaments, courts, ministries and 
administrations”.32 As the translation proviso is only required for public officials, 
ordinary citizens may appeal to their religious comprehensive doctrines without 
having to provide parallel public reasons. Yet thisframework, Lafont notes, presents 
the same problems which emerge from Rawls’s account as political reasons, enabling 
an institutional translation, may not be available for religious citizens when they 
enter the formal public sphere. Although Habermas’s distinction between the two 
domains is clearer than Rawls’s, and although he imposes conversational constraints 
only upon the formal public sphere, such constraints seem to be as strict as the 
Rawlsian ones.33   
 
                                                      
28 Nicholas Wolterstorff, “The Role of Religion in Decision and Discussion of Political Issues”, in 
Robert Audi and Nicholas Wolterstorff, Religion in the Public Square (London: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 1997), p.105 (italics in original). 
29 Lafont, “Religion in the Public Sphere: Remarks on Habermas’s Conception of Public Deliberation 
in Postsecular Societies”, p.244. 
30 Jürgen Habermas, “Religion in the Public Sphere”, European Journal of Philosophy, Vol.14, No. 1 
(2006), pp.1-25. 
31 Melissa Yates, “Rawls and Habermas on Religion in the Public Sphere”, Philosophy and Social 
Criticism, Vol.33, No.7 (2007), p.883. 
32 Habermas, “Religion in the Public Sphere”, pp.9-10. 
33 Lafont, “Religion in the Public Sphere: Remarks on Habermas’s Conception of Public Deliberation 




In truth, Habermas also advocates a “self-reflectiv ranscending of a secularist self-
understanding of Modernity”.34 In a post-secular society, characterized by the 
established presence of religious communities, secular citizens must take religion 
seriously and restrain from denying the possible truth of religious claims. They must 
adopt “an epistemic mindset…that would originate from a self-critical assessment of 
the limits of secular reason”.35 As Melissa Yates highlights, this requirement, that 
Habermas imposes upon non-believers, does restore “a symmetrical account of civic 
obligations”36 which assigns a duty of “cognitive openness” to both religious and 
non-religious citizens. Yet, like Lafont, she highli ts that “the split between one’s 
identity as a co-legislator and one’s identity as a religious person persists at a 
different theoretical level, but maintains a significant resemblance to the distinction 
upheld in Rawls’s theory between citizens’ public and non-public selves”.37 
 
Beyond the Public-Private Divide: Inclusive Accounts of the Public Political 
Realm 
What emerges from the analysis conducted in the previous section has important 
implications for religious political parties. Exclusivist conceptions of public reason, 
such as those provided by Rawls, Audi and Habermas, pre ent common features in 
their accounts of the relationship between religious and political reasons. They all 
establish an institutional borderline beyond which only political reasons may be 
admitted into public deliberation. Despite the different characterizations of this 
borderline, the three conceptions agree in compelling religious citizens to split their 
identities when switching from the informal to the formal public sphere. As the only 
standard idiom admitted in the latter realm is a secular or political one, these 
accounts impose an unfair burden upon religious citizens, forcing them to both 
divorce themselves from their most profound beliefs and struggle to reformulate their 
religious reasons in public political terms.    
 
This problem, which I had already envisaged in the second chapter when I assessed 
the compatibility between party politics and Rawls’s political liberalism, seems to be 
                                                      
34 Habermas, “Religion in the Public Sphere”, p.15. 
35 Ibid., p.15. 
36 Yates, “Rawls and Habermas on Religion in the Public Sphere”, p.887. 




particularly relevant for religious political parties. Many religious comprehensive 
doctrines (i.e. those which, in Rawls’s terms, lack n “account of free faith”) are 
likely to be excluded by Rawls from the public political realm. This likely exclusion 
is also clear in Habermas’s and Audi’s accounts. The split-identity issue which 
characterizes these approaches prevents therefore the cognitive and political 
continuity, between civil society and public political realm, which religious political 
parties require in order to preserve their role of bilingual semi-institutional channels 
of religious comprehensive views.  
 
Yet there are alternative models of public deliberation which reject the Rawlsian-
Habermasian exclusivist approach and share instead the endorsement of an inclusive 
public political realm, open to the contributions of religious citizens. The main 
condition that these accounts impose upon religious citizens, on entering the public 
political realm, is that they ought to be willing to face the challenges and critiques 
arising during the process of public deliberation. This argument presupposes the 
epistemological assumption that religious reasons are not essentially obscure but 
accessible to non-believers, and that therefore they may be critically evaluated and, if 
necessary, rejected by the latter, without having to be “translated” into political or 
secular reasons. While endorsing the basic assumptions of these inclusive models, I 
will also highlight the potential flaws which characterize them. I will then explain 
how religious political parties, by complying with e normative criteria of party 
politics that I presented in the first chapter, may be invaluable institutional tools for 
ensuring the feasibility of this inclusive public deliberation while guaranteeing that 
religious citizens maintain a self-critical attitude, open to argumentative challenges. 
Outside party politics, such commitments, although not unfeasible, might be more 
difficult to achieve.  
 
The first aspect usually highlighted by defenders of an inclusive public political 
realm is that, in order to take religious or non-religious reasons seriously in public 
deliberation, it should be sufficient “to evaluate them strictly on their merits and thus 




why they may be wrong, in case one thinks they are”.38 According to Lafont, though, 
the right to include in public debate one’s sincere r asons (e.g. religious ones) should 
be distinguished from “a right to be released from the obligation to engage the views 
and reasons of others in order to justify to them the coercive policies one favours”.39 
In other words, the right to appeal to religious reasons does not involve the right to a 
“‘mono-glot’ political advocacy”40 or to the protection of one’s cognitive integrity as
this would be incompatible with a genuine process of democratic deliberation, testing 
both religious and non-religious views on the basis of arguments and 
counterarguments.      
 
Similarly to Lafont, Maeve Cooke highlights how Habermas’s institutional 
translation proviso is too restrictive and undermines “the transformative power of 
deliberation”41 that Habermas himself has helped to delineate through his discourse 
ethics and the non-authoritarian account of truth and knowledge which characterizes 
his theory of communicative rationality.42 If the arguments put forward by citizens 
who endorse different comprehensive views must be acc ssible to every citizen from 
the beginning, she argues, then there is no actual need for deliberation. Cooke 
invokes instead an open-ended deliberation in which “general agreement is construed 
as a regulative idea that guides our practices while always transcending our powers 
to achieve it”,43 so that political legitimacy does not depend on the actual attainment 
of such an agreement but rather on the process itself which tends towards it. This 
view, she argues, finds institutional expression in the provisional character of 
majoritarian politics and it corresponds to the model that Habermas himself provides 
in Between Facts and Norms.44  
 
                                                      
38 Lafont, “Religion in the Public Sphere: Remarks on Habermas’s Conception of Public Deliberation 
in Postsecular Societies”, p.249 (italics in original). 
39 Ibid., p.252 (italics in original). 
40 Ibid., p.253. 
41 Maeve Cooke, “A Secular State for a Postsecular Society? Postmetaphysical Political Theory and 
the Place of Religion”, Constellations, Vol.14, No.2 (2007), p.228. 
42 Maeve Cooke, “Salvaging and Secularizing the Semantic Contents of Religion: the Limitations of 
Habermas's Postmetaphysical Proposal”, International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Vol.60 
(2006), p,199. 
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44 Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms (translated from the German by William Rehg) 




According to Cooke, then, Habermas simply fails to apply his own theory to the 
analysis of religious beliefs and “to distinguish between religious beliefs that are 
epistemologically authoritarian and those that are not”.45 Only the former, Cooke 
argues, must be excluded from democratic deliberation and decision-making as they 
consider knowledge of the final truth not as a regulative ideal but rather as an 
achieved goal, thus undermining the whole process of critical questioning and 
argumentation which should characterize public deliberation.46 According to Cooke, 
therefore, metaphysical understanding of truth (such as the one displayed by 
religious faiths) needs not be epistemologically authoritarian. As long as it is 
accompanied by the idea that only fallible knowledg of truth is possible, it is 
entirely compatible with democratic deliberative processes. Furthermore, Cooke 
argues, having acquired their beliefs through revelation does not prevent religious 
citizens from being able to provide reasons to sustain heir views in public 
deliberation.47 Similarly to Cooke, Christopher Eberle48 highlights how religious 
citizens need not deny the existence of infallible religious texts (e.g. the Bible, the 
Koran etc.) but only that of infallible interpretations of those texts, in order to 
participate in public discourse. Eberle therefore invokes “inclusion coupled with 
criticism”,49 i.e. a model of public deliberation which admits both religious and 
secular reasons as long as they accept being exposed to critical assessment.   
 
Religious Political Parties and Inclusive Deliberation 
Religious political parties can be especially useful, in ideal terms, for providing the 
semi-institutional guarantee for the self-critical, non-authoritarian kind of political 
advocacy invoked by defenders of an inclusive public political forum (such as 
Lafont, Cooke and Eberle) as an alternative to the Rawlsian/Habermasian exclusivist 
model. Indeed it is unclear, at first glance, why religious citizens should be 
committed to the non-authoritarian and self-critical kind of political advocacy which, 
according to these authors, should accompany a moreinclusive public political realm 
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46 Cooke, “A Secular State for a Postsecular Society?”, p.235. 
47 Cooke, “Salvaging and Secularizing the Semantic Contents of Religion”, p.200. 
48 Christopher J. Eberle, “Religion, Pacifism and theDoctrine of Restraint”, Journal of Religious 
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and replace Rawls’s and Habermas’s secular constraits. From a normative 
perspective, it is unclear why religious (or non-religious) citizens ought to engage the 
views and reasons of other citizens, display a non-authoritarian understanding of 
truth and embrace a self-critical attitude, alimented by “the transformative power of 
deliberation”,50 if not on the basis of the normative criteria of party politics. From an 
institutional perspective, it is uncertain how an iclusive and critical public 
deliberation could be guaranteed and sustained, if not through religious parties.   
 
Religious political parties operating within liberal democracies ought to commit to 
the non-authoritarian promotion of comprehensive conceptions of the good, and to 
the provisional character of majoritarian politics. They thus can be the institutional 
embodiments of Cooke’s idea that the metaphysical understanding of truth needs not 
entail epistemological authoritarianism. By complying with the normative criteria of 
party politics that I outlined in the first chapter, religious parties can convey the 
former while refusing the latter. Parties ought not t  forsake their metaphysical 
conceptions of truth but only accept “that they are parts and will always be seen as 
partial…All that is necessary is acknowledging that organized political disagreement 
is ineliminable and party conflict its form”.51  
 
I also explained, in the first and third chapter, how political parties ought to respect 
party pluralism. While conveying metaphysical understandings of truth, they ought 
to acknowledge that they express politically partial demands and forsake any 
ambition to permanently impose them upon the whole s ciety, ignoring other parties. 
Furthermore, religious parties ought to reject any uthoritarian stance and be open to 
the challenges and criticisms they face in public deliberation. The transformative 
power of party politics, more than “the transformative power of deliberation”,52 can 
therefore be especially valuable for guaranteeing the presence of an inclusive public 
political forum, where metaphysical understandings of truth are welcomed as long as 
they are accompanied by a self-critical attitude and openness toward a plurality of 
reasons and beliefs.  
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The second argument usually put forward by defenders of an inclusive public 
deliberation is that citizens need not share “some major premise and some mode of 
reasoning”53 or rely on a pre-existing consensus grounded on ideas implicit in the 
political culture of Western societies (as claimed, for example, by Rawls), but only 
adopt an open and imaginative mind and the readiness to be exposed to unfamiliar 
and challenging perspectives. According to Jeremy Waldron, for example, admitting 
religious views into political life does not necessarily lead to “a babel of mutually 
unintelligible and incommensurable metaphysics”.54 Referring to the Aristotelian 
idea of deliberation, in which contributions in public debate must be “apt to be 
received by other members of the community”,55 Waldron defends “the idea of 
shared modes of reasoning, a common matrix of public understanding on which 
various views of various people can be laid out, compared, contrasted and 
synthesized”.56 Public consensus as a pre-condition for deliberation should therefore 
be replaced, according to Waldron, by the Wittgensti ian idea of “family 
resemblances”.57 This implies that, rather than a fixed set of publicly endorsed 
propositions, “several sets of views may exist, each of which has a claim to be 
regarded as ‘the public consensus’, if anything is to be so regarded”.58  
 
The need for an “imaginative approach” to public deliberation is also highlighted by 
Bhikhu Parekh, one of the main advocates of an inclusive public sphere in which 
religious people may convey their religious values and reasons without having to 
translate them into secular arguments. According to Parekh, the only requirement is 
that “if religious persons wish to persuade others, they must speak in a manner to 
which the latter can imaginatively relate and respond”.59 This does not imply, for 
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54 Ibid., p.835. 
55 Ibid., p.836 (italics in original). 
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Parekh, that religious people must adopt neutral (rational and secular) arguments.60 
According to him, religious language does not create particular difficulties in 
political life, especially in contemporary Western societies where political debate is 
already “multilingual” and has been able so far to accommodate the instances of 
communists, conservatives, liberals etc.61 Furthermore, Parekh argues, religions have 
often contributed to the development of emancipatory movements and, even when 
they endorse controversial policy decisions (e.g. forbidding abortion), they stimulate 
public debate within society concerning values and moral practices.62 
 
Similarly, Michael J. Perry63 argues that religious beliefs are not in principle more 
controversial than nonreligious ones. Both kinds are susceptible to participation in 
public deliberation and reason-giving processes. Above all, Perry argues, religious 
beliefs are not necessarily more sectarian, monologic, rigid and destabilizing than 
secular ones and, crucially, they “do not have a different, much less inferior, 
epistemological status from that of other beliefs, a status that makes them less 
appropriate than other beliefs as a basis for a political choice”.64 Perry endorses 
therefore a form of “epistemological holism”, refusing any qualitative 
epistemological distinction between religious and nonreligious beliefs and arguments 
in public debate. Yet admitting religious beliefs into public deliberation means 
recognizing that their epistemological status is not i ferior to that of nonreligious 
views, but it does not imply that they will always prevail over opposing (religious or 
nonreligious) views. A political choice, grounded in religious reasons, might be 
rejected if “the reasons opposing the choice (which may even be religious reasons) 
are stronger than the reasons supporting it”.65  
 
                                                      
60 For the idea of a neutral epistemological standpoint see, for example, Larry Alexander, “Liberalism, 
Religion, and the Unity of Epistemology”, San Diego Law Review, Vol.30, No.4 (1993), p.797. See 
also Stephen L. Carter, “Evolutionism, Creationism, and Treating Religion as a Hobby”, Duke Law 
Journal, Vol.1987, No.6, December (1987), pp.992-993. 
61 Parekh, “The Voice of Religion in Political Discourse”, p.74. 
62 Ibid., pp.70-71. In order to guarantee the institutional integration of religious groups, Parekh 
suggests the creation of “a national interreligious forum” (ibid., p.78). See also Bhikhu Parekh, 
Rethinking Multiculturalism (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006a), p.331. 
63 Michael J. Perry, “Religious Morality and Political Choice: Further Thoughts - And Second 
Thoughts - on Love and Power”, San Diego Law Review, Vol.30 (1993), pp.703-727. 
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Although I endorse epistemological holism and agree that religious reasons need not 
in principle be incomprehensible to non-believers, I also believe that certain 
arguments, deeply grounded in religious texts or tradi ions, may not immediately be 
intelligible to non-religious citizens when put forward in the public political forum. 
Religious political parties can provide, in this sen , a second important contribution 
to an inclusive public deliberation. Thanks to their b lingual nature, they can 
contribute in rendering such arguments more accessibl  to the general public, by 
linking them to specific and concrete policy matters all citizens are likely to be 
familiar with (e.g. abortion, public funding of religious schools etc.). Through their 
manifestoes and party programmes, religious parties can therefore establish a formal 
interrelation between the comprehensive religious doctrines by which they are 
inspired, and the variety of policy issues that they n ed to address during electoral 
campaigns or when they are in power. In this way, non-religious citizens can acquire 
a better grasp of the meanings of certain religious beliefs, and of their implications 
for political matters which affect the whole society, thus becoming more equipped to 
critically evaluate and sometimes reject those views. In this way, religious political 
parties can also render religious views more vulnerabl  to public scrutiny, and 
therefore more suitable for public deliberation.   
 
Why Is Pluralistic Deliberation Through Religious Parties Valuable? 
Political parties ought to comply with the normative criteria of regulated rivalry and 
loyal opposition. They ought to ensure that the politicization of comprehensive views 
and public deliberation, involving both religious and non-religious citizens in the 
public political forum, are conducted within the limits and in the respect of a 
common constitutional and institutional framework. By complying with these 
criteria, both religious and non-religious parties can therefore prevent the escalation 
of political and religious division and enhance instead the idea of pluralistic 
unanimity. They can share the same common political framework and see themselves 
as parts-of-a-whole. Thanks to the normative criteria of party politics, and to its 
intermediate location between civil society and public political domain, religious 
parties can therefore be especially valuable tools for conveying the transformative 




religious and non-religious claims. Pluralistic delib ration conducted through 
religious political parties is, in ideal terms, a vital mechanism for channelling and 
moderating religious claims in a way that enhances democracy. As I explained in the 
previous chapter, the normative criteria of party politics reflect the central features of 
the pragmatist model of democratic deliberation that I endorsed.  
 
The channeling of religious demands via political prties, consistently with the 
normative criteria of party politics, can therefore allow religious individuals and 
groups not to be excluded from the public life of their political community and to 
have their voices heard at the political and institutional levels. The exclusion of 
religious groups from party politics might result ei h r from their choice not to 
participate or from the state’s decision to exclude religious values and religious 
advocacy from the political and institutional spheres. In the former case, religious 
groups which refuse to participate in democratic party politics should be aware that 
this might lead to their isolation and marginalization from the political community. 
The choice not to develop a religious political identity in order to participate in 
democratic politics, and to remain instead anchored to one’s holistic religious 
worldview may involve “high costs in a religiously pluralistic and democratic 
society. Self-distancing removes the religious community, its institutions and ideas, 
from participation in the larger spiritual and intellectual life of the nation and, 
through that, of one’s own time”.66 The latter case refers instead to those secularist or 
even political liberal arguments (some of which I have examined in the present 
chapter) which invoke the relegation of religious beliefs to the private sphere.  
 
The exclusion of conservative religious groups and parties from democratic politics 
is likely not to enhance their eagerness to compromise and negotiate on political 
matters. Instead, they are “more likely to become passionate (and perhaps paranoid) 
about their beliefs than included groups”.67 Their views will not be exposed to public 
scrutiny and challenges, being more likely to be reinforced by a limited and self-
referential deliberation conducted among the narrow limits of their religious 
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communities, where such views are already broadly endorsed. Rather than enhancing 
a sense of common belonging to the political community and a feeling of shared 
citizenship, this process might therefore intensify divisions and render them more 
disruptive of democratic politics.68 Banning religious parties from democratic 
politics, therefore, “is liable to close off the central political method of 
accommodating ethnic and religious pluralism, and can amount to the political 
exclusion of a whole sector of society”.69 
 
Especially in those societies characterized by religious pluralism, it is therefore 
important to provide religious communities with effective channels for conveying 
their values and their policy proposals into the political arena.  If such groups want to 
base public policies on their religious beliefs, it is important to let their views be 
challenged and questioned in the public political sphere. By including such views 
into political deliberation at the national level, “liberals [and, I would argue, any 
other group or individual opposing them] can challeng  them to provide evidence for 
their beliefs”.70 This also helps to defy the common liberal view that religious 
reasons are especially idiosyncratic and therefore not accessible to public 
deliberation involving non-religious citizens. Rather than by being shared by all 
citizens, reasons are public when “they are open to inspection and can be 
intelligently discussed by anyone with the requisite knowledge or willingness to 
acquire it”.71 
 
Pluralistic deliberation through religious political parties can therefore have a 
transformative effect. Religious citizens who have decided to create a party ought to 
abide by the legal constraints of party politics (e.g. participating in elections and pre-
electoral debates, fostering policy proposals through representatives in the parliament 
etc.). In this way, parties can put into practice th  deliberative potential often 
attributed to representative democracy and they “can serve as deliberative agents in 
democratic politics, and…be organized to enable deliberation”.72 By complying with 
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the normative criteria of party politics, parties can “preserve a high level of 
commitment to political action, yet be forced in some measure to speak the language 
of general welfare”.73 They can also reshape religious claims “in a way that is 
conducive to democratic participation”.74 Religious political identity, which they 
introduce in political life, is qualitatively differ nt from the religious (pre-political) 
identity of churches, religious sects or other non-partisan organizations.75 Party 
politics, therefore, can make religious views more suitable to public deliberation, e.g. 
by rendering them open to challenges, to confrontation with alternative views and to 
the provisional nature of political authority. Religious parties can also contribute in 
rendering the inclusion and participation of religious groups into the public political 
realm more systematic, therefore preventing them from maintaining a degree of 
exclusion which a merely occasional involvement might imply, thus offsetting the 
beneficial effects of participation in democratic politics.  
 
Furthermore, the inclusion of religious political parties into the public political realm 
of liberal democratic polities is also important because such parties represent the 
views and interests of (religious) sections of society, therefore performing an 
important democratic task. Banning them from democrati  politics, therefore, “is 
liable to close off the central political method of accommodating ethnic and religious 
pluralism, and can amount to the political exclusion of a whole sector of society”.76 
Without such parties, many religious citizens would lack the institutional channels 
for conveying their views into the public political realm. The democratic support that 
religious parties enjoy, especially when it provides them with political power (e.g. 
seats in the parliament) also enhances their legitimacy. Therefore if excluding 
religious parties a priori from political life might reduce the space for democratic 
expression and prevent the moderation of religious claims which can result from 
their deliberative function, excluding them once thy have acquired the legitimacy 
which comes from people’s democratic support may represent an even greater 
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infringement of democratic politics.   
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have illustrated the relationship between religious political parties 
and inclusive models of democratic deliberation. While endorsing the idea of an 
inclusive public political realm, I have also highlighted how religious political parties 
may be especially useful for obviating some of the normative difficulties raised by 
inclusive models of deliberation. By complying with t e normative criteria of party 
politics, religious parties can contribute in guaranteeing the presence of an inclusive 
public political forum, accompanied by a self-critical attitude and openness toward 
the reason and beliefs of other citizens (and parties). They can also help in 
establishing a formal interrelation between the comprehensive religious doctrines by 
which they are inspired, and the variety of policy issues which they need to address 
in their manifestoes and electoral programmes, thusrendering religious arguments 
more accessible to nonreligious citizens and open to public scrutiny. Finally, 
religious parties can contribute to a political delib ration conducted within the limits 
and in the respect of a common constitutional and institutional framework, thus 
preventing the factionalization and fragmentation of the political and institutional 
landscape. These arguments, I believe, enhance the case for allowing religious values 
and religious partisan mobilization into the public political realm. 
 
In the next chapter I will examine some ideal institutional models of church-state 
relations and assess their implications for a normative theory of religious political 
parties. In the ninth chapter, I will then endorse Veit Bader’s77 model of associative 
democracy (AD) and non-constitutional pluralism (NOC P) but argue that Bader 
neglects the role religious political parties can play in providing religious views with 
qualitatively novel features which make them suitable for the kind of deliberation he 
advocates. I will therefore conclude that Bader’s model is normatively justified and 
institutionally feasible only if religious political parties are placed at its core.      
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Chapter 8 - Institutional Models of Church-State Relations  
 
As I explained at the beginning of chapter 7, the influence of institutional 
arrangements of religious governance upon the ways normative principles (e.g. 
religious freedom, religious equality) are understood and implemented, raises the 
need for an “institutional turn in political philosphy and theory”.1 Yet I also argued 
that the “institutional turn” in political theory must be accompanied by a parallel 
“normative turn” in the study of institutions and regimes of church-state relations. In 
other words, the need for a novel, hybrid perspectiv  must help not only to 
contextualize normative findings but also to enlighten our understanding of existing 
institutional arrangements on the basis of normative ideal frameworks. Only if 
interpreted in this sense can the “institutional turn” be useful for both normative and 
empirical inquiry.    
 
Furthermore, I argued, due to their bilingual nature, and to their intermediate position 
between civil society and the political realm, (religious) political parties are always 
affected by the institutional framework within whic they operate. Different regimes 
of religious governance institutionalize different (combinations of) normative values, 
including freedom of religious association and religious expression, right to religious 
education, equality between religious faiths etc. It is therefore crucial, when 
examining religious parties from a normative perspectiv , to look at the level of 
institutionalization of religious values which characterizes different models of 
church-state relations as this will inevitably condition the extent to which religious 
parties may be allowed to channel religious values and demands into the public 
political realm. I will treat these various kinds of regimes of religious governance as 
“ideal types”2 and analyse their implications for ideal religious political parties. I will 
conclude, in the ninth chapter, that religious political parties are best incorporated 
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into the public political realm by a regime of religious non-establishment which 
guarantees the political institutionalization of a plurality of religious demands.   
 
Three Models of Church-State Relations 
Tariq Modood and Riva Kastoryano3 individuate three major institutional models of 
church-state relations which have been adopted, with some variations, by Western 
countries. Due to their mainly sociological approach, they analyse these models in 
their concrete dimension, referring to some specific polities in which they have been 
implemented in an almost paradigmatic way. I will instead look at these models in 
their ideal significance. My critique, although directed at Modood and Kastoryano’s 
analysis, will therefore address the ideal versions f the models that they illustrate. 
Only by looking at the relationship between ideal regimes of religious governance 
and ideal religious political parties, may it be possible to unveil the normative 
implications of this analysis. 
 
The first model illustrated by Modood and Kastoryano is the English one which, they 
argue, involves a clear distinction between the establi hed Anglican Church, 
institutionally connected to the state, and a deeply secular society. According to 
Modood and Kastoryano, the historical and theoretical roots of the English model 
must be found in the British Enlightenment, namely in the way of intending religion 
as a medium for the acquisition of morality.4 Furthermore, according to them, the 
historically limited power of the Anglican Church has contributed to the absence, in 
England, of a significant opposition to the established Church and of an anti-clerical 
movement.5 
 
The second model illustrated by Modood and Kastoryano is the American one. The 
First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States (US), stating that 
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“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting 
the free exercise thereof”,6 establishes a radical separation between church and st te. 
This, according to Modood and Kastoryano, aims to guarantee and promote religious 
diversity, which is considered as a valuable good in itself. Furthermore, contrary to 
the English model, the American one displays a regim  of state secularism coexisting 
with a very religious society, therefore revealing (as in England) the absence of a 
causal relationship between societal and political secularization.7 
 
The third model is the French one. Like the American one, Modood and Kastoryano 
note, the French model hinders the presence of an established church. However, 
contrary to both the American and the English varieties of secularism, it assigns to 
the state the duty to encourage the privatization of religion within civil society. 
Furthermore, while attributing to the republican inst tutions an almost religious 
connotation, the French state has retained a certain degree of control upon the 
various religious faiths and their representatives, and the latter have become almost 
like civil servants.8 The main consequence of this process, they argue, is that “[t]he 
state confers institutional legal status on the Catholic clergy, the Protestants of the 
National Federation of the Protestant Churches of France, and to the Jews governed 
by the Consistory created under Napoleon”.9 The French state seems thus able to 
control religious expression, foster anti-clericalism in civil society and prevent 
religious beliefs from entering the public political realm.  
 
The American Model 
If intended in ideal terms, the American model implies a neat separation between 
church and state, aiming above all to further the value of religious pluralism. In truth, 
American secularism has been interpreted in two different ways throughout history, 
as either accommodationism or separationism. The former allows a close relationship 
between state and religion (e.g. official references to religion, public funding of 
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religious school etc.) whereas the latter invokes a “w ll of separation” between the 
two domains.10 Although separationists prevailed over accommodatinists during the 
1960s, when they managed to disestablish monotheistic religion, accommodationists 
began to gradually regain influence under Ronald Reagan’s presidency during the 
1980s.11 Here, for the sake of my analysis, I will treat the American regime of 
religious governance as an expression of what Veit Bader defines Non-Establishment 
and Private Pluralism (NEPP), involving a strict separation between religious and 
political realms and allowing religious pluralism in civil society but not at the 
political and constitutional levels.12 
 
One of the positive implications of this model for religious partisan identity is that it 
favours a bottom-up channelling of societal religious instances. By promoting the 
diversity of faiths, American secularism allows broad scope for organized religion in 
civil society.13 Religious groups seek therefore to employ their powerful voice in 
order to influence the political process, both at the level of ordinary and 
constitutional politics. This in principle allows space for the bilingual agency of 
religious political parties, intended as carriers of c mprehensive conceptions of the 
good from civil society into the public political realm.   
 
To the extent that the American model of secularism encourages political 
channelling from below, it thus meets one of the main requirements for the presence 
of religious political parties. Nonetheless, one crucial feature of the American model, 
if interpreted in its ideal meaning, renders it incapable of accommodating religious 
parties. This is the neat separation that it imposes b tween church and state, and 
between political and religious realms. The “wall of separation” embodied by the 
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First Amendment precludes the presence of religious parties, both in normative and 
institutional terms. 
 
The bilingual nature of political parties, which is characterized by the promotion of 
particularistic and general principles, and by the ranslation of perfectionist (e.g. 
religious) claims into political ones, finds an insurmountable obstacle in the 
American model of secularism, ideally intended. In this model, the societal 
dynamism of religious organizations cannot in principle be translated into either 
(plural) religious establishment or religious partisan pluralism. Religious partisan 
identity is simply unattainable. Within this institutional framework, therefore, parties 
might not be able to balance “partisanship and impartial governing, loyalty to the 
party and loyalty to the state, party interest and general interest”.14 Instead, they 
might risk being reduced to behaving like factionalist movements, given the absence 
of an institutional point of connection between their pluralistic instances and the 
unity of the polity. Pluralistic unanimity and regulated rivalry are therefore 
unfeasible goals for religious parties operating within this model, and religious 
claims are condemned to remain merely partial and disintegrative.15 American 
secularism fails to provide the balance between a shared set of public values and 
citizens’ private allegiances which is necessary for the bilingualism of religious 
parties. In the absence of this balance, private religious instances might thus lead to 
social and political instability. The disintegrative tendency of the American model, 
intended in ideal terms, prevents the presence of rligious political parties as these 
are not given the chance to link their particularistic claims with the common 
constitutional and institutional framework, in orde to preserve their bilingualism.       
 
The French Model 
The French model presents paradoxical traits. As in the United States, in France 
there is no established church. Contrary to the American case, however, non-
                                                      
14 Ibid., p.65. See also ibid., p.26. 
15 For a similar argument, in relation to the issue of public education, see Meira Levinson, “Liberalism 
versus Democracy? Schooling Private Citizens in the Public Square”, British Journal of Political 
Science, Vol.27, No.3, July (1997), pp.344-349. See also Bhikhu Parekh, “The Voice of Religion in 
Political Discourse”, in Leroy S. Rouner (ed.), Religion, Politics and Peace (Notre Dame, Indiana: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1999), p.79 and Cécile Laborde, “From Constitutional to Civic 




establishment in France does not aim to promote religious pluralism and, most 
importantly, it is not accompanied by a neat separation between state and religious 
faiths. Grounded in the Jacobin tradition, French secularism is rather driven by the 
state’s endeavour to impose a substantive, anti-clerica  philosophy upon civil society, 
and it tries to achieve this through a top-down control of religious expression.16 It is 
easy to understand where the problem for religion partisan identity lays.  
 
On the one hand, the absence of a “wall of separation”, such as the American one, 
certainly offers more normative and institutional room for partisan bilingualism. 
Indeed a Christian Democratic Party (the Mouvement Républicain Populaire - MRP) 
did exist in France until the 1960s.17 More recently, the Union pour la Démocratie 
Française (UDF), succeeded by the Mouvement Démocrate (MoDem) in 2007, has 
also been partly inspired by Christian Democracy. On the other hand, however, the 
top-down nature of the French model renders the politicization of religious views 
significantly restrained by state control. This prevents the possibility of translating 
religious views into religious partisan ones. As in Rawls’s political liberalism, 
religious views are either excluded from the public political realm or only admitted 
in so far as they contribute to endorsing and legitimizing the existing constitutional 
framework, an unlikely prospect given the strong, secular and non-neutral character 
of French state secularism. I will show in the tenth chapter how an analogous 
problem characterizes Turkey, where the top-down laicism imposed by the Kemalist 
republican establishment has prevented for several decades the existence (or led to 
the banning) of religious political parties.  
 
Contrary to the American model, then, the French one emphasizes the presence and 
preservation of a strong common framework. This institutional centralistic 
arrangement excludes religious instances from the public sphere while enacting a 
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top-down control which aims to impose unity and repress plurality. Religious 
political parties are not in principle forbidden and there is no neat church-state 
separation able to preclude their existence. However, even if allowed, such parties 
would always be reduced to mere branches of the stat . Their religious values would 
be constantly shaped by the state basic structure in order to transform them into 
sources of legitimization of the existing institutional and constitutional framework, 
as in Rawls’s political liberalism.18  
 
Interestingly, Cécile Laborde19 highlights how, unlike secularism (which involves 
the liberal aspiration to provide a balance between the preservation of individual 
freedoms, the presence within society of diverse conceptions of the good and the 
need for mutual norms of political membership reflecting the equal status of all 
citizens), French laïcité “endorses a more expansive conception of the public sphere 
than political liberalism, as well as a thicker construal of the ‘public selves’ which 
make up the citizens of the republic”.20 Excluding or limiting the presence of religion 
in the public sphere is considered necessary, in this framework, for ensuring the 
equal treatment of all citizens. French laïcité was officially sanctioned by the Law of 
Separation promulgated in 1905, which aimed to guarantee religious freedom as well 
as the absence of state official recognition and fiancial support of any religious 
creed. The law obliged all religious groups to be officially registered by the state as 
associations cultuelles (religious associations) and established that all religious 
buildings built by 1905 would become public property.21  
 
Laborde argues that French laïcité is grounded in the idea of an independent secular 
ethics which permeates a “thick” public sphere and ims “to make the ‘public’ 
identity of citizenship an expansively constructed identity and one that is more 
discrepant from the ‘private’ identity of citizens than political liberals, such as 
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Rawls, would allow”.22 This contributes in fostering “a homogeneous public 
identity”23 and it seems to defy the idea itself of separation between public and 
private realms. This strongly centralized, expansive public sphere represents the 
landmark of French laïcité and it points at an almost unidirectional, top-down 
process of political channelling. While advocating the neat separation between 
political and religious realms, Laborde highlights, he French state recognizes the 
representative role of “centralized religious authorities”.24 By endorsing moderate 
and laïque leaders, as in the case of the recently constituted Fr nch Council of the 
Muslim Cult, the state “favours the ‘laicization’ of Muslim organizations along lines 
already followed by Catholics, Protestants and Jews”.25 This reveals, for Laborde, 
the paradoxical character of French laïcité, combining a rhetoric of church-state 
separation with the state’s constant endeavour to influence and control, from above, 
centralized religious representative bodies.26 Laborde’s analysis anticipates some of 
the issues that I will address in the tenth chapter, where I examine Turkey’s 
unorthodox model of secularism. Although I find her account quite compelling, I 
disagree with the distinction that she makes between French laïcité and Rawls’s 
political liberalism. As I explained in the second chapter, behind an apparently “thin” 
conception of the political sphere political liberalism conceals a “thick” and 
expansive understanding of public reason. This imposes serious limitations upon 
religious expression both in the public political realm and in the associational and 
private domains. Political liberalism is therefore much more similar to French laïcité 
than Laborde argues, as it conceives the relationshp between political and societal 
realms in a top-down way, thus seriously jeopardizing the feasibility of religious 
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analysis of French republican perfectionism in relation to the headscarf issue see Cécile Laborde, 
“Female Autonomy, Education and the Hijab”, Critical Review of International Social and Political 
Philosophy, Vol.9, No.3, September (2006), pp.351-377. 
26 For a more detailed account of the ways the French state actively intervenes in the life of religious 
communities, as well as for a useful historical account of church-state relations in France since the 
13th century, see John R. Bowen, Why the French Don’t Like Headscarves: Islam, the State, and 






The English Model 
The English model, as I have already explained earlier in this chapter, combines 
weak religious establishment with a deeply secularized society.27 As in France, there 
is no neat separation, in England, between political and religious realms. Indeed, the 
publicly recognized role of religion seems to promise broader normative space for 
religious partisan identity. However, I believe that two main problems characterize 
this model.  
 
First, the possibility of an institutionalized religious pluralism that the English model 
seems to allow, implying the (potential) public recognition of other faiths besides 
Anglicanism, may not necessarily facilitate religious partisan pluralism. As I 
explained in the first chapter, an institutional and constitutional framework must 
already be settled for party bilingualism to be feasible28 and, therefore, for parties to 
comply with the normative criteria of party politics. Political parties require an 
impartial common institutional arrangement in order to be able to comply with the 
normative criteria of loyal opposition and regulated rivalry. This framework is not 
made more impartial by simply expanding it so as to include not one but several, or 
even all the religious faiths present within a specific society. My suggestion, in the 
sixth chapter, was indeed that a procedural framework, grounded in a pragmatist 
model of deliberation, would be more suitable for welcoming the perfectionist claims 
conveyed by religious and other political parties, while also establishing the 
legitimate limits of their expression. Both weak establishment and a potential plural 
establishment would not therefore modify, in my view, the biased character of the 
common framework which characterizes the English model. Institutional 
establishment, in other words, is not flexible enough for reflecting changing societal 
trends and integrating novel religious demands while providing a non-partial 
framework suitable for religious political parties. By incorporating religious values 
into the framework itself, this model offers a very rigid institutional arrangement and 
                                                      
27 See John G. Francis, “The Evolving Regulatory Structure of European Church-State Relationships”, 
Journal of Church and State, Vol.34 (1992), p.797. 




precludes the pluralistic unanimity religious parties ought to convey.  
 
The second problem which characterizes the English model is related to the first one. 
Weak establishment, as we have seen, coexists in England with a deeply secularized 
society. This implies that there may not actually be many societal religious instances 
to be conveyed by hypothetical religious parties into the political arena. In other 
words, the comprehensive idiom of religious partisan identity is weak in the English 
model, and party bilingualism seems therefore jeopardized. One might argue that this 
is a mere sociological aspect which should not affect an evaluation of the English 
institutional model, intended in ideal terms, in relation to religious partisan identity. 
However, as I explained earlier, the presence of an established Church in England 
was historically facilitated by the distinctive way in which religion itself was 
conceived within society. The tradition of the British Enlightenment contributed in 
enhancing a process of societal secularization which rendered the presence of a (not 
very powerful) Church of England institutionally and ormatively unproblematic. 
Therefore, the secular character of English society is ightly connected to the weak 
establishment model and it may represent a further factor against the feasibility of 
religious partisan identity within this framework. Conversely, the presence, in 
England, of recently arrived religious communities ( .g. the Muslims) which have 
not experienced the same process of secularization, poses a different set of problems 
that I am going to address in the next section. 
 
Pluralistic Institutional Integration/Assimilation 
Having delineated some of the weaknesses of the English model of secularism, I 
would now like to illustrate the alternative model proposed by Modood and 
Kastoryano.29 According to them, secularism is usually endorsed on the basis of the 
idea that, by guaranteeing a neutral public sphere and not favouring any specific 
religious belief, it ensures religious freedom and equality within society. This 
argument, they claim, is essentially flawed as it overlooks the fact that “[p]olitics and 
law depend to some degree on shared ethical assumptions and inevitably reflect the 
                                                      




norms and values of the society they are part of”.30 Therefore, they endorse the idea 
that the arrival of new religious or ethnic groups, with their values and demands, may 
in fact contribute to expanding the existing constitutional frameworks of Western 
polities. This, they argue, implies a deep interaction between political and cultural 
realms, as religious communities may seek state support, for example for their 
schools or cultural institutions, while the state may rely on religious communities for 
fostering those virtues, such as truth-telling and ltruism, which enhance and foster 
civic morality.31 
 
Modood and Kastoryano highlight how the public culture of Western societies has 
been partly shaped by religious (mainly Christian) values, even though the religious 
import of such values may nowadays no longer be recognized.32 This implies that 
“those citizens whose moral, ethnic or religious communal identities are most 
adequately reflected in the political identity of the regime…will feel least the force 
of a rigidly enforced public/private distinction”.33 Refusing to integrate the religious 
claims of Muslims or other non-Christian communities s therefore likely to reinforce 
the privileged status of Christian citizens and to je pardize, rather than ensure, 
religious equality.34 Modood and Kastoryano thus argue that “the appropriate 
response to the new Muslim challenges is pluralistic nstitutional 
integration/assimilation, rather than an appeal to radical public/private separation in 
the name of secularism”.35 This model, they highlight, aims to substitute strict 
separation with a more moderate and flexible secularism “based on institutional 
adjustments”.36 Furthermore, it replaces difference-blind state neutrality with a more 
difference-sensitive approach and it encourages “a pr gmatic, case-by-case, 
negotiated approach to dealing with controversy andconflict, not an ideological, 
                                                      
30 Ibid., p.169. 
31 Ibid., p.169. 
32 Ibid., p.170. 
33 Ibid., p.170. 
34 For this point, see also Tariq Modood, Multicultural Politics: Racism, Ethnicity and Muslims in 
Britain (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2005), pp.132-134 and Bhikhu Parekh, “Europe, 
Liberalism and the ‘Muslim Question’”, in Modood, Triandafyllidou and Zapata-Barrero (eds.), 
Multiculturalism, Muslims and Citizenship: A European Approach, p.189. 
35 Modood and Kastoryano, “Secularism and the Accommodati n of Muslims in Europe”, p.173. 




drawing a ‘line in the sand’ mentality”.37 According to Modood in particular, this 
model is especially suitable to England where, as well as the established Church of 
England, various religious faiths (e.g. Catholicism, Judaism, Methodists etc.) already 
enjoy some forms of state recognition in various areas of public life (e.g. Parliament, 
schools, hospitals, prisons etc.).38 Similarly to Modood and Kastoryano, Parekh 
highlights how the only way to institutionally acknowledge the centrality of 
Christian values in British society while guaranteeing, in the name of religious 
equality, the official recognition of religious minorities in the UK, would be “both to 
accept the privileged status of Christianity and to give public recognition to other 
religions”.39   
 
A Critical Assessment of Pluralistic Institutional Integration/Assimilation 
I would like to highlight three reasons why pluralistic institutional 
integration/assimilation is unsuitable for guaranteeing true religious pluralism and, 
indirectly, religious partisan pluralism. First, like the English model of weak 
establishment, Modood and Kastoryano’s involves the incorporation of religious 
values into the institutional framework itself, therefore precluding the pluralistic 
unanimity of which religious parties ought to be expressions. If one or more religions 
(but not others) received institutional and constitutional recognition, the common 
framework required for (potential) religious partisan pluralism and pluralistic 
unanimity to be viable would inevitably be biased. Moreover, any attempt to provide 
all religious faiths with institutional recognition would encounter practical and 
normative difficulties, and it would risk rendering the institutional and legal 
arrangement of the polity unnecessarily complex and rigi .     
 
Second, the fact that certain religious (Christian) values have shaped the national 
culture (and often the institutional arrangement) of Western polities does not imply 
that the religious values of newly arrived religious minorities should be 
                                                      
37 Ibid., p.173. 
38 Ibid., pp.172-173. 
39 Bhikhu Parekh, “Religion and Public Life”, in Tariq Modood (ed.), Church, State and Religious 
Minorities (London: Policy Studies Institute, 1997), p.20. See also Bhikhu Parekh, “The Cultural 
Particularity of Liberal Democracy”, in David Held (ed.), Prospects for Democracy: North, South, 




straightforwardly incorporated into the existing institutional and constitutional 
frameworks of these countries. On the one hand, values take a long time to settle 
within a culture. During this process they shape and re shaped by the majority 
culture. Therefore, it may not be feasible to simply incorporate newly arrived 
religious faiths into a framework which has been formed over centuries. On the other 
hand, by invoking the incorporation of religious values directly into the 
constitutional framework of a polity, this model lacks the institutional flexibility 
which is necessary for dealing with a continuously evolving religious landscape. The 
model of “pluralistic institutional integration/assimilation” seems therefore a shortcut 
for a process of integration which is much more complex and lengthy.40 These 
problems emerge, for example, from the abovementioned way in which Parekh 
emphasizes the need to balance equal treatment of all religions and respect for the 
Christian identity of the British society. By acknowledging the privileged status of 
the Church of England, Parekh implicitly recognizes the weight of history and 
tradition. Although I appreciate the idea of pluralistic establishment, I find it difficult 
to understand how the privileged status of the Anglican Church would have to be 
interpreted in institutional terms.  
 
If other religions were only granted a secondary institutional status (whatever this 
might be) this would certainly undermine equal treatment. Furthermore, this would 
represent the implicit acknowledgement that, as I have just argued, religious 
minorities may not deserve full institutional recognition as their values have not yet 
become part of the national public culture. In this sense, a secondary institutional 
status would have to be considered as a temporary arangement, gradually evolving 
towards full establishment as religious minorities become more entangled with the 
national culture. If, on the other hand, religious minorities were granted the same 
institutional recognition enjoyed by the Anglican Church, then the primacy of 
England’s Christian identity would be jeopardized. If, finally, disestablishment was 
chosen instead, this would present again the initial problem of the cultural 
predominance of the Christian religion, one of the reasons why institutional 
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pluralism had been conceived in the first instance. There seems to be no way out 
from this dilemma and this is due, as I explained, to the lengthy and complex process 
by which new religious demands are incorporated into an existing culture, a process 
that no institutional short-cut may elude. 
 
The second reason why new religions cannot simply be incorporated into the 
institutional and constitutional framework of Western polities is that they are often 
intrinsically (and historically) different from Christianity. As I have illustrated above, 
Modood and Kastoryano, like Parekh, view the UK as the locus where institutional 
religious pluralism would be especially feasible, given the presence there of an 
institutional framework (weak establishment) which ould be easily expanded in 
order to embrace other religious faiths. I also explained, however, the deep 
connection between the specific character of Christianity in Britain, and the fact that 
religious faiths have historically undergone a process of moderation and internal 
secularization, influenced above all by the legacy of the British Enlightenment. Most 
non-Western religions have not experienced an analogous evolution. By simply 
incorporating Islam or other non-Western religions i to the existing institutional 
framework we would thus dangerously ignore the crucial differences arising from 
their diverse historical evolutions. 
 
Conclusion 
Given the difficulties highlighted in the present chapter, I find it necessary to search 
for an alternative model of church-state relations, able to provide both normative and 
institutional space for religious parties, and different from the ideal models which 
find concrete expression in the US, France and England, but also from the model of 
pluralistic institutional integration/assimilation proposed by Modood and Kastoryano 
(as well as by Parekh). In the next chapter, I willtherefore focus on the model of 
associative democracy (AD) and non-constitutional pluralism (NOCOP) recently 
devised by Veit Bader.41 Bader’s work is probably the most comprehensive and
systematic account of secularism and church-state relations published to date. 
Furthermore, it manages to combine strong empirical and sociological analysis with 
                                                      





a deep theoretical perspective, thus offering an unus ally balanced interdisciplinary 
approach. His NOCOP model, as I will show, avoids the main normative difficulties 
that I have envisaged in the models of church-state relations examined in the present 
chapter. Unlike the English and the pluralistic institutional integration/assimilation 
models, NOCOP rejects the incorporation of religious values and principles into the 
constitutional framework. In contrast to the American model, it does not place a 
“wall of separation” between religious and political spheres, and it thus allows the 
spill-over of religious values, present within society, into the political realm. Finally, 
unlike the French model, it endorses a bottom-up channelling of religious demands, 
avoiding the strong top-down state control upon religious groups and organisations 
which characterizes France and, as I will illustrate in the tenth chapter, Turkey.      
      
By avoiding all the difficulties arising from these models, then, NOCOP offers a 
novel and fresh theoretical platform for reconsidering the issue of church-state 
relations from a normative perspective. For this reason, I will engage in a detailed 
analysis of Bader’s account, in order to disclose the central features of his model and 
assess its soundness in the light of my account of religious political parties. Although 
NOCOP, I will argue, provides in principle a more inclusive and flexible framework, 
for the normative agency of religious political parties, than the models that I have 
illustrated in the present chapter, I will show how Bader does not grasp sufficiently 
the intrinsic features of religious partisan identity and therefore fails to provide 
convincing normative grounds for justifying the inclusive public deliberation that 
NOCOP involves. I will therefore conclude that religious political parties, intended 
as the institutional channels of the pragmatist model of deliberative perfectionism 
that I defended in the sixth chapter, can reshape religious values and make them 
suitable for the kind of deliberation advocated by Bader, thus providing NOCOP 




Chapter 9 - Secularism, Religious Political Parties and Non-
Constitutional Pluralism 
 
Veit Bader1 envisages five major models of religious establishment, characterized by 
different degrees of institutionalization of monism and pluralism. His account 
displays a much more theoretical approach than that of Modood and Kastoryano. The 
first model illustrated by Bader is represented by the “[s]trong establishment of a 
monopolistic church”2 and can be found in countries such as Greece, Serbia or Israel. 
In this model, normative religious monism is accompanied by full church 
establishment and there is no space, it seems, for the pluralistic institutionalization of 
religious values. The normative foundations of thismodel correspond to those of the 
monistic perfectionism that I have already illustrated and rejected in the third 
chapter. The second model illustrated by Bader is weak establishment, which 
involves “constitutional or legal establishment of one State-Church which has to be 
compatible with de jure and de facto religious freedoms and religious pluralism”.3 
This model characterizes England, Scotland and the Scandinavian countries4 and, as 
I have already explained in the previous chapter, is considered by some scholars as 
potentially able to accommodate a plurality of established faiths. I also clarified, 
however, why this is not a feasible solution. The third model, constitutional 
pluralism or plural establishment, implies “the constitutional and/or legal recognition 
of more than one organized religion”.5 Bader argues that this model can possibly 
only be found in Finland, as this country is characterized by the establishment of two 
state churches (the Lutheran Church of Finland and the Orthodox Church of 
Finland). As Bader himself notes, this model corresponds to the one advocated by 
Modood for England. However, rather than providing a feasible example for the 
English case, the Finnish model highlights the problems that I have already 
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Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Vol.6, No.1, March (2003b), pp.55-91. 
2 Ibid., p.67 (italics in original). 
3 Ibid., p.68 (italics in original). 
4 For an account of the Norwegian system of church-state relations see Ingvill Thorson Plesner, 
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envisaged in Modood and Kastoryano’s account. In Finland, Lutheran and Orthodox 
Christian religions have found institutional and constitutional recognition because for 
centuries they have been part of the nation’s cultural and historical identity. This 
differs significantly from the case of England examined by Modood and Kastoryano, 
where plural institutional establishment is thought to be viable for accommodating 
the religious demands of recently arrived religious groups such as the Muslim 
community. 
 
Certainly one might argue that, in the light of the Finnish experience, religious 
organizations such as the Catholic Church of England or the Jewish community, 
which have a longer history of integration into England’s national culture, could be 
quite easily incorporated into the existing institutional framework (and, to some 
extent, they already are).6 What this argument proves, however, is the presence of a 
tight link between the historical integration of religious faiths into the national 
culture and history and the extent of their institutional and constitutional recognition. 
This leaves unanswered, therefore, the question of how the institutional recognition 
of Muslims and other newly arrived religious groups should be conceived. When 
dealing with non-Western religious traditions, therefo e, the Finnish model ceases to 
provide useful insights and it fails to support Modo  and Kastoryano’s contention. I 
would like to clarify this point further. What I am critiquing here are the ideal models 
of weak or plural establishment and not their empirical versions, such as English or 
Finnish ones. Indeed to the extent that countries such as England, despite their 
regime of religious establishment, have recently carried out a process of gradual 
incorporation of non-Anglican religions at various political and institutional levels 
(especially at the local level), they in fact display some of the characteristics of 
Bader’s non-constitutional pluralism (NOCOP) model which I am going to illustrate 
in the next paragraphs. This does not remove, however, the problem that maintaining 
the constitutional privilege of one (or several) religious faith(s) determines the 
presence of a rigid institutional framework, thus preserving a normative bias towards 
the officially recognized religion(s). This may prevent, in the long term, the genuine 
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full integration of non-established faiths within the polity.7   
 
Bader also rejects Non-Establishment and Private Pluralism (NEPP), a model of 
religious governance which involves a strict separation between religious and 
political realms and allows religious pluralism in civil society but not at the political 
and constitutional levels.8 NEPP therefore represents the ideal version of the 
American model of church-state separation which I criticized in the previous chapter. 
Bader emphasizes how the idea of “difference-blind neutrality”, endorsed by 
political liberals (such as Rawls) and by advocates of NEPP, implies the 
discrimination of religious minorities and enhances “structural political and cultural 
inequalities among (organized) religions”.9 The separation between political and 
religious realms and, more generally, between public and private spheres, prevents 
an open and democratic public debate about religious issues and inevitably benefits 
dominant groups.10 Bader indeed highlights how the First Amendment to the United 
States (US) Constitution has not undermined “the political, social, and cultural or 
symbolic power of de facto established Protestant Christianity”.11 This seems to 
confirm that state neutrality and church-state separation do not provide the best 
institutional arrangement for guaranteeing religious equality and pluralism.12 
According to Bader, NEPP therefore fails to provide difference-sensitive “relational 
neutrality” towards religions and it ignores the broad variety of possible ways in 
which the relationship between church and state canbe conceptualized and 
institutionalized.  
 
Above all, Bader emphasizes that, under NEPP, “interes  groups (including 
churches) may form lobbies and may try to influence political parties and 
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(Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2007), p.207, p.240. 
8 Bader, “Religion and States: A New Typology and Plea for Non-Constitutional Pluralism”, p.70. See 
also Bader, Secularism or Democracy?, p.203. 
9 Veit Bader, “Religious Pluralism: Secularism or Priority for Democracy?”, Political Theory, Vol.27, 
No.5, October (1999), p.600. 
10 Ibid., p.601. 
11 Ibid., p.603. 
12 For other accounts of religious non-establishment see Mark Jensen, “The Integralist Objection to 
Political Liberalism”, Social Theory and Practice, Vol.31, No.2, April (2005), p.166 and Steven Wall, 
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parliaments…However, such ‘political pluralism’ is upposed to prevent or 
forestall…the political institutionalization of particular interests, not to recognize or 
formalize it”.13 The distinction between mere “influence” and “political 
institutionalization” is essential for understanding the relationship between ideal 
model and empirical practice in the US. It is certainly true that, in the US, religious 
references pervade the swearing-in of the President as well as all the Congress and 
Supreme Court sessions.14 It is also true that some religious denominations, such as 
the evangelicals, bear a strong political and electoral influence upon the Republican 
Party.15 This undoubtedly defies the idea of a strict separation between political and 
religious realms in the US and therefore signals the distance between NEPP as a 
normative ideal and its concrete implementation(s).16 Indeed I also emphasized, in 
the previous chapter, how American secularism has been interpreted in two different 
ways throughout history, as either accommodationism or separationism.17 While the 
former is closer to the NOCOP model that I am going to examine in the next section, 
the latter can be considered as an approximate expression of NEPP. NEPP prevents 
the formal institutionalization of religious demands, intended either as the 
constitutional establishment of one or more churches, or as the politicization of 
religious claims through religious political parties. In this sense, it provides a useful 
ideal model for assessing the distinctiveness of American denominationalism and its 
normative and institutional incompatibility with the presence of religious political 
parties. 
 
Non-Constitutional Pluralism (NOCOP) 
The model endorsed by Bader, NOCOP, represents his response to the problems 
raised by the weak and plural establishment paradigms, as well as by NEPP. The 
distinctiveness of this model, according to Bader, is that it “combines constitutional 
dis-establishment or non-establishment with restricted legal pluralism (e.g. in family 
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Turkey (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p.9. 
15 Ibid., p.53. 
16 See, for example, Mary C. Segers, “In Defense of Religious Freedom”, in Mary C. Segers and Ted 
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law), administrative IP [institutional pluralism] (de jure and de facto 
institutionalization of several organized religions), institutionalized political 
pluralism and the religio-cultural pluralization ofthe nation”.18 This implies that 
religious groups are officially recognized not by incorporating their values into the 
constitutional framework of the polity but by expanding the legal, administrative and 
political spheres so as to guarantee that religious citizens are “integrated in the 
political processes of problem-definition, deliberation, presentation of decision 
alternatives and decision making”.19  
 
Bader endorses especially a specific version of NOCOP, namely associative 
democracy (AD).20 AD, Bader highlights, “rejects constitutional establishment. It 
supports the legal, administrative and political recognition of organized 
religions…and provides maximum accommodation to religious practices, 
constrained only by minimal morality and basic rights”.21 Bader argues that religious 
groups should be treated even-handedly, admitted to processes of deliberation and 
decision-making and granted the governance of services such as health care and 
education.22 Separate religious schools, he stresses, have often “contributed 
considerably to the integration of the respective religious communities into the 
common polity”.23 This, together with a system of health care and social services 
provided for by religious organizations funded by the state, may help “to respond to 
increasingly individualized demands on one hand, to accommodate legitimate wishes 
and needs of ethno-religious minorities on the other hand”.24 By integrating religious 
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England. Nevertheless, in line with Bader I believe that the regime of weak establishment which 
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21 Bader, Secularism or Democracy?, p.20. 
22 Ibid., p.20. 
23 Bader, “Religion and States: A New Typology and Plea for Non-Constitutional Pluralism”, p.83. I 
would like to point out that faith schools exist, for example, in the UK, where they are funded (and 
sometimes even built) by the state [see, for example the chapters in Roy Gardner, Jo Cairns and Denis 
Lawton (eds.), Faith Schools: Consensus or Conflict? (London and New York: RoutledgeFalmer, 
2005)]. This shows once more how the English/British framework of weak religious establishment 
also contains elements of NOCOP, although these are partly jeopardized, as I explained earlier, by the 
institutional privileged status of Anglicanism. 




communities through the provision of essential public goods, NOCOP displays 
therefore its flexible and dynamic character. 
 
In contrast with NEPP, Bader also endorses a shift from a politics of benign neglect, 
intended as “fairness-as-hands-off”, which tends to abstract from the particular 
cultural and religious traits of various groups, to a conception of “fairness-as-even-
handedness” which addresses people according to their concrete and specific features 
and needs.25 AD, according to Bader, represents a “third way” beyond the weak or 
plural constitutional religious establishment, which haracterizes several European 
polities, and American demominationalism, which rejects the public role of religion 
and relegates it to the realm of civil society.26 Bader’s conception of AD is 
accompanied by his endorsement of “moderate universalism and embedded 
impartiality”27 which represent an alternative to “exclusivist secularism or liberal 
reason restraints”.28 According to Bader, AD provides a framework which s more 
favourable to religious minorities than other models of religious institutional 
pluralism. It guarantees “meaningful exit options”29 to members of religious groups, 
thus rendering the abstract “right of exit” more sub tantial and relevant for concrete 
purposes. Furthermore, it provides a fine balance between associational autonomy 
and accountability of religious groups and associations before the state, promoting 
internal deliberation within groups and minimal state control as conditions for public 
funding.30 Finally, Bader endorses the “idea of differentiated morality, i.e. standards 
of minimal morality have to protect the basic needs, interests and rights of all, 
including vulnerable minorities within minorities, uch as minors and women”.31 
 
AD therefore contributes to a “dialectic of instituonalization” which may prevent 
religious fundamentalism as “[r]eligions who vie for public money and want to exert 
political influence have to accept that polities vice versa exert influence upon 
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28 Ibid., p.21. 
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them”.32 Additionally, Bader rejects “the liberal congruenc that is so characteristic 
of comprehensive liberal or democratic morality”33 and highlights how the presence 
of a minimal state may ensure instead a broader range of “morally legitimate cultural 
options”34 within society. Furthermore, AD provides one of the best answers to the 
risk of cultural and religious “Balkanization” and is preferable to integrationist 
approaches for dealing with the problems arising within culturally and religiously 
divided societies.35 Most importantly for a normative theory of religious political 
parties, Bader also emphasizes how AD ensures that “central organizational and 
representational structures by the respective religions emerge as far as possible from 
below, to avoid the…great threat to religious autonomy through external state-
crafting from above”.36 This responsiveness to religious demands emerging from
civil society certainly renders AD hospitable to the channelling bilingual agency of 
religious political parties.  
 
Finally, AD provides a better balance, than pillarized and corporatist models of 
NOCOP, between a flexible institutional framework and the need to give political 
voice to various religious groups facing an ever-changing religious landscape.37 
Indeed Bader highlights how, by encouraging “not only multi-level polities but 
also…multi-layered schemes of overlapping, partly competing and partly reinforcing 
obligations, loyalties and commitments”,38 AD promotes in fact the development of 
common, inter-group commitments towards the unitary polity. This renders AD 
different from models of consociational democracy and pillarization, characterized 
by “government by elite cartel designed to turn a democracy with a fragmented 
political culture into a stable democracy”,39 and also clarifies its relationship with 
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party politics. Indeed, although parties “in divided societies...are crucial in voicing 
the interests of communal groups”,40 their role in consociational polities has not 
always been seen as unproblematic. Rosenblum highlights, for example, how 
compromises and power sharing among elites, which chara terize consociational 
models of democracy, may contribute to eluding the societal cleavages which 
normally underlie partisan divisions, thus preventing regulated rivalry among 
political parties and replacing the latter in providing a link between social groups and 
government.41 Other critics emphasize instead how consociationalsm may 
artificially reinforce subcultural divisions, therefore leading to the reification of 
ethnic cleavages and exacerbating intraethnic competition.42 This may enhance 
factional interests, thus jeopardizing the possibility of pluralistic unanimity and 
regulated rivalry which ought to characterize partis n politics. Either way, then, 
consociationalism seems to undermine the bilingual agency of political parties and 
the normative criteria of party politics, establishing that parties ought to seek a 
balance between particular and general interests and avoid both factionalism and 
unitarism.  
 
Bader’s constant emphasis on the need to maintain a balance between communal 
loyalties and national obligations signals his intention to proceed beyond both a 
monistic and a purely fragmented conception of the polity. Bader’s central claim, in 
this sense, is that “[t]o the degree that ‘communal groups’ have meaningful 
autonomy and group representation, and further experience this as satisfying…they 
can and usually do accept obligations towards the overarching polity, allowing strong 
commitments to develop”.43 This certainly signals his intention to avoid the 
reinforcement of societal fragmentation which traditionally characterizes models of 
pillarization and consociational democracy. Furthermore, although neither political 
                                                                                                                                                    
The central features of consociational democracy inlude the presence of a grand coalition, mutual 
veto among subcultural groups, proportionality and segmental autonomy [see Arend Lijphart, 
Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 
1977)]. 
40 Arend Lijphart, “Constitutional Design for Divided Societies”, Journal of Democracy, Vol.15, No.2 
(2004), p.102. 
41 Nancy Rosenblum, On the Side of the Angels: An Appreciation of Parties and Partisanship 
(Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2008), pp.101-102. 
42 Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley CA: University of California Press, 1985), 
p.575. 




parties nor party elites play a significant function in Bader’s NOCOP model (an 
aspect that I will critique in the next section of this chapter), this paradoxically 
provides a better framework for party politics. The absence of party elites, leading 
subcultural segments and artificially enhancing societal divisions, confers to NOCOP 
and AD a more fluid and flexible character, able to deal with ever-changing societal 
divisions (including religious ones) and to guarantee a more appropriate space for 
religious party pluralism. It might certainly be legitimate to argue that the legal and 
administrative pluralism advocated by Bader may risk leading to the same kind of 
political and societal fragmentation which characterizes consociational democracy. 
Yet, as I will explain more extensively in the next pages, it is through the idea of an 
institutionalized political pluralism, rather than through the legal/administrative 
recognition of religious faiths, that Bader’s NOCOP introduces a novel and sounder 
framework for allowing religious party pluralism. This, I will show, helps to 
guarantee both (potential) political representation for all religious groups and respect 
for political and institutional unity, therefore eschewing the extreme fragmentation 
which characterizes consociational polities.  
 
A Critical Assessment of NOCOP 
Compared to the plural establishment model suggested by Modood and Kastoryano, 
Bader’s NOCOP guarantees a more feasible balance between the cultural and 
religious identity of the majority and religious equality, and therefore provides a 
much more dynamic and flexible framework for accommodating the demands of an 
ever-changing plurality of religious groups and theexpression of religious partisan 
identity. In Bader’s NOCOP, religious demands are welcomed into the process of 
public deliberation, and the expansion of the legal, administrative and political 
spheres (the latter to be intended as the realm of ordinary politics) aims to provide an 
inclusive framework for both old and new religious faiths. Equality is guaranteed by 
ensuring that all voices are heard. Identity, instead, may be preserved by the fact that 
majority religious groups can bring their collective history, values and tradition into 
the deliberative arena, therefore enhancing their stance in front of newly arrived 
religious communities. The main difference from theplural establishment model is 




static terms. Instead, they both become contestable during the process of public 
deliberation and the dynamics of their reciprocal interaction may help to expand the 
common understanding of the national public culture. Bader’s NOCOP certainly 
provides broad normative and institutional space for religious political parties as it 
promotes “participation in public fora and hearings, inclusion in advisory councils 
and corresponding consultation rights and duty to lis en”.44  
 
Yet I do not believe that there is a significant difference, from a normative point of 
view, between the legal and administrative recognitio  of organized religions 
invoked by Bader and the constitutional establishment of one or more religions. I 
illustrated in the previous chapter the main problem merging from Modood and 
Kastoryano’s model of plural religious establishment, amely the fact that it 
underestimates the complexity of the historical process by which religious values are 
incorporated into the national culture and the qualitative difference between 
Christianity and some non-Western religious faiths. This, I argued, makes it difficult 
to guarantee the right balance between identity andequality and shows the 
unfeasibility of the plural establishment model for dealing with the demands 
emerging within religiously plural societies. 
 
However, Bader’s version of NOCOP presents analogous problems at a lower level 
of analysis. Incorporating alien religious values into the legal or administrative 
framework of a (for example) predominantly Christian society may simply raise 
again the same questions which are raised by constitutional pluralism. Legal 
provisions in the area of family law, for example, are not mere procedural devices 
but they often reflect the cultural and religious background of a society, even when 
they have acquired more “secular” meanings. In other words, even though a society 
may be deeply secular at present, its legal framework may still reflect certain moral 
values which were originally religious in nature. Although the religious import of 
these values may no longer be recognized by the citizens, there may still be a 
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widespread perception that the values embodied in the legal provisions regarding (for 
example) family law bear a cultural and social signif cance which deserves respect 
and cannot be ignored.45  
 
A similar problem emerges if we consider the spheres of health care provision and 
education. As I have illustrated, Bader argues that entrusting religious communities 
with the responsibility of providing such basic services may in fact enhance, rather 
than jeopardize, their cultural and political integration. This argument is quite 
controversial. Meira Levinson, for example, emphasize  how models of education, 
such as the English one, which aim to accommodate exc ssively the demands of 
religious children and parents, risk undermining social and political unity. By 
enhancing children’s religious private values, Levinson argues, the English model 
may potentially prevent children from being exposed to ifferent people and cultures 
and from detaching themselves from their own cultura  background(s). In this way, it 
may be unable to provide them with the public virtues necessary for the coexistence 
of plural religious groups in a democratic polity.46 I am not arguing, here, against 
legal and administrative pluralism as such. I am only stressing the fact that, despite 
Bader’s endeavour to avoid the problems involved in constitutional pluralism, 
similar difficulties may arise from the legal and aministrative incorporation of 
religious demands which characterizes NOCOP. 
 
NOCOP and Religious Political Parties 
Having unveiled the normative problems raised by Bader’s idea of the legal and 
                                                      
45 This is, I believe, one of the main issues arisen in February 2008, after the Archbishop of 
Canterbury Rowan Williams publicly stated that it would be soon inevitable to incorporate some of 
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News, “Sharia law in UK is ‘unavoidable’”, 7 Februay 2008 [online]. Available at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/uk/7232661.stm [accessed 4 June 2008]. See also Murad Ahmed 
and Frances Gibb, “From Leyton to Dewsbury, Sharia courts are already settling disputes”, The 
Times, 8 February 2008 [online]. Available at: http://ww.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/faith/article 
3330657.ece [accessed 4 June 2008]. Many of the critiques raised against Reverend Williams did not 
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controversial. 
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administrative incorporation of religious groups, I would like to turn my attention to 
the idea of the political integration of religious faiths that Bader also advocates. 
Contrary to constitutional integration, but also to legal and administrative pluralism, 
political incorporation implies that organized religions should be “integrated in the 
political processes of problem-definition, deliberation, presentation of decision 
alternatives and decision making”.47 Furthermore, Bader argues, organized religions 
should emerge from below rather than be shaped by the s ate in a top-down 
fashion.48 By granting religious communities freedom of association and refusing the 
neat divide between political and religious realms, Bader’s NOCOP guarantees broad 
space of action for religious organizations and religious parties in particular. This, 
according to Bader, may contribute in moderating religious values, making them 
compatible with liberal democratic institutions and principles and preventing 
religious fundamentalism. 
 
The political integration of religious instances, then, may certainly contribute to the 
presence and functioning of religious political parties. Indeed Bader emphasizes how 
religious parties “undergo the transformational pressures of liberal democratic 
institutions and, eventually, contribute to integrate huge masses of believers into 
liberal democratic polities”.49 Bader also highlights how “[g]ranting minority 
religions wide associational freedoms and meaningful political representation 
compatible with liberal democracy does not threaten political stability and unity but, 
eventually, helps to integrate them into a thin liberal democratic polity compatible 
with reasonable pluralism”.50 Religious political parties are, according to Bader, one 
of the channels through which this process can be institutionalized, thus contributing 
to political stability and to the democratization of religious claims. Bader’s account 
seems therefore to grant importance to religious parties, yet it is not entirely 
convincing. Religious political parties seem to be,for him, only one among many 
vehicles for institutionalizing religious pluralism and guaranteeing the 
democratization of religious instances. Although AD and NOCOP provide, in my 
view, a suitable ideal institutional framework for the presence and functioning of 
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religious political parties, I believe that Bader does not spell out sufficiently the 
particular traits of religious partisan identity.  
 
Religious parties, his model seems to imply, can be included within NOCOP as long 
as they abide by the rules and constraints of a minimally liberal democratic 
framework. This approach overlooks therefore an understanding of the creative 
agency of parties, namely their power to re-shape comprehensive views and societal 
demands in a way compatible with the institutional and constitutional framework 
within which they operate. This power, as I argued extensively in the first and fourth 
chapters, is grounded in the normative criteria of party politics. Only by looking at 
the bilingual nature of religious political parties can NOCOP be fully understood and 
made viable. Rather than simply inserting religious political parties within NOCOP, 
then, it is necessary to show that parties, in ideal terms, are crucial for providing the 
institutional balance between unity and pluralism advocated by Bader. 
 
First, according to Bader, institutionalizing political (rather than constitutional) 
pluralism would guarantee the inclusion of all religious communities into the process 
of public deliberation. Yet Bader does not provide sufficient normative reasons for 
explaining why religious groups ought to enter the process of deliberation that he 
carefully aims to ensure through political institutionalized pluralism. In other words, 
the presence of an inclusive framework does not necessarily provide sufficient 
reasons for expecting religious groups to participate in the deliberative process, 
through religious parties, associations etc. Bader seems to overlook the fact that 
certain illiberal, undemocratic or fundamentalist religious groups may simply not 
recognize the legitimacy of the framework within which deliberation and decision-
making are to be conducted. Furthermore, such groups may not even understand the 
need for a deliberative process, as they may be convinced that their views are the 
only true ones and that they would not benefit from engaging with different 
(religious, moral, ethical etc.) perspectives. AD and NOCOP certainly meet the 
criteria of inclusiveness, relational neutrality and even-handedness, but they fail (at 
least in the version provided by Bader) to grasp the crucial role of religious political 




framework. Religious political parties which comply with the normative criteria of 
party politics that I illustrated in the first chapter are especially useful for sustaining 
an inclusive public deliberation involving religious matters. Thanks to their bilingual 
identity which defies the public/private divide, their acknowledgement of pluralism 
and of a common constitutional framework (e.g. a liberal democratic one), and their 
commitment to trial in electoral politics, religious political parties can help to sustain 
the kind of deliberation advocated by Bader within NOCOP. Outside party politics 
any commitment to such a deliberation risks remaining normatively unwarranted, or 
at least institutionally unfeasible. 
 
Second, Bader highlights how the separation between church and state also 
presupposes the idea of a qualitative difference between religious and secular 
arguments in public deliberation and the consequent co viction, endorsed by many 
liberal theorists, that public reason must be secular, i.e. it must not derive its 
justification from theological premises. As religious reasons rely on theological 
grounds which are not endorsed by every citizen, it is unfair, secularists argue, to 
adopt them in public deliberation and in decision-making processes.51 Bader denies 
the equation between “public” and “secular” reasons as this precludes the 
participation, in deliberative processes, of those religious citizens who genuinely 
support liberal democracy while, on the other hand, it oes not provide an answer to 
the risk of “secular fundamentalisms”52 and of “illegitimate scientocracy or 
expertocracy”.53 According to Bader, therefore, public deliberation does not require 
secular arguments, but rather arguments compatible with, and supportive of liberal 
democracy.54 “To treat people fairly”, Bader argues, “does not mean that we have to 
abstract from all their cultural and religious particularities but to take them into 
account in an evenhanded manner”.55 Furthermore, simply equating public reasons 
with secular reasons might just reproduce, against religious citizens, the same 
discrimination applied by secular citizens against the use of religious arguments in 
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public deliberation. This might easily lead to a sense of alienation among religious 
citizens. 
 
The solution proposed by Bader, I explained earlier, is the idea that both religious 
and secular reasons should be publicly evaluated on the basis of their compatibility 
with a minimal conception of liberal democracy. Rather than preventing any 
controversial issue from entering the realm of public deliberation, Bader argues, “one 
has to develop the duties of civility, such as the duty to explain positions in publicly 
understandable language, the willingness to listen to others, fair-mindedness, and 
readiness to accept reasonable accommodations or alterations in one’s own view”.56 
Strict separationism, Bader argues, “seems clearly not to be required by decent and 
liberal democratic morality and polities”.57 
 
As I have already illustrated in the first part of this chapter, in his later work Bader 
increasingly highlights the difference between “mini al morality” and “liberal 
democratic morality”.58 Bader indeed argues that “there are some basic normative 
standards for the accommodation of religious diversty that apply to all polities [and 
that] there are additional normative standards that apply only to liberal democratic 
polities”.59 This shift towards a minimalist universal morality is accompanied by his 
conviction that “a liberal state should not be morally neutral regarding all and every 
way of life but only with regard to those that are ‘justice-respecting’ or compatible 
with minimal morality”.60 Minimal morality, according to Bader, must include “basic 
rights to security…to subsistence…to basic education and basic healthcare, a certain 
minimum of due-process rights, freedom of conscience, toleration, minimal though 
not fully ‘equal’ respect and…even…minimal though not fully equal representation 
for all those affected from political decisions”.61 Religious faiths, according to Bader, 
can learn to become “minimally moral” thanks to themoderating role of political 
institutions, internal processes of doctrinal learning and the role of multi-party 
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democracy, as in the case of Catholic parties between the end of the 19th century and 
the first half of the 20th century62 and of recent Islamist parties in Turkey.63  
 
However, despite Bader’s shift towards a minimal conception of universal morality, 
thinner than a liberal democratic one, his version f NOCOP still remains 
normatively unwarranted. If left unspecified, it may still be interpreted by some 
liberal secular citizens as the requirement to translate religious arguments into 
secular ones, on the grounds that only the latter can provide the toleration, equal 
respect, equal representation and publicly understandable vocabulary invoked by 
Bader. The need to tell the “whole truth”,64 strongly advocated by Bader, may thus 
risk being jeopardized (as in the case of the exclusivist conceptions of the public 
political realm that I assessed in the seventh chapter) by the presence of secular 
conversational constraints. Bader65 does criticize the approach to religious pluralism 
displayed by contemporary liberal theorists (arbitrar ly excluding religious 
arguments from public deliberation and neglecting the prospect of moral 
disagreement also regarding the constitutional essentials). He also argues that “public 
reason should be freed from cognitive, rationalist assumptions, allowing emotions as 
reasons”,66 thus implicitly endorsing a form of “epistemological holism”.67 
Nevertheless, I believe, only by focusing on religious political parties can we 
understand the true significance of the epistemological holism invoked by Bader, 
including its institutional implications and its normative legitimacy. I am going to 
spell out the flaws of Bader’s account in the next section.   
 
Religious Political Parties, Epistemological Holism and Pragmatist Deliberation 
First, Bader does recognize that religious political parties “undergo the 
transformational pressures of liberal democratic institutions and, eventually, 
contribute to integrate huge masses of believers into l beral democratic polities”.68 
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By channelling religious views, within the constraints of minimal morality, 
democratic religious parties (e.g. Christian Democrati  parties in 19th century 
Europe)69 can contribute to the moderation and integration of religious instances into 
secular polities, thus fostering public interest and the common good.70 Yet Bader 
focuses too much on the external constraints encountered by religious political 
parties (such as the Christian Democratic ones) and risks reducing his argument to an 
empirical appraisal of the moderating influence of democracy upon religious parties. 
He therefore also risks overlooking the distinctive way in which political parties 
convey religious values into the political realm and the normative rationale behind it. 
Christian Democratic parties in 19th century Western Europe, for example, 
represented novel institutional bodies which had to abide not only by the external 
rules imposed upon them by the institutional and constitutional arrangements of 
Western European states, but also and especially by the normative criteria of party 
politics. Respect for the constitutional framework, acknowledgment of pluralism and 
commitment to the trial of elections and of public deliberation were the normative 
criteria that these parties had to comply with in order to be faithful to preserve their 
bilingualism.71 Therefore, although Bader does consider religious political parties as 
one of the vehicles through which political deliberation should be conducted, he does 
not appreciate enough their uniqueness and the importance of their presence within 
NOCOP. It is not clear, indeed, at which institutional level the kind of deliberation 
advocated by Bader (with its normative constraints) would have to be carried out, if 
not at the level of party politics.  
 
My critique seems to be confirmed by Bader’s own coclusion that, despite the 
contribution that religious parties may bring to democratic politics, his model of 
NOCOP may in fact reduce the demand for religious parties and contribute to 
accommodating religious demands. “By guaranteeing meaningful autonomy, 
selective cooperation, and political representation f r ethno-religious minorities”, 
Bader argues, “it [i.e. AD] reduces the demand for separate religious political parties 
and it helps prevent communal cleavages from completely conquering and 
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segregating party systems”.72 In other words, although Bader displays some kind of 
appreciation for religious parties, he does not grasp their normative and institutional 
distinctiveness. Once the functions usually provided by religious parties are supplied 
by the regime of AD that he devises, parties become dispensable. 
 
Second, Bader does not explain on which grounds his minimal liberal democratic 
morality is normatively justified. Indeed he adopts a “non-foundationalist”73 
approach and critiques those theorists who “stick to the idea that rights and 
democracy can only be stable if we also agree on their deep foundations”.74 
Therefore he fails to clarify to which extent his minimal morality differs from a 
thicker liberal morality. The difference, if any, seems to only be one of degree. The 
concepts of freedom of conscience, toleration and equal respect, through which he 
defines minimal morality, still display a strong liberal bias. Although these principles 
may be crucial for guaranteeing an open and inclusive public deliberation, Bader 
fails to provide the rationale for them. This also implies that Bader cannot explain 
why these values ought to be endorsed by religious citizens and preferred, for 
example, to alternative, substantive normative principles (e.g. religious 
fundamentalist, Marxist etc.) as the foundations of a political framework. 
 
Third, as a consequence of the previous point, Bader’s model does not provide a 
feasible and warranted explanation of how passions and emotions could be conveyed 
into the public realm, communicated and defended in publicly understandable terms. 
He fails to explain what common denominator may ensure the feasibility of an 
inclusive public deliberation and of an “epistemological holism”. His answer seems 
to be, once again, that reasons are publicly understandable if they are compatible 
with a minimal universal morality. However, given the unwarranted character of the 
minimally moral (and covertly liberal) framework that he suggests, his account does 
not offer a valid point of reference against which religious and secular views may be 
assessed in public deliberation. An alternative theoretical framework is therefore 
required. 
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I believe that Cheryl Misak’s model of pragmatist deliberation, which I illustrated in 
the sixth chapter, helps to the fill the conceptual and normative gaps which 
characterize Bader’s account. First, pragmatism provides the rationale for 
epistemological holism, through the idea that moral beliefs, like scientific ones, are 
both fallible and susceptible to experience.75 I explained in the sixth chapter how 
Misak also extends this argument to ethical beliefs, that is, comprehensive 
conceptions of the good, therefore including religious beliefs as well. In response to 
Misak, I argued that moral and ethical beliefs are different but that it might be 
feasible to conceive a universal inquiry concerning the meta-ethical foundations of 
ethical values and, derivatively, conceptions of the good intended in their inherent 
value. This helped me to reconceptualize Misak’s epi t mological holism in more 
specific terms. 
 
Second, pragmatism provides the rationale for legitimately adopting a liberal 
democratic political framework. This is grounded in the idea that holding a belief 
and, more crucially, aiming for the truth, require being sensitive to moral experiences 
and therefore not arbitrarily excluding certain peol  from discussion on the basis of 
their race, gender, religion etc. Misak, we saw, argues that “[t]he pragmatist’s route 
to the preservation of autonomy, equal moral worth, and respect for persons is that 
preserving these things is a vital part of deliberation aimed at the truth”.76 Political 
parties, we have seen, ought to comply with the normative criterion of loyal 
opposition. Within liberal democratic polities, this entails that they ought to respect 
the principles of autonomy, equal moral worth and respect for persons. Therefore, 
even though it might be questioned whether deliberation aimed at the truth 
(conducted outside the realm of party politics) does in itself involve such principles, 
it can certainly be asserted that, when such a deliberation is conducted through 
political parties within liberal democratic polities, it ought to abide by these 
principles.    
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Without adopting a foundationalist approach (that Bder indeed rejects), in a liberal 
democratic polity the coexistence of religious claims with the kind of minimal liberal 
democratic morality advocated by Bader can especially be sustained, normatively 
and institutionally, by religious political parties. As I explained in the sixth chapter, 
parties which comply with the normative criteria of party politics reflect the central 
traits of pragmatist deliberation. Parties ought to submit their views to the trial of 
elections, acknowledge pluralism and display loyal opposition. They ought to offer 
their claims to the judgment of other parties and public opinion, and accept 
challenges to their views and policy proposals in parliamentary debates, electoral 
campaigns and, most straightforwardly, at the ballot box. The pragmatist model of 
democratic deliberation seems thus particularly suitable for making sense of party 
politics. 
 
This provides the grounds for connecting epistemological holism and a deliberation 
conducted in publicly understandable terms. Religious political parties, intended as 
the semi-institutional channels of a pragmatist model of democratic deliberation, 
may crucially contribute in sustaining Bader’s NOCOP model in a way that Bader 
himself fails to envisage, as he relegates parties to a secondary and accessory role. 
Religious parties which comply with the normative criteria of party politics convey 
into the public realm views, values and arguments which are no longer merely 
religious in nature but have acquired instead a novel qualitative shape and are 
therefore suitable for a deliberation about substantive values, carried out in publicly 
understandable terms. A religious political party complying with ideal of party 
politics that I presented in the first chapter conveys into the public political forum not 




This also applies to any other comprehensive doctrine or belief (including secular 
ones) conveyed by political parties which abide by the normative criteria of party 
politics. My conclusion is therefore that, although Bader’s NOCOP is the 




can only be normatively justified and institutionally sustained if religious political 
parties, ideally intended, are placed at its core and given a prominent role, rather than 
be considered as one among many vehicles for institutionalizing religious pluralism. 
This signals their importance for guaranteeing the political integration of a plurality 
of religious claims.  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have endorsed a specific model of church-state relations, Bader’s 
NOCOP, and reinterpreted it in the light of the normative theory of deliberative 
perfectionism that I developed in the fifth chapter. On the one hand, I have argued 
that NOCOP provides the most inclusive and flexible framework for the presence 
and functioning of religious political parties. On the other hand, I have critiqued 
Bader’s version of NOCOP and shown that it lacks valid normative foundations. 
Only by placing religious political parties at its centre, I concluded, can NOCOP 
acquire normative soundness and institutional feasibility. The outcome of my 
enquiry has therefore been both to illustrate which framework best provides the 
normative rationale and the institutional space for religious party politics and, at the 
same time, to highlight how religious political parties are indispensible for sustaining 
that framework, both normatively and institutionally.  
 
In the fourth and final part of my thesis, I will an lyse two specific examples of 
religious political parties, the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma 
Partisi - AKP) in Turkey and the former Christian Democratic Party (Democrazia 
Cristiana - DC) in Italy, and assess whether these parties conform to the normative 
ideal of religious partisan identity that I have devis d. As I explained in the first 
chapter, although the AKP has not invoked, so far, “the religious transformation of 
state and society”,77 it can still be considered a religious party insofar as it is “deeply 
involved in Islamic social ethics and cultural norms, and stresses the religious values 
and interests of its pious electorate”.78 In this sense, the AKP satisfies the criteria of 
the definition of “religious party” that I presented in the first chapter. After having 
                                                      
77 M. Hakan Yavuz, Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), p.8 (italics in original). 




characterized Turkey’s regime of religious governance with a monistic and top-down 
form of laicism (i.e. state control upon religion) rather than with secularism (i.e. the 
separation between political and religious realms), I will argue that Turkey’s 
monistic laicism ought to be replaced by a form of “pluralistic laicism” analogous to 
NOCOP and that this is the kind of framework the AKP ought to invoke in order to 
safeguard the political and institutional space for its religious partisan identity and to 

































Chapter 10 - Secularism, Laicism and Religious Political Identity in 
Turkey  
 
There is certainly some truth in the idea that Turkey, at least until the introduction of 
multipartyism in 1946, was an authoritarian polity, and that the centralistic top-down 
approach of the Kemalist establishment has continued to operate until recently. In 
this sense, it is probably correct to argue that “all the Turkish political parties formed 
during 1946-1950 and afterwards, are…Republican Parties, regardless of whether or 
not they genuinely accept republicanism”.1 Ahmet Kuru2 traces this situation back to 
a form of “assertive secularism” which has been dominant in Turkey since the 
Kemalist revolution, especially during the single-party rule of the Republican 
People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi - CHP) between 1923 and the end of the 
1940s. Contrary to regimes of “passive secularism”, where the state is even-handed 
towards all religions while guaranteeing their public visibility, “assertive secularism” 
involves the state endorsement of a secular comprehensive doctrine in the public 
realm while religion is relegated to the private sphere.3  
 
Due to this regime of assertive secularism, religious political parties in Turkey have 
always had to face strict constraints in the public political realm. On 28 February 
1997, for example, a military coup dismantled the Islamist Welfare Party (Refah 
Partisi - RP), forerunner of the Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi - FP) and of the Justice 
and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi - AKP), due to its alleged link 
with Islamic militancy. The coup stressed once more the presence of deep structural 
and institutional obstacles to the formation and political expression of Islamist 
                                                      
1 Kemal H. Karpat, Turkey’s Politics: the Transition to a Multi-Party System (Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1959), p.249. See also Eric Rouleau, “Turkey: Beyond Atatürk”, Foreign 
Policy, No.103 (1996), p.71. 
2 Ahmet T. Kuru, “Reinterpretation of Secularism in Turkey: The Case of the Justice and 
Development Party”, in M. Hakan Yavuz (ed.), The Emergence of a New Turkey: Democracy and the 
AK Party (Salt Lake City: The University of Utah Press, 2006), pp.136-59. Kuru traces the assertive 
secularism, which characterizes Turkey and France, back to the presence of an ancien régime 
characterized by the coalition of monarchy and dominant religion. The lack of an ancien régime in the 
United States, according to Kuru, explains the latter’s passive secularism [Ahmet T. Kuru, Secularism 
and State Policies toward Religion: The United States, France and Turkey (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), p.14]. 





political parties in Turkey. The AKP, on which I am focusing here, was founded in 
2001 by the more reformist and pragmatist wing of the FP, after that party, like the 
RP, had been disbanded by the Constitutional Court due to its alleged role as a focal 
point for Islamic militancy.4 The reformist leadership of the AKP, of which Tayyip 
Erdoğan (the current AKP leader and Prime Minister of Turkey) and Abdullah Gül 
(the current President) are the most prominent members, has emphasized from the 
beginning the need for an impartial and more tolerant state, allowing religious 
doctrines to manifest themselves in the public sphere.5 It has therefore called for a 
more inclusive public sphere and for the shift from an assertive to a more passive 
secularism. The AKP has displayed so far a more cautious approach (i.e. than its 
disbanded forerunners) towards the Kemalist establihment. While maintaining its 
roots in political Islam, the party embraced a democratic conservative outlook which 
allowed it to win over 34% of the public vote at the 2002 general elections, making it 
the main party in Turkey, an electoral success confirmed and enhanced at the 2007 
general elections. 
 
Despite contrary statements by Erdoğan,6 the religious character of the AKP is 
widely endorsed. Graham Fuller, for example, consider  the AKP “an overtly 
religious party...even though it has been prudent and careful in not advertising its 
religious roots.”7 Although the AKP has not invoked, so far, “the r ligious 
transformation of state and society”,8 it can still be considered a religious party 
insofar as it is “deeply involved in Islamic social ethics and cultural norms, and 
stresses the religious values and interests of its pious electorate”.9 Its programmatic 
                                                      
4 For a detailed historical account of the National Outlook Movement and the development of Islamist 
political parties in Turkey since the 1970s see Angel Rabasa and F. Stephen Larrabee, The Rise of 
Political Islam in Turkey (Santa Monica: Rand Publications, 2008), pp.40-50; M. Hakan Yavuz, 
Islamic Political Identity in Turkey (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 207-264; Sultan 
Tepe, Beyond Sacred and Secular: Politics of Religion in Israel and Turkey (Stanford, California: 
Stanford University Press, 2008), pp.159-226. 
5 Kuru, “Reinterpretation of Secularism in Turkey: The Case of the Justice and Development Party”, 
p.140 
6 See Deborah Sontag, “The Erdoğan Experiment”, New York Times, May 11 (2003) [online]. 
Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/11/magazine/the-erdogan-experiment.html [accessed 
10 February 2009]. 
7 Graham E. Fuller, “Turkey’s Strategic Model: Myths and Realities,” Washington Quarterly, Vol.27, 
No.3 (2004), p.52. 
8 M. Hakan Yavuz, Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009), p.8 (italics in original). 




platform and ideological stance, therefore, are very much rooted in a religious 
Islamic worldview.  
 
For other authors, the AKP could be considered as the Muslim counterpart of 
Western Christian democratic parties, as it endorses d mocratic values, but is 
influenced and inspired by Muslim beliefs.10 Indeed, soon after the AKP’s victory in 
the general elections of November 2002, the Turkish Islamist writer Ali Bulaç 
highlighted the divergence between the public statements of the party leadership and 
the attitude of the party’s grassroots supporters. While discarding an Islamist 
political agenda, the latter still saw the AKP as a “Muslim democrat” party and 
provided it with mass support on these grounds.11 In this sense, therefore, the AKP 
can be considered a religious party on the basis of the broad definition that I 
provided in the first chapter.  
 
Turkey’s Constitutional Court and the Ambiguities of Turkish Secularism 
The Constitutional Court, in Turkey, has never abandoned a strongly assertive 
conception of secularism but it has always endorsed, at least in principle, the 
separation not only between religion and politics but, more radically, between 
religion and worldly affairs (e.g. education, family, dress etc.).12 Secularism is not 
seen by the Constitutional Court (or at least not only) as a mere institutional tool 
aiming to protect the state from religion and vice versa, in order to guarantee their 
respective autonomy, but rather as an intrinsic good, i.e. as “Turkey’s philosophy of 
life”. 13 As the main scope of the Constitutional Court is to preserve its conception of 
strict secularism at all costs because it is intrinsically good, therefore there is not 
much space left for alternative institutional arrangements, even if the latter were 
found to be suitable for achieving similar concrete results, namely the autonomy of 
both political and religious realms. In other words, a perfectionist conception of 
                                                      
10 See William Hale, “Christian Democracy and the JDP: Parallels and Contrasts”, in M. Hakan 
Yavuz (ed.), The Emergence of a New Turkey: Democracy and the AK Party (Salt Lake City: The 
University of Utah Press, 2006), pp.66-87. 
11 Ibid., p.67. 
12 The Turkish Constitutional Court’s ruling on The Welfare Party case on January 16, 1997, 
no.1998/1, quoted in Kuru, “Reintepretation of Secularism in Turkey: The Case of the Justice and 
Development Party”, p.144. 




secularism does not leave much scope for institutional change.  
 
The single-party regime which characterized Turkey until 1946 was therefore 
determined, at least in part, by the assertive (and perfectionist) conception of 
secularism, endorsed by the Kemalist regime and emphasized by the Constitutional 
Court. In ideal terms, political parties require animpartial common institutional 
arrangement in order to be able to comply with the normative criteria of loyal 
opposition and regulated rivalry. Therefore multi-party politics is in principle 
undermined by a common framework grounded in a specific omprehensive 
doctrine, e.g. the assertive secularism endorsed by the Kemalist regime and by the 
CHP.14  
 
By distinguishing between “political” and “cultural” domains, Turkey’s 
Constitutional Court aims both to protect culture from political “contamination” and 
vice versa.15 For example, Dicle Kogacioglu observes, during the discussion that led 
to the Court’s decision to ban the Kurdish People’s Labour Party (Halkin Emek 
Partisi – HEP) on the basis of its separatist views, the Court acknowledged the 
presence in Turkey of different ethnic groups but it also emphasized that “different 
traditions…could not become a basis for claiming minority status and an amalgam of 
derivative rights. Such claims, the Court argued, could not but amount to 
separatism”.16 In relation to the case of the RP, instead, the Court highlighted the 
importance of separating religion from politics in order “to safeguard the dignity of 
religious life”.17 The idea that particular interests or societal demands should not be 
formalized through political institutionalization corresponds to the model of Non-
Establishment and Private Pluralism (NEPP) that I illustrated in the previous chapter 
in relation to Veit Bader’s analysis. As in that model, one might argue, in Turkey 
pluralism is “relegated to the ‘private sphere’ of civil society and is not allowed to 
spill over into political society or the state, particularly not into decision-making”.18     
                                                      
14 This party, founded by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (the founder of the Turkish Republic and its first 
President), remained the only officially recognized party in Turkey until 1946. 
15 Dicle Kogacioglu, “Progress, Unity, and Democracy: Dissolving Political Parties in Turkey”, Law 
& Society Review, Vol.38, No.3 (2004), p.435. 
16 Kogacioglu, “Progress, Unity, and Democracy: Dissolving Political Parties in Turkey”, p.446. 
17 Ibid., p.451. 




The constraints imposed upon the formation of a religious political identity would 
therefore seem to arise, in Turkey, from the neat sparation between religion and 
politics and between public and private realms. In this sense, the Court’s apparent 
willingness to “protect” the cultural realm (through this separation) could be read as 
the attempt to guarantee the flourishing of religious expression within civil society, 
that is, at the social (but not at the political) level. On that basis, one might then 
argue, the existing framework ought to be replaced by a less rigid interpretation of 
the separation between the two spheres, in the formof a “passive secularism” more 
favourable to the expression of religious partisan identity. However, this might raise 
two problems. From a normative point of view, secularism, intended as the 
separation between political and societal realms, in principle prevents the 
politicization of religious and other perfectionism claims, whether it is assertive or 
passive. In ideal terms, this kind of framework is not compatible with the presence of 
religious parties.   
 
From a more empirical point of view, we should be careful and not be misled by the 
ambiguities of the interpretation of secularism displayed by the Turkish 
establishment. Although the Constitutional Court has often emphasized the idea of 
separation between religion and worldly affairs (including political affairs), in the 
case of Turkey (as in Rawls’s theory) this separation is only apparent. The real 
difficulty, in both cases, lies instead in the subordination of religion to politics and of 
the non-public to the public realm. Kogacioglu himself, for example, notes how the 
Court’s call for the separation between culture (including religion) and politics “was 
inherently political in its implications as it insisted…on the Court’s ability to 
simultaneously define where culture ends and politics begin”.19 In other words, the 
paradox of the Court’s approach was in the fact that i  appealed to a distinction that it 
had itself made, from within the standpoint of one of the domains of the distinction 
(i.e. the political one). It is evident, from this, that “separation” for the Court means 
in fact “subordination” of religion and culture to he political domain and this poses 
normative problems further to those raised by the superficially neat separation of 
religion and politics.   
                                                                                                                                                    
(Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2007), p.203. 




Laicism and the Subordination of Religion to Politics 
A closer examination of secularism will further enha ce the idea that the 
subordination of religion to politics, rather than the separation between them, is the 
key normative concept for understanding the limits imposed upon religious political 
identity in Turkey. It is particularly useful to star  from Andrew Davison’s emphasis 
on the distinction between the terms “secular” and “lay”. 20 The former, he argues, 
denotes the separation between religion and politics, that is, a negative relation 
between the two spheres, grounded in a Christian conception.21 This implies that, 
although secularism may sometimes degenerate into ati-religious behaviour and 
provisions, its aim is more often that of guaranteeing the loyalty, of non-religious 
people for non-religious reasons and of religious people for religious reasons, to the 
constitutional and institutional framework of a polity. This is fully consistent, 
Davison argues, with allowing the vitality of religion at the non-political, 
associational level, as in the United States (US).  
 
This argument clearly resembles the Rawlsian distinctio  between public and non-
public (i.e. associational) spheres. Secularism, in this sense, could be considered a 
tolerant and inclusive framework ensuring the social (but not the political) 
manifestation and expression of religious identity, as the case of the US clearly 
shows. Moreover, Davison’s account of secularism, with its idea of the loyalty of 
both religious and non-religious citizens to the constitutional arrangement of a polity, 
seems to mirror Rawls’s idea of an overlapping consensus. However, as I argued in 
the second chapter, the political conception of justice devised by Rawls is not 
sufficiently inclusive for allowing an overlapping consensus among most 
comprehensive views (both religious and non-religious) endorsed by citizens within 
pluralistic liberal democratic societies.22 Yet rather than with secularism, I believe, 
Rawls’s political liberalism and his expansive conception of public reason bear 
                                                      
20 Andrew Davison, “Turkey, a ‘Secular’ State? The Challenge of Description”, South Atlantic 
Quarterly, Vol.102, No.2/3, Spring/Summer (2003), pp.333-350. 
21 For a critique of an essentialist understanding of Christianity and Islam, considering the separation 
of temporal and divine realms as intrinsic to the former but extraneous to the latter, see Yavuz, 
Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey, p.153. 
22 Davison, “Turkey, a ‘Secular’ State? The Challenge of Description”, p.336. For a critique of 
Rawls’s overlapping consensus as a model of secularism see Charles Taylor, “Modes of Secularism”, 





significant similarities, in ideal terms, with “laicism”, i.e. the idea that religion and 
state affairs should not be separated and that, contrary to secular arrangements, 
“laicist political relations…may also retain the religion in a prominent, lay-defined, 
official role”.23  
 
Davison emphasizes how the principle of “laiklik” was soon adopted by the CHP in 
Turkey during the 1920s. Despite some secularizing moves (e.g. the abolition of the 
Caliphate, the replacement of the Islamic Sharī’a with the Swiss civil and the Italian 
penal codes etc.) the CHP kept religion under tight state control.24 In this sense, then, 
religion remained “a constitutive element of the larger national bond”25 and “a 
separate concern among other state concerns, not separat  from politics or the 
state”.26 Although the Kemalist establishment rejected from the beginning certain 
fanatical or reactionary expressions of Islam, it never invoked a total divorce 
between religion and politics. Indeed various authors, examining the ambiguities of 
the Turkish model of secularism, have played down the concept of “separation”, 
either intended as freedom of or (state) freedom from religion, and stressed instead 
the tight control of the political establishment upon religion in Turkey.27 The 
institution which best symbolizes this state of things is the Directorate of Religious 
Affairs, which is under the direct control of the Prime Minister and promotes a 
moderate version of Islam. Through the Directorate “Islam…was integrated into the 
government structure, quite in keeping with the Ottoman pattern of including ulama 
[i.e. the Muslim legal scholars expert in Islamic studies and arbiters of Sharī’a law] 
within the state. It was, however, stripped of its original meaning in the Ottoman 
bureaucracy and reduced to a subservient role”.28  
 
                                                      
23 Davison, “Turkey, a ‘Secular’ State? The Challenge of Description”, p.337. 
24 Ibid., p.337. 
25 Ibid., p.340. For the use of Islam as a “common identity marker” by the Kemalist regime, see Sultan 
Tepe, “A Pro-Islamic Party? Promises and Limits of Turkey’s Justice and Development Party”, in 
Yavuz (ed.), The Emergence of a New Turkey: Democracy and the AK Party, p.110. 
26 Davison, “Turkey, a ‘Secular’ State? The Challenge of Description”, p.341. Binnaz Toprak, for 
example, describes this process as one of “polity expansion” and “polity dominance” rather than one 
of “polity separation” [Binnaz Toprak, Islam and Political Development in Turkey (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 
1981), p.57]. 
27 See Kogacioglu, “Progress, Unity, and Democracy: Dissolving Political Parties in Turkey”, pp.437-
438. 
28 Umit Cizre Sakallioglu, “Parameters and Strategies of Islam-State Interaction in Republican 




The absence of an existing dualist institutional frmework (i.e. church and state) 
analogous to the one present in France or, more genrally, in Western European 
countries, stemming from the historical battles betwe n popes and princes, sacred 
and temporal authority, determined therefore the specific nature of Turkish laicism.29 
While controlling religious expression from above, though, Kemalist laicism 
involved “the prohibition of political associations or parties seeking particularist 
religious support”.30 Religion was protected by the state and guaranteed fr om “as 
long as and insofar as it was not utilized to promote any social or political ideology 
having institutional implications”.31 Despite “disestablishing Islam in the public 
sphere”,32 the Kemalist elite aimed not only to control religious expression within 
society but also to use religious values for legitimiz ng the state institutions and 
policies.33 The Kemalist establishment embraced this rigid, top-d wn form of laicism 
due to the “exclusive nature of orthodox Islam”,34 which would prevent any dialogue 
and compromise between state and religion. Yet thisgave rise to a similarly 
exclusive state, unable to guarantee “an inclusive and pluralist understanding of 
religion”35 or the kind of church-state cooperation and “twin tolerations”36 which 
characterize several Western European polities.     
 
This aspect points out the unidirectional, top-down relation between political and 
religious realms. Due to the internal bifurcation of the pre-existing Ottoman 
establishment, and to the subsequent supremacy of the political branch over the 
religious one, the main obstacle to the formation of religious parties in Turkey lies 
not in the state indifference towards religion but in the fact that the state controls 
both which religious values can be expressed (i.e. those which are compatible with 
                                                      
29 See Serif Mardin, “Religion and Secularism in Turkey”, in Albert Hourani, Philip S. Khoury and 
Mary C. Wilson (eds.), The Modern Middle East: A Reader (London; New York: I.B. Tauris & Co. 
Publishers, 1993), p.347. See also Niyazi Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey 
(Montreal: McGill University Press, 1964), p.480. 
30 Ibid., p.499. 
31 Ibid., p.499. 
32 Yavuz, Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey, p.23. 
33 See Sultan Tepe, “Religious Parties and Democracy: A Comparative Assessment of Israel and 
Turkey”, Democratization, Vol.12, No.3, June (2005), pp. 299ff and Sakalliog u, “Parameters and 
Strategies of Islam-State Interaction in Republican Turkey”, p.245. 
34 Yavuz, Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey, p.149. 
35 Ibid., p.148. 





the strict secularism endorsed by the Constitutional Court) and where they can be 
expressed (i.e. at the social but not at the politica  and institutional levels).  
 
Laicism and Political Liberalism 
My analysis in the previous paragraphs provides therefore another striking parallel 
with those aspects of Rawls’s political liberalism that I analysed in the second 
chapter. Both Kemalism and Rawls’s theory share a “top-down” conception of the 
polity and allow religious (or other perfectionist) claims into the public political 
realm only as long as these contribute to enhancing a pre-existing constitutional 
framework.37 Not surprisingly, while highlighting the subordination of religion to the 
state sanctioned by Article 24 of the 1982 Constitution (for matters concerning 
education)38 and by the presence of the Directorate of Religious Affairs,39 as well as 
the instrumental use of religion displayed by the Kmalist establishment,40 Pinar 
Tank compares Turkey’s “unorthodox understanding of secularism”41 to Rawls’s 
political liberalism. Both exclude comprehensive doctrines (such as religious ones) 
from the public political sphere unless they somehow c ntribute to enhancing the 
existing constitutional and institutional framework.42 However, Tank also 
emphasizes how political liberalism requires a clear distinction between public and 
non-public reason and between public and private realms, a consensus “on what 
constitutes ‘reasonable’ behaviour as well as an agreement on the issues that can be 
included in the public arena”.43 These distinctions, he highlights, are not at all clear 
within the Turkish context. The idea of secularism, which is embodied in the 
Constitution, is in fact contested by large sectors of Turkish society and it does not 
                                                      
37 See Yavuz, Islamic Political Identity in Turkey, p.46. 
38 Pinar Tank, “Political Islam in Turkey: A State ofControlled Secularity”, Turkish Studies, Vol.6, 
No.1, March (2005), p.5. 
39 However, the Directorate of Religious Affairs tends to favour the Sunni branch Islam, thus 
displaying a biased way of controlling religious expression (Rabasa and Larrabee, The Rise of 
Political Islam in Turkey, p.12). 
40 Tank, “Political Islam in Turkey: A State of Controlled Secularity”, p.11. This instrumental way of 
conceiving religion, however, has been embraced throughout the years not only by the Kemalist 
establishment and by the CHP but also by political p rties which were closer to Islamist 
constituencies, such as the Democratic Party (Demokrat Parti - DP). See, for example, Sakallioglu, 
“Parameters and Strategies of Islam-State Interaction in Republican Turkey”, p.237 and Yavuz, 
Islamic Political Identity in Turkey, p.61. 
41 Tank, “Political Islam in Turkey: A State of Controlled Secularity”, p.5. 
42 See Yavuz, Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey, p.32. 




seem therefore to display the degree of democratic legitimacy that a constitutional 
arrangement requires. 
 
As secularism in principle establishes the separation between public and private 
spheres, it is therefore obvious that the lack of consensus about the precise meaning 
of this separation makes it difficult to achieve a common understanding of what 
belongs, respectively, to the private and the public domains. In Turkey, according to 
Tank, “the clear divide between the public and private spheres advocated by political 
liberals wavers over several issues”.44 One of the most prominent ones, he highlights, 
concerns the banning of the headscarf in public places. The headscarf issue 
emphasizes the reciprocal permeability of public and private spheres, therefore 
defying the neat separation that secularism would requi e. What is most interesting, 
however, is that Tank does not in fact contest politica  liberalism as such. Rawls’s 
doctrine, in his view, represents a coherent theoretical model against which the limits 
of the Turkish polity can be (negatively) evaluated. 
 
However, I highlighted in the second chapter how the lack of a clear distinction, in 
Rawls’s account, between constitutional and ordinary politics, and between public 
political realm and civil society, render the constraints of public reason all-
encompassing. There is a correspondence between political liberalism and 
Kemalism, and the latter should be seen as an embodi ent of laicism rather than 
secularism. Moreover, the main problem emerging from Tank’s analysis is the 
continuity, rather than separation, between public and private realms. Due to this 
continuity, the political expression of religious identity has been seriously 
jeopardized in Turkey. Furthermore, the arbitrariness of the boundary between public 
and private spheres implies that “the AKP walks the tight boundary between what is 
acceptable and unacceptable, considered reasonable and unreasonable, in the sphere 
of secularity, but to a certain degree it walks that boundary blindly”.45  
 
This is especially important, in my view, for religious political parties. As I 
explained in the first chapter, only the presence of an institutional and constitutional 
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consensus, preceding partisan divisions, allows a party to be “a subdivision 
compatible with unity rather than a division that disrupts it”.46 Only consensus on 
fundamental values and principles at the community level allows parties to comply 
with the normative criterion of loyal opposition and to be a “parts-of-the-whole” 
rather than disruptive factions. The lack of such a stable consensus seems to be one 
of the main problems in Turkey and the major source of the AKP’s “blindness”. This 
has allowed the Kemalist regime to shift continuously the boundaries between 
politics and religion, sometimes preventing religion from entering the public realm, 
sometimes allowing its presence in order to help the establishment to face more 
dangerous threats (such as the one coming from the radical left). This seems to 
highlight, then, that the problem in Turkey derives not so much from the 
“invisibility” of the boundaries between politics and religion, and of the 
constitutional consensus which defines them, but rathe  from their “arbitrariness”.  
 
In this sense, it might even be argued that the Kemalist establishment has adopted a 
kind of secularism à la carte. On the one hand, it has endorsed top-down laicism and 
continuity between political and non-political realms, in order to assert its control 
upon the latter, by “bureaucratizing religious functionaries and scholars so as to 
make them subservient to the state” and “controlling the legitimacy and 
representative capability of public religious discourses by defining a ‘mainstream’ 
Islam”.47 On the other hand, it has sometimes advocated bottom-up secularism (i.e. 
separation between political and non-political realms) in order to protect itself 
against unwelcome religious demands, while at other times it has allowed religious 
views into the public political realm when these were useful for enhancing the 
regime or for fighting non-religious political threats.         
 
Consequently, I would argue, religious political parties have had to confront a double 
challenge. On the one hand, the top-down laicism of the Kemalist regime, 
characterized by a tight state control upon religious matters, has conditioned which 
religious values, issues and demands could be conveyed into the public political 
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realm by religious parties. On the other hand, the lack of a clear and legitimate 
constitutional consensus (and the consequent fluctuation of the boundary between 
private and public realms) has conditioned the way in which religious parties can 
carry these values, that is, their partisan identity itself. The lack of a clear 
constitutional consensus deprives parties (religious and not) of one of the two crucial 
components of their bilingual identity (i.e. the reference to a unitary framework), the 
other being the expression of comprehensive conceptions of the good, as I explained 
in the first chapter. In this sense, the abovementioned arbitrariness of the 
constitutional consensus can contingently disrupt the parties’ understanding of the 
boundaries between political and religious realms and perhaps posit risks to their 
capacity to formulate a settled partisan identity and settled purposes. Therefore the 
risk of being banned, encountered by every Islamist par y in Turkey (a risk that 
became reality for the parties forerunners of the AKP, the RP and the FP), is due not 
only to their violation of the boundaries between public and non-public domains but, 
more fundamentally, to the absence of clear boundaries nd of one of the preliminary 
conditions for the existence of a plural party system, that is, a broadly endorsed 
constitutional consensus. That only certain kinds of parties have been allowed to 
exist in Turkey is not a contingent aspect but rather e consequence of the fact that 
the constitutional and institutional consensus has always been a partial and artificial 
one, established and imposed from above (i.e. by the army, by the Kemalist elite, 
etc.) rather than democratically emerging from civil society. This has implied that the 
party system, in republican Turkey, has been distorted from the beginning and it has 
never fully mirrored the values, demands and cleavages (especially religious ones) 
present within Turkish society. 
 
Turkey’s regime of religious governance, therefore, does not conform to the ideal 
model of NOCOP that I defended in the previous chapter and which, I explained, is 
the most suitable, in ideal terms, to the presence a d functioning of religious political 
parties. It does not provide an impartial and inclusive framework for the channelling 
of religious claims into the public political realm and it prevents religious parties 
from being able to adhere to the normative criteria of party politics that I presented in 




Religious Political Identity, Secularism and Laicism 
As religious political parties are bilingual and exist on the borderline between 
political and non-political spheres, they are particularly affected by the way in which 
a lay political establishment may impose constraints upon the expression of religious 
values in the public political realm. The basic meaning of the idea of “religious 
political identity” is that, in ideal terms, religious arguments as presented by religious 
political parties are qualitatively different from religious arguments offered by a 
church, a religious sect or other non-partisan organizations.48 As I explained in the 
first chapter, political parties (including religious ones) ought to display loyal 
opposition, acknowledgement of pluralism and commitent to electoral politics. 
This can contribute in reshaping religious views in more moderate terms. The 
ideologies and manifestoes of religious parties which comply with the criteria of 
party politics and preserve their bilingualism, therefore, do not merely mirror pre-
existing religious doctrines. Instead, they offer novel political alternatives, resulting 
from their unique bilingual nature. 
 
Consequently, it may not be appropriate for the AKP simply to reject the Kemalist 
ideology because it represents a betrayal of the tru  meaning of secularism, which 
should guarantee the autonomy of all religious communities through the separation 
between religion and politics. Although secularism belongs in some ways to the 
cultural and historical tradition of Islam (as in the Ottoman Empire, where the millet 
system guaranteed the legal autonomy of the various eligious communities present 
within the territory of the Empire)49 it would not be the most suitable framework for 
the presence of religious parties such as the AKP. As I explained in the ninth chapter, 
when examining the NEPP model of church-state relations, pure secularism is not 
suitable, in ideal terms, for the specific, bilingual nature of religious parties, for their 
religious political identity. It may certainly guarantee autonomy for religious groups 
and communities but not necessarily for religious political parties. The fundamental 
distinction between associational and partisan ident ti s, which I have often stressed 
                                                      
48 For this point, see Rosenblum, “Religious Parties, Religious Political Identity, and the Cold 
Shoulder of Liberal Democratic Thought”, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Vol.6 (2003), p.45. 
49 Feroz Ahmad highlights how “[t]he millet system suggests that the Ottomans made no attempt at 
assimilation, only a pragmatic integration that allowed the empire to function smoothly” [Feroz 




in the previous chapters, should not be overlooked.  
 
The AKP ought not to invoke the discontinuity between Turkey’s political and 
religious spheres either. Although this might end the subordination of the latter to the 
former, and might prevent state interference in the affairs of religious communities, it 
might also defy the rationale for the existence of religious political parties. In other 
words, if secularism implies the distinction between political and religious spheres, 
this should then work in both directions. The state should be indifferent to the life of 
religious citizens but the latter should not be allowed to enter the political realm by, 
for example, constituting religious political parties. Therefore I disagree with the 
idea that the AKP ought to call upon mere “freedom f religion from state 
intervention and the protection of religious rights”.50 This might be enough to 
guarantee the freedom of religious communities within civil society. However the 
AKP is a religious political party, deeply relying on Islamic values and interests in 
order to appeal to its electorate.51 Its programmatic platform and ideological stance 
result from the politicization of a religious worldview. Preventing this process of 
politicization, by strictly separating religious and political realms (i.e. through a 
strictly secular regime), would seriously reduce th normative and institutional space 
for religious parties such as the AKP. 
 
It is quite significant to think of how religious political parties are in fact absent in 
those countries which are normally most identified with an ideal secular 
establishment, such as the US. As I explained in the seventh chapter, the NEPP ideal 
model, of which the US secular framework represents a concrete (though imperfect) 
manifestation, allows the presence of a multitude of religious groups and 
communities at the level of civil society, while preventing at the same time the 
formation of religious parties. It would seem paradoxical, therefore, to argue that the 
AKP ought to call for a secular regime thus intended.52 One might then suggest that 
the AKP ought to invoke a regime of “passive secularism”, as intended by Kuru,53 
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and for state even-handedness towards all religions. However, although the 
distinction between assertive and passive secularism might be interesting, in fact it 
overlooks the crucial aspect of the problem that I am currently addressing. If 
secularism, contrary to laicism, implies separation between private and public 
realms, it may not be sufficient simply to distinguish between its “assertive” and 
“passive” versions. This distinction could be intend d as one of degree but it would 
not bear any relevance for political parties. A “passive” form of secularism would 
only involve greater freedom of religious expression at the social, not at the political 
level.  
 
The NEPP model might be considered analogous to a form of passive secularism, as 
it guarantees state even-handedness towards all religions and their public expression 
at the level of civil society. Yet at the same time, as I explained in the ninth chapter, 
no religious party could in principle be allowed inthis kind of institutional 
framework, if intended in ideal terms. This passive secular model, therefore, would 
not be very beneficial to the AKP. Once we understand that secularism implies the 
separation between public and private realms, its degree of inclusiveness towards 
religious expression depends on how we delimit the sphere of the private in relation 
to the public and the political. The private sphere may thus include associations, 
clubs etc., but it may also be restricted to churches, or even just families. Despite 
these differences of degree, the idea itself of “separation” is never questioned. 
Perhaps assertive secularism is to be intended as asubstantive value in itself, 
whereas passive secularism is better characterized as a modus operandi, i.e. as an 
institutional arrangement which does not imply substantive normative judgments 
regarding the actual “goodness” of such a framework, and of the distinction between 
politics and religion. Yet passive and assertive secularism only express different 
ways of understanding the extent of the “private” ralm, the only realm in which 
religious expression may be allowed. Despite the Turkish Constitutional Court’s 
apparent endorsement of an assertive form of secularism,54 though, neither assertive 
nor passive secularism characterizes Turkey and neither could be invoked by the 
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AKP consistently with the party’s requirement to preserve its bilingualism and abide 
by the normative criteria of party politics. The normative requirements of secularism 
are simply incompatible with those of (religious) party politics. 
 
Pluralistic Laicism and Non-Constitutional Pluralism (NOCOP) 
While a regime of passive secularism might in principle be useful for fostering 
religious expression within civil society (but not within the public political realm), 
what is really at stake in Turkey is the distinction (and contrast) between monistic 
top-down laicism and pluralistic bottom-up laicism. Kemalism involves continuity, 
not separation between political and non-political re lms, public and private spheres. 
A truly secular state, for example, would never prevent women from wearing the 
headscarf in public places as it would rather display a certain degree of indifference 
(or at least even-handedness) towards religious matters. Given the lay, rather than 
secular, character of the Turkish establishment, the AKP ought to invoke a more 
inclusive and pluralistic form of laicism rather than a clearer separation between 
politics and religion. Inclusiveness would imply a greater permeability of the 
political realm to the expression of religious values emerging from civil society and 
conveyed through party politics. Pluralism, instead, would entail the possibility, for 
religious parties, of promoting their values within the political sphere without having 
to conceive them as different ways for legitimizing the institutions and policies of the 
monistic Kemalist establishment. In other words, this would prevent the normative 
fault that I also found in Rawls’s political liberalism, namely the idea of considering 
religious and comprehensive views only as ways for enhancing the political 
conception of justice which provides the normative foundations of the state basic 
structure. 
 
By arguing that the AKP ought to invoke laicism rather than secularism, I do not 
intend to claim that laicism is better than secularism in fostering religious pluralism 
per se. Secular polities which conform to the NEPP model (such as the United 
States) do allow a high degree of societal religious pluralism. Yet NEPP does not 
allow, in ideal terms, religious partisan identity, i.e. the politicization of religious 




forego those benefits which can arise from the presence of religious parties which 
comply with the normative criteria of party politics. Such parties can contribute in 
channelling and moderating comprehensive views and making them suitable for 
pluralistic democratic deliberation. They can also guarantee the balance between 
“partiality” and “wholeness”, particular and general principles, pluralism and unity 
under a common constitutional framework. Their absence might bear serious 
consequences for purely secular polities by leading to either a gradual fragmentation 
of society, through an increasing “factionalism” of views and values, or to the 
gradual convergence of the political establishment towards a monistic (religious or 
secular) conception of the political community. This clarifies in what sense 
pluralistic laicism would be better suited for allowing and encouraging the 
flourishing of religious political identity through political parties. To be able to 
channel religious claims while abiding by the normative criteria of party politics, 
religious parties require continuity between political and non-political realms. 
Therefore a lay system can in principle provide for them a more suitable framework 
than a secular regime of separation. 
 
The kind of pluralistic laicism that I am endorsing here presents important normative 
links with the NOCOP model illustrated in the previous chapter. Two features are 
especially crucial in allowing this connection. First, by defending pluralistic laicism, 
I endorse both religious pluralism within civil society and the possibility of its 
politicization through religious political parties. These are two of the central traits of 
NOCOP. Second, the analysis of Turkey’s top-down laicism, which closely 
resembles the French model of religious governance, helps to reject Bader’s view 
that the latter should be identified with NEPP.55 France and Turkey do not display a 
regime of strict separation between politics and religion, but rather a top-down 
control, by the state, of religious expression, concer ing both the content and the 
locus of this expression. Furthermore, both France and Turkey are characterized by a 
distinctive form of establishment in which the established doctrine is not a religious 
faith (as in England or, more strongly, in Greece or Israel) but rather a lay, and 
                                                      




therefore political religion.56 This kind of lay, non-religious establishment differs 
from that of countries such as Belgium, where laicism (or secularism) “is one of 
several comprehensive doctrines [funded by the state], not the one officially 
recognized and imposed by the state on people”.57    
 
This enhances the case for envisaging a normative link between NOCOP and 
pluralistic laicism. The AKP ought to call for a form of disestablishment in which 
Turkey’s institutional arrangement would be disentangled from monistic laicism. In 
order to satisfy the AKP’s demands, the latter ought to be replaced by a thinner and 
more inclusive constitutional framework, normatively grounded in a pragmatist 
conception of deliberation, in the way illustrated in the previous chapter. This would 
allow the spillover of religious demands into the political sphere and protect societal 
and religious pluralism from the dominance of an institutionalized monistic 
(religious or lay) creed. Both conditions are normatively and institutionally crucial, 
in ideal terms, for the presence of religious political parties. 
 
Religious Partisan identity, Pragmatist Deliberation and the AKP  
Religious parties which comply with the normative criteria of party politics depicted 
in the first chapter can enhance a pluralistic understanding of laicism by joining the 
idea of partiality within a whole with the lay idea of the continuity between political 
and religious domains, an idea which allows religious values endorsed within civil 
society to enter the public political realm. Moreovr, as explained in the previous 
chapter, religious parties are necessary for guaranteeing the normative and 
institutional feasibility of Bader’s version of NOCOP. Most importantly, religious 
parties provide the crucial link between pluralism and pragmatist deliberation.  
 
Only a procedural, rather than substantive conception of laicism, can guarantee 
societal pluralism and the access of religious claims nto the public political realm 
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through religious parties. A narrower, procedural understanding of the foundations of 
a lay polity, such as that which characterizes NOCOP, provides in ideal terms a more 
inclusive framework for religious political parties. Grounding the limits and 
constraints imposed upon the expression of religious political identity in the values 
and principles of pragmatism (as argued in the fifth and sixth chapters) enhances the 
legitimacy of the state before religious political parties while at the same time 
establishing the legitimate democratic limits within which the parties’ political 
activity ought to be conducted. The pragmatist version of deliberative democracy 
guarantees a more inclusive public sphere as different religious (or, more generally, 
comprehensive) views are allowed to enter the public realm as they are, without 
having to present their views as different perspectiv s from which the constitutional 
essentials and an independent political ethic ought to be endorsed. This therefore 
allows the presence even of religious parties conveyi g views which Rawls would 
define “unreasonable” just because they may not contribute in endorsing and 
enhancing the constitutional framework.    
 
The present analysis helps us therefore to clarify the normative relationship between 
religious political parties and an ideal NOCOP grounded in pragmatist democratic 
deliberation. Religious claims are often considered inapt to enter the public political 
sphere due either to their partial, non-universal significance or to their lack of 
discursive and argumentative character.58 However, “[r]easons are public not 
because their grounds are or can be shared by all…but because they are open to 
inspection and can be intelligently discussed by anyone with the requisite knowledge 
or willingness to acquire it”.59 Inspection and deliberation are what religious parties, 
ideally intended as both carriers of perfectionist v ews and expressions of pragmatist 
deliberation, guarantee. Therefore religious parties which, within liberal 
democracies, comply with the normative criteria of party politics, transform religious 
claims into qualitatively novel (political) claims, uitable to democratic politics.   
 
A NOCOP grounded in pragmatist deliberation, therefore, offers a suitable normative 
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framework for religious parties. On the one hand, it provides an inclusive political 
domain, permeable to the expression of religious values emerging from civil society. 
On the other hand, it guarantees a high degree of societal and institutional pluralism, 
favouring and enhancing, as we have seen, the pragmatist character of religious 
political parties. I therefore contend that, in order to allow the presence and 
functioning of religious parties such as the AKP, and the potential benefits they can 
bring, Turkey ought to embrace a regime of religious governance analogous to my 
pragmatist deliberative version of NOCOP. 
 
The AKP, more than other Islamist parties in Turkey, has been trying to foster a 
democratization of Turkey’s institutional framework by questioning the democratic 
legitimacy of Turkey’s strongly secular constitutional arrangement. In this way, 
while formally respecting so far Turkey’s constitutional arrangement, expression of 
the Kemalist ideology, the AKP has contributed in reopening a debate on the 
fundamental values of Turkey’s political framework. The party has both 
acknowledged the framework in which it operates andchallenged it from within, 
thus managing to “play the electoral and regime games simultaneously”.60 In this 
way, therefore, the AKP has complied so far with the normative criterion of loyal 
opposition and preserved its bilingualism.  
 
Furthermore, the moderation of Islamic instances that e AKP has undergone, both 
before and after obtaining power in 2002, has certainly been conditioned by 
extrinsic, structural factors. These include for example, the repressive nature of the 
Kemalist establishment and its practice of banning Islamist parties (a practice of 
which the AKP’s forerunners had been victims) as well as the constraints imposed by 
the European Union (EU) membership project, especially by the need to comply with 
the Copenhagen criteria (i.e. democratic governance, respect for human rights, 
functioning market economy and acceptance of the obligations and purpose of the 
EU), the rules that establish whether a country is qualified to join the EU.61  
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Yet the AKP’s moderation and democratization could an  should also be seen as the 
results of the party’s increasing compliance with the normative criteria of religious 
partisan identity (i.e. respect of the constitutional framework, acknowledgment of 
pluralism, commitment to electoral trial etc.). We cannot tell with certainty whether 
the original intention of the AKP’s founders was to play the democratic game in 
order to impose a theocratic regime or whether they w re genuinely committed to 
democracy. The decision to engage in partisan politics may indeed not signal a “deep 
ideological pre-commitment to democracy”.62 Yet it might represent a minimal effort 
to conceive one’s views and policy proposals in relation to the public good rather 
than as factional and divisive instances, especially when the founders of a party are 
fully aware of the normative constraints they will have to abide by. This might 
engender a process of democratic acculturation and, s the AKP case shows, might 
contribute to the gradual moderation and integration of a group’s originally radical 
claims.  
 
Therefore the AKP case helps to understand better th  idea that pluralistic 
deliberation, conducted through the medium of partis n politics and party pluralism, 
can be a vital mechanism for channelling and moderating religious claims in a way 
that favours democracy. Religious political parties which comply with the normative 
criteria of party politics can contribute in integrating religious groups and religious 
values into democratic politics, by tying religious claims to the normative and legal 
constraints of party politics and engendering a virtuous circle of democratization. 
This is why religious parties ought to be welcomed in emocratic polities, rather than 
be excluded, as Turkey has always done in the past,on he basis of their alleged 
antidemocratic or anti-secular goals. Exclusion is much more likely to cause the 
radicalization of religious demands, when these are fostered outside the limits and 
checks of party politics. It might also risk concealing the presence of fundamental 
flaws in the constitutional and institutional framework of the regime in which such 
parties operate, as well as the lack of widespread consensus on the fundamental 
values of the political order. 
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State Corporatism in Turkey and the AKP 
Finally, I would like to illustrate how the AKP, thanks to its anti-statist stance, has 
contributed in challenging the “state corporatism” which has characterized the 
Turkish establishment since the foundation of the Republic. “State corporatism” 
refers to a top-down conception of the relationship between state and society, by 
which the former aims to control the latter and uses political parties and other groups 
as institutional tools for preserving the existent state structure rather than fostering 
democracy.63 According to the Kemalist establishment, “a political party with its 
constitution or programme is considered to be part of a State’s constitutional order 
and is not an association”.64 This conception of political parties as branches of the 
state establishment deeply contrasts with the overall account provided here, which 
considers parties as bilingual carriers of comprehensiv  conceptions of the good.65 
 
By inheriting the Ottoman tradition of maintaining links with social actors through 
“state-granted privileges”,66 the Kemalist populist ideology has used parties as 
“effective gatekeepers”67 of the state apparatus, thus enhancing a uni-directional 
channelling process from above which has undermined the free expression of 
religious partisan identities.68 Within this context, the rise of political Islam 
represents one of the few examples of political development from below, although it 
has seriously been constrained by the 1982 Turkish constitution, which forbids the 
formation of political parties grounded in ethnic, religious, regional or class 
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Indeed, according to Mustafa Erdodan, the 1982 Constitution (unlike the more liberal 
1961 Constitution) conveyed both the idea of a “nationalized Islam” and the opposite 
view that Islam ought to be relegated to the private sphere and not be used by 
political parties in order to obtain political influence.70 The Kemalist idea of a “cult 
of the state”71 and a monistic state corporatism aiming to assimilate various groups 
into the state administrative structure, in order to obtain their loyalty and ideological 
support, have imposed clear limitations upon political parties and party pluralism. 
State control of all political activity (including political parties) and the assimilation 
of the latter into the former imply that “the political order loses its role as a mediator 
between the state and civil society”.72  
 
The AKP has been questioning not only the “secular” character of the Kemalist 
establishment but also and above all its state corporatism. Rather than calling for a 
top-down process of Islamization, the AKP “conceives and frames secularism as a 
matter of democratization/liberalization and wants it to be conceived as such so that 
consensus between the parties can be achieved”.73 Modernization is intended by the 
AKP not as a cultural revolution aiming to substitute a novel set of (Islamist) values 
for an old (secularist) one, but rather as a redistribution of political power allowing 
the emergence of the dynamism of Turkish society. Furthermore, the AKP has 
constantly emphasized the importance of dialogue and consensus among different 
societal groups, and especially the idea that “democratic legitimacy needs to be 
constantly reproduced in the actions and policies of a political party. The AKP is 
therefore…susceptible to societal signals and aims at gaining the trust of the 
people”.74 This is an important aspect as it suggests a shift towards an upward kind 
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of political channelling. The AKP’s ability to gather the demands of a broad 
constituency has been the result of the party’s mobilization strategy and of the 
aspiration, by traditional religious networks, “to redefine the political center of 
Turkish politics in terms of their values…to expand the boundaries of the public 
sphere and make the political institutions representative of the people rather than of 
the official state establishment”.75 
 
The AKP has thus avoided, so far, both the factional st nd unitarist degenerations of 
partisan identity that I illustrated in the first chapter. It has managed to maintain a 
balance between “partisanship and impartial governing, loyalty to the party and 
loyalty to the state, party interest and general interest”.76 By contesting the top-down 
Kemalist model, the AKP has not challenged the ideaof secularism (or laicism) per 
se but rather the way in which this idea has been imposed upon civil society, a way 
which prevents the presence of religious political parties. What therefore 
distinguishes the AKP and accounts for its success is not only its capacity to 
guarantee greater visibility for religion in the public political realm but, above all, its 
ability to display compliance with the normative crite ia of party politics while 
fostering political and institutional change.  
 
Indeed the AKP has not merely been trying to foster a b oader understanding of the 
constitutional consensus; it has also begun to challenge that consensus from within. 
The party’s approval, in 2007, of a bill lifting the headscarf ban in all universities, 
led the Chief Public Prosecutor of the Supreme Court f Appeals to formally ask the 
Constitutional Court to close the party in March 2008, on the basis of its anti-secular 
activities. The AKP was found guilty of anti-secular ctivities but it was not 
disbanded, due to the lack of the qualified majority (of seven out of eleven votes) 
necessary for this measure to be implemented. The Court only halved the public 
funding destined to the party.77 Yet the party’s policy measures, such as the 
headscarf ban lifting, should not be interpreted as attempts to implement Islamist 
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values in the political realm. The AKP seems to be genuinely fighting for a more 
inclusive public sphere, one in which citizens may be free to express their religious 
identities without state interference.78 The AKP’s challenge to Turkey’s controversial 
constitution, a challenge conducted through legal means, should thus not be 
considered as the expression of a factionalist straegy, merely aiming to undermine 
the existing constitutional framework.  
 
On the contrary, the AKP has contributed in reintroducing, within the Turkish polity, 
the necessary tension between unity and democracy, between rights and liberties, a 
tension which has long been inhibited by the Kemalist establishment’s monistic 
laicism. It has been legitimately challenging the undemocratic features of Turkey’s 
constitutional framework in order to make it more hospitable to a plurality of 
political parties, including religious ones. The party claims that “secularism needs to 
be empowered by democracy to maintain religious freedom and social harmony”79 
and its anti-statist bottom-up conception of democrati  politics involves the idea that 
“the community has the right to define political institutions through democracy”.80 
This is also the reason why the AKP must test blindly the boundary between political 
and religious realms. The absence of a previous religious partisan model able to 
provide the “right” balance between “partiality” and “wholeness”, particular and 
general interests, makes the AKP’s attempt a pioneeri g one in Turkish politics. The 
tension arises both from the absence of a clear constitutional consensus, establishing 
the separation between political and religious realms, and from the AKP’s 
willingness to gradually modify, democratically, tha  consensus.  
 
The AKP can therefore gradually contribute in reshaping and democratizing the 
Turkish institutional landscape not from above but through the interplay of state and 
societal instances, in a way that only a political p rty complying with the normative 
bilingualism of party politics, such as the AKP, can do. Indeed the AKP is the first 
religious party, in Turkey, to have complied with te normative criteria of party 
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politics and preserved its bilingualism. On the one hand, it has renounced the 
unitarist tendencies of the Refah Partisi (RP), which aimed to simply replace the 
Kemalist apparatus with its own religious “state-centr d structures”81 and to realize 
“its own project of ‘moral development’ in a top-down fashion”.82 On the other hand, 
it has rejected the factionalism of radical Islamist movements such as Turkish (or 
Kurdish) Hizballah (Hizbullahî Kurdî – HK), a Kurdish Sunni Islamist militant 
organization. As Hüseyin Velioğlu, the movement’s deceased leader, once argued, 
“[p]arty politics is not…a way of preaching Islam. Even if legal political parties are 
Islamic, Hizballah must stand against them because of their strategy. Partaking in 
elections…means recognizing the legitimacy of the statu  quo and thus a great sin”.83 
The AKP leadership would certainly agree with this characterization of party 
politics, intended in normative terms (i.e. how parties ought to behave). Loyal 
opposition is a crucial normative criterion of party politics and even radical Islamists, 
such as Velioğlu, recognize that entering party politics might signal a minimal 
commitment to it. Velioğlu is probably also aware that, once a religious movement 
has entered party politics, its claims might be subject to a gradual process of 
democratization and moderation. However, instead of rejecting party politics in order 
to pursue a factionalist and terrorist strategy, the AKP has fully embraced the legal 
route and acknowledged the limits established by the Turkish constitutional 
framework, while trying to change such a framework from within.  
 
This analysis confirms therefore two crucial points. First, as religious political parties 
conceive policy claims as rooted in religious values, only an open public political 
sphere, permeable to the bottom-up expression of religious demands, may allow their 
presence and functioning. I have identified this framework with a version of Non-
Constitutional Pluralism (NOCOP) grounded in pragmatist deliberation. This is the 
kind of institutional framework that ought to be established in Turkey in order for 
religious parties such as the AKP to be able to exist and operate. Second, the AKP 
case shows that, despite the criterion of loyal opposition, religious political parties 
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can in principle be important channels of democrati change, by conveying societal 
(e.g. religious) demands into the public political realm and therefore allowing the 
community to shape the political institutional framework through democratic means.  
 
The AKP has put emphasis, as we have seen, on the need for reconciling democracy 
(the people’s voice) with Turkey’s secular political institutions, which are considered 
biased against religious citizens and therefore partly lacking democratic legitimacy. 
We have seen how the AKP has often been accused (e.g. by the Constitutional Court) 
of rejecting the fundamental values of the regime in which it operates, especially by 
pursuing anti-secular activities. Yet the AKP should not be considered an anti-system 
party, as it has genuinely displayed its acceptance of and respect for Turkey’s 
constitutional framework. However, by invoking a democratization of Turkey’s 
secular establishment it has performed an important task that I also attributed to anti-
system parties in the fourth chapter. It has reopened the debate on the relationship 
between unity and democracy, by highlighting the flaws in the existing political 
institutions and the need to reassess them on the basis of the demands emerging from 
civil society through the democratic means of party politics. 
   
Conclusion 
This chapter examined the normative implications of religious partisan identity in 
Turkey at present, by analysing the AKP party currently in power. I argued that the 
notion of “secularism”, if intended as the separation between religious and political 
domains, is not suitable for explaining Turkey’s regime of religious governance. The 
idea of separation, which undermines the bilingual n ture of religious partisan 
identity by preventing the politicization of religious values, contrasts with the 
strategy pursued by the Kemalist establishment, which as constantly attempted to 
maintain its top-down control over religious matters. I argued that the concept of 
“monistic and top-down laicism”, implying the contiuity between political and 
religious spheres, and the subordination of the latt r to the former, is better suited for 
understanding religious partisan identity in Turkey, and the obstacles that the latter 
has had to face. I finally argued that the existing lay institutional arrangement ought 




provides a more inclusive framework for the presence of religious political parties.  
 
It has recently been highlighted by William Hale84 that Turkey’s AKP could be 
compared to the Christian Democratic parties of Western Europe. The endorsement 
of a moderate promotion of religiously grounded values and policies, the 
acknowledgment of liberal democratic principles, an essential inter-class appeal, the 
refusal of state nationalism and the support of international cooperation are among 
the features which, according to Hale, allow a close comparison between the AKP 
and Christian Democratic parties. Furthermore, Hale highlights that democratic 
parties in Muslim countries have to renounce the project of an Islamic state and 
“restrict the role of religion in politics to those topics, such as education and 
morality, which are an accepted part of the religion-State dialogue in non-Muslim 
democracies”.85 As the AKP has clearly accepted this restriction, Hale argues, it can 
be considered, at least in this respect, analogous to the Christian Democratic parties 
of Western Europe.86 In the next chapter I will therefore examine the relationship 
between a specific Christian Democratic party, i.e. th  former Italian Democrazia 
Cristiana (DC), and the Italian regime of religious governance. I do not intend to 
provide an exhaustive comparative analysis of AKP and DC but only to unveil the 
implications of my normative theory of religious political parties for assessing the 
DC and the regime of almost religious establishment which characterized Italy at 
least until 1984.   
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Chapter 11 - Religious Political Identity and Christian Democracy in 
Italy   
 
The former Italian Christian Democracy (Democrazia Cristiana - DC), and Christian 
Democratic parties more in general, can be considered religious political parties 
according to the definition that I provided in the first chapter. As I explained there, 
the basic principles of Christian Democracy (e.g. personalism, subsidiarity and 
federalism) are deeply grounded in Christian doctrine and Catholic social teaching 
and cannot be defended “without the basis of Christianity”.1 Despite not aiming to 
establish theocratic regimes, Christian Democratic parties display a deep link 
between their political platforms and Christian or Catholic principles. Some of the 
statements contained in the European People’s Party’s (EPP) Basic Programme and 
in the early programmatic documents of the DC, which I illustrated in the first 
chapter, testify the explicit reference to Christian values as the ideal foundations for 
Christian Democratic principles. This kind of religiously-inspired political platform 
is what characterizes religious political parties broadly intended. 
 
Church and State in Italy between 1861 and 1922 
In order to understand the role of religious parties n Italy, we need to briefly 
examine the historical evolution of the relationship between the Catholic Church and 
the Italian state. Following the unification of Italy (1861) and the Holy See’s loss of 
Rome (1870), the Pope retired into the Vatican Palace, refusing any form of dialogue 
with the new Italian state. This phase showed the irr concilability between 
Catholicism and liberal democracy and was characterized by the Italian Catholics’ 
opposition to the centralistic and anticlerical character of the new liberal state. A 
series of laws, approved by the new Italian Parliament in 1865, “provided for civil 
marriage and led to the suppression of religious bodies. Many of the most ancient 
monasteries and convents were taken over by the Stat , and numerous ecclesiastical 
organizations were suppressed”.2 These measures considerably reduced the Church’s 
                                                      
1 Luigi Sturzo, “The Philosophic Background of Christian Democracy”, The Review of Politics, Vol.9, 
No. 1, January (1947), p.6. 





influence upon Italian society, especially in the field of education. Furthermore, “[i]n 
the 1890s many Catholic charitable institutions were taken over by the 
government”.3 All these measures, together with the end of the papal state, 
represented a radical change in a country which was almost entirely Catholic and 
where the Vatican had always played a central role in both spiritual and political 
matters. As a reaction to these measures, Italian Catholic citizens were prevented by 
the Church from participating in the Italian political life, both as voters and as 
candidates. This prohibition was officially sanctioned by the papal promulgation, in 
1868, of the encyclical Non Expedit, which forbade both passive and active 
participation of Catholics in the political life of the new state. However, the Non 
Expedit inadvertently created “the basis for the emergence of a Catholic political 
identity. The formula preparazione nell’astensione (preparation through 
abstention)…was a means used by Catholic activists to urn electoral abstentionism 
into organizational preparation for future political struggles”.4   
 
The approval of (almost) universal manhood suffrage in Italy (1912) persuaded the 
Church to become more involved in the political life of the Italian state. This 
culminated in the Gentiloni Pact (1913), through which the Church would guarantee 
its organizational and electoral support for conservative liberal candidates in 
exchange for the promotion, by the latter, of pro-Church policies. The emergence of 
the socialist movement and the outbreak of the First World War, however, raised 
expectations for a more direct political interventio . This led to the formation of the 
Partito Popolare Italiano (PPI) in 1919 and to the abrogation of the Non Expedit. 
Several factors pressed the Church to accept the formation of Catholic parties (such 
as the PPI in Italy): the possibility, for the Vatican, to control these parties by 
influencing internal factions; the conviction that, if the political organization of 
Catholics had become inevitable, it would be best srved by pro-Catholic parties; 
finally, the idea that confessional parties would represent a political warranty against 
future anticlerical assaults.5  
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Two main features characterize therefore the pre-Fascist, liberal framework up to the 
advent of Fascism and the signing of the Lateran Pacts in 1929. First, the absence of 
an actual institutional arrangement defining the relationship between the Italian state 
and the Catholic Church; second, the openly anti-clerical character of the liberal 
state, exemplified by the abovementioned legislation in the fields of education, 
marriage law, ecclesiastical courts and Church properties. This framework bears 
several similarities with the one imposed by the Kemalist elite in Turkey. The latter 
is characterized indeed by religious non-establishment and by a top-down, 
authoritarian, laicism, preventing (or, at least, seriously opposing) the formation of 
religious political parties. Yet, one major aspect distinguishes the Italian pre-Fascist 
framework from the Turkish one. As noted in the previous chapter, Islam in Turkey 
did not possess an autonomous church to which the sate could assign the 
independent control of religious affairs.6 This has certainly affected the way laicism 
is intended in Turkey and it has helped in fostering continuity between political and 
religious realms, rather than a dualist church-state institutional framework. 
 
In pre-Fascist Italy, instead, despite the absence of a formal institutional arrangement 
between state and Catholic Church, the presence of these two distinct loci of 
authority prevented the full subordination of religious matters to political power, and 
this also contributed, as I will explain later, in preventing the Fascist regime from 
establishing complete institutional and moral contrl over the Vatican and, most 
importantly, over the (deeply Catholic) Italian society. Indeed, by looking at the 
main changes brought about by Fascism, it may be possible to indirectly envisage the 
positive features of the pre-Fascist liberal regime regarding the relationship between 
religion and politics and the presence of religious political parties such as the PPI.  
 
Fascism and the Catholic Church (1922-1945) 
One of the main changes produced by the Fascist regime was the “‘nationalization’ 
of civil society”.7  Despite its anticlerical character, the pre-Fascist liberal state had 
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maintained a certain balance and distinction between monarchic institutions, 
parliamentary politics and civil society. Fascism gathered instead all the power in the 
state which, by pervading and weakening civil society, undermined the bottom-up 
channelling of societal demands on which the PPI had relied.8 Furthermore, the 
totalitarian character of the Fascist regime implied an ideologization of politics, 
characterized by the holistic and totalitarian pursuit of final ends.9 This aspect is 
particularly important as it conditioned the strategy adopted by the Church in 
response to the Fascist regime.  
 
The Lateran Pacts, the agreements made between the Italian state and the Holy See 
in 1929, should indeed be seen as a compromise between the Church and the Fascist 
regime, through which the former attempted to contrast the ethical monopoly of the 
latter and maintain a direct control upon crucial sectors of civil society, such as the 
young generations.10 The Lateran Pacts consisted of three separate parts: the Treaty, 
the Concordat and the Financial Settlement. Through the Treaty, the Italian state 
acknowledged the creation of an independent Vatican ity-state and the papal 
possession of several churches and palaces in Rome and in the rest of Italy. The 
Concordat assigned to Catholicism the status of only state religion and conferred to 
the Church several privileges in the fields of education, marriage law and taxation.11 
Above all, “[n]on-Catholic religions were relegated to inferior legal status and placed 
under certain restrictions. Priests were banned from party membership and political 
activity. The State was given the right to approve th appointment of bishops”.12 
Finally, the Financial Settlement was an indemnity given by the Italian state to the 
Vatican as a compensation for the loss of properties subsequent to unification.  
 
Within the totalitarian framework imposed by the Fascist regime, partly endorsed by 
the Vatican and culminated with the ratification of the Lateran Pacts, the mediating 
function of a party of Catholic inspiration such as the PPI would have been of no use 
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to the Church. For this reason the Vatican did not hesitate in abandoning the PPI to 
its destiny and embracing the Concordat strategy, in order to ensure for itself an at 
least partial sphere of influence upon Italian society. Despite several Fascist attacks 
the Church, through Catholic Action, managed to maintain its moral control over a 
large part of Italian society, especially a considerable section of the Italian youth, 
part of which would constitute, after the Second World War, the bulk of the DC 
leadership.13  
 
The signing of the Lateran Pacts certainly represent d a negative episode for the 
Italian Catholic movement as the Vatican had to accept the dismantling of all 
Catholic associations except Catholic Action.14 The Church only changed its attitude 
towards Fascism when it realized that it was not merely an authoritarian regime but 
also, and above all, a “secular religion”.15 Luigi Sturzo, from his exile, denounced 
“the exchange between the confessionalization of the State and the sacralization of 
an illiberal and pagan regime”.16 Indeed the Fascist regime, with its endeavour to 
build an all-encompassing ethical and pagan state, dominating every aspect of 
citizens’ life, was in principle incompatible with e Christian faith and aimed to use 
Catholic religion as an instrumentum regni.17  
 
Despite this apparent irreconcilability, though, the anti-socialist, anti-liberal, anti-
Jacobin and anti-Enlightenment character of the Fascist regime, essentially hostile to 
the principles and values asserted by the French Revolution, contributed in reducing 
the distance between the regime and the Church,18 which had not forgotten the 
humiliations suffered under the pre-Fascist liberal regime. Nevertheless, given the de 
facto existence of a single-party totalitarian regime, the Church had to renounce the 
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dream of controlling a party of Catholic inspiration such as the PPI, which was in 
principle non-confessional but in fact would have nver opposed the Church 
hierarchy or the Pope.19  
 
The Fascist regime conducted an offensive against Catholic Action in 1931, as it 
aimed to eliminate any organization hostile or extraneous to the regime itself.20 This 
was followed by the passing of the racial laws in 1936, which openly contrasted with 
the Christian doctrine, although Italian Fascism never managed to acquire the same 
universal and holistic character of the Nazi regime.21 The end of the Fascist regime 
marked the emergence of a less anti-clerical attitude by non-Catholic forces, 
especially as a form of gratitude towards the Churc for its important contribution to 
the Resistance. This aspect, together with the inclusion of the Lateran Pacts into the 
new Constitution (which I will assess in the next section), represented a favourable 
framework for the emergence of the Italian DC, which was founded in 1942 by 
Alcide De Gasperi and by other former members of the disbanded PPI, such as 
Mario Scelba, Attilio Piccioni and Giovanni Gronchi. 
 
From a theoretical perspective, two major features of the Fascist regime represented 
a crucial shift from the pre-Fascist, liberal phase. First, Catholicism acquired 
institutional recognition through the Lateran Pacts. This helped in reducing the gap 
between political and religious spheres, and between th  state and Catholic citizens. 
Second, this institutional recognition implied a greater subordination of the Vatican 
to the Fascist state. The latter, as I have highlighted, saw the Lateran pacts in purely 
pragmatic terms and conceived the Catholic Church, with its moral and 
mobilizational strength, as an i strumentum regni.  This arrangement more closely 
resembles the one imposed by the Kemalist establishment in Turkey which, as 
explained in the previous chapter, has aimed to control religious expression within 
society and to use religious values for legitimizing ts institutions and policies.  
 
The formal separation between political and religious authorities in Italy certainly 
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prevented the full subordination of religious matters to political power. Yet the 
authoritarian character of the Fascist regime and the banning of all political parties 
are certainly sufficient for grasping the absence of a normative and institutional 
space, within this framework, for religious parties. In this sense, Fascism is an 
expression of the monistic perfectionism that I extensively illustrated, and rejected, 
in the third chapter. It is therefore more useful to focus on the legacy that, more or 
less intentionally, the post-Fascist republican state inherited from Mussolini’s 
regime.      
 
The Inclusion of the Lateran Pacts into the 1948 Constitution 
It is important to assess the relationship between Fascist and post-war republican 
Italy regarding the institutional arrangement of church-state relations, in order to 
underline the elements of continuity between the two phases and, consequently, the 
influence that this continuity had on the DC. For this purpose, we should focus on 
the debate, conducted within the Constituent Assembly of the new Italian republic, 
about the inclusion of the 1929 Lateran Pacts within t e new Constitution. Some 
parliamentarians, such as the Christian Democrat Giorgio La Pira, argued that the 
new juridical framework would have to respect and reflect the religious inclination of 
Italian society and that therefore the Pacts should have been included in the new 
Constitution.22 Others, such as the liberal philosopher Benedetto Cr ce, spoke 
against the inclusion. Croce especially highlighted how the Pacts had been agreed to 
by Mussolini only in order to enhance his prestige and tyranny.23  
 
A crucial contribution to this debate is, in my view, the position expressed by the 
Christian Socialist deputy Gerardo Bruni, as it raises interesting normative 
implications. According to Bruni, religious pluralism and freedom of conscience 
could not be guaranteed “where there is State religion or where there is a State 
atheism”.24 Therefore, for Bruni, the only way to safeguard the Christian values 
which permeated the Italian nation would “not [be] by introducing laws which 
accord exemptions and privileges to the national Church, but by establishing a 
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régime based on equality”.25 In this way, he argued, the “spiritual physiognomy” of 
the Italian nation would not be preserved by the presence of a confessional state but 
rather “in virtue of the number and spirit of the majority of its members and of the 
democratic forms which permit and fully guarantee th  public expression of religious 
sentiments”.26 Consequently, according to Bruni, the inclusion of the Pacts into the 
new Constitution would prevent the presence of a truly democratic framework, 
jeopardizing both the free religious expression of the Catholic majority and the 
achievement of a regime of genuine religious pluralism. 
 
Bruni’s speech clearly grasps some of the central issues characterizing not only the 
Italian situation after Fascism but, more generally, the normative problem of 
devising the most suitable institutional framework for the equal expression of 
religious groups and, indirectly, for the ideal presence of religious political parties. 
Bruni highlights one aspect that I emphasized in the sixth and seventh chapters of my 
thesis. I argued there that the model of pluralistic institutional 
integration/assimilation proposed by Modood and Kastoryano (similarly to the 
English model of religious establishment) provides the wrong answer to the problem 
of integrating religious groups into political life and does not represent a suitable 
institutional framework for the potential presence and flourishing of a plurality of 
religious political parties. Including one or even several churches into the 
institutional framework of a polity does not provide, I claimed, the common 
impartial framework that religious parties require in order to be able to preserve their 
bilingual agency and comply with the normative criteria of loyal opposition and 
regulated rivalry. I also argued that the NOCOP model proposed by Veit Bader, 
complemented by a pragmatist conception of democratic deliberation and centred on 
the normative agency of religious political parties, represents a better model for 
guaranteeing a viable balance between respect for the eligious identity of a nation 
and equal treatment of different religious faiths. My version of NOCOP, centred on 
religious political parties, relies on the same normative arguments which underlie the 
institutional framework suggested by Bruni. The latter aimed to warrant state 
recognition of the religious (Catholic) identity ofthe majority of the Italian people 
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not by institutionalizing a set of privileges conferred to the Catholic Church but 
rather by guaranteeing the presence of a democratic deliberative space where 
Catholic citizens could convey their history, identity and values, also through a party 
of Catholic inspiration.  
 
In NOCOP, I argued, religious claims are welcomed into the process of public 
deliberation, and the expansion of the legal, administrative and political spheres (the 
latter to be intended as the realm of ordinary politics) aims to provide an inclusive 
framework for both old and new religious demands. Equality is guaranteed by 
ensuring that all voices are heard. Identity, instead, may be preserved by the fact that 
majority religious groups can bring their collective history, values and tradition into 
the deliberative arena, therefore enhancing their stance before both other religious 
communities and non-religious citizens. A similar con eption of church-state 
relations had also been at the basis of the political strategy of the PPI, forerunner of 
the DC. Indeed according to R. E. M. Irving, Luigi Sturzo, founder of the PPI, 
wanted “a society in which Christian principles and i eals predominated, 
but…believed that such a society could best be achieved in a free and democratic 
environment in which Catholic arguments would win the day on their merits”.27 The 
PPI therefore endorsed a kind of institutional framework characterized by free and 
democratic deliberation, pluralism and religious non-establishment.  
 
This approach clearly differed from the one that the DC would adopt after the 
Second World War, and which was evident in the speech s of those Christian 
Democrat members of the Constitutional Assembly who endorsed the inclusion of 
the Lateran Pacts into the new Constitution. The framework that they supported was 
characterized by a form of almost religious (monistic) establishment and by the 
consequent presence of a distorted (and not entirely democratic) deliberative arena in 
which Catholic citizens would inevitably be privileg d over both non-religious 
citizens and believers of other faiths. The DC would therefore enjoy a special 
institutional advantage which, as I will show, would undermine any endeavour to 
abide by the normative criteria of religious party politics and preserve the party’s 
                                                      







Indeed the Lateran Pacts were eventually incorporated into the new Constitution. 
According to the new juridical framework (which would have been modified only in 
1984), the Catholic Church could fully administer Catholic marriages, priests could 
be admitted to public employment only upon the approval of their bishops and the 
state should provide religious primary and secondary instruction in Catholic form 
under Episcopal supervision.28 These were the major privileges that the Catholic 
Church was granted by the Italian state. In truth, the new Constitution also 
guaranteed freedom for all religions and established that the institutional relations 
between the Italian state and non-Catholic religious faiths would have to be regulated 
through specific agreements. Despite the latter provision, the inclusion of the Lateran 
Pacts into the new Constitution determined the de facto establishment of a 
confessional state, characterized by a strong discrimination towards all non-Catholic 
minorities.29 Indeed the first agreement between the Italian Republic and a non-
Catholic religious organization (the Waldensian Churc ) was only ratified in 1984. 
The inclusion of the Lateran Pacts into the new Constitution determined therefore a 
sort of continuity between Fascist and Republican It ly. Furthermore, also other 
features of the Fascist regime, namely the top-down control of societal demands, a 
heavily interventionist approach in economic matters and the imposition, from 
above, of a monistic worldview, had an influence upon the DC’s ideology and on its 
tendency to conceive the party almost as a branch of the state.30  
 
The DC aimed, from its formation, to control the state and obtain electoral support 
among the bourgeoisie and the middle class, as well as among the Catholic masses.31 
The power of the DC was grounded in the “entangling between party and State and 
between party and economic structures”32 and the DC was more a state-party than 
the genuine expression (from below) of the Catholic movement.33 The establishment, 
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by DC Prime Minister Amintore Fanfani, of the Ministry of State Participation in 
1956, was crucial in determining the symbiosis betwe n party and state.34 Arguably, 
the DC could even be considered a “cartel party”, i.e. one of those “colluding parties 
[that] become agents of the State and employ the resou ces of the State to ensure 
their own collective survival”,35 thus undermining the crucial distinction between 
state institutions and civil society.36 This contravened Fanfani’s own demand that the 
DC should transmit people’s demands to the legislative and executive powers, thus 
establishing a link between political realm and civil society.37 The DC’s endeavour 
to maintain control of the state institutions was crucially influenced by the legacy of 
the Fascist regime’s emphasis on state interventionism in the social and economic 
spheres,38 as well as by the Catholic Church’s resolve to bring “political discourse 
back to the level of the institutional highest authorities, ecclesiastical on the one 
hand, State on the other, in a direct dialogue which resumed the medieval formulas 
of the two powers”.39     
 
It should be clear, by now, that the DC, contrary to the AKP, never had to fight 
against an assertive secular or lay establishment pr venting the formation of religious 
political parties. After Catholicism had officially been recognized in the new 
Constitution, the DC’s bilingual identity, unlike the AKP’s, was never threatened by 
the presence of a common institutional language opposing the bottom-up societal 
expression of religious claims or imposing the separation between religion and 
worldly affairs. Indeed, William Hale rightly highlights how, while Christian 
Democratic parties in Western Europe could openly place Christian values at the 
centre of their political proposal, “the need to stay within the secularist bounds 
imposed by the Turkish constitution…meant that the JDP [the English acronym of 
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the AKP] could not give an equal role to Islam in its public discourse”.40  
 
Yet the DC encountered a different set of problems. The party, that is, had to struggle 
in order to acquire full autonomy from the religious authority of the Church and 
foster therefore a specific religious partisan idiom, independent from the influence of 
the Vatican. Due to the almost confessional characte  of the post-Second World War 
institutional arrangement, and the consequent political and social weight regained by 
the Church, the DC found its political religious identity undermined by the presence 
of a competing, purely religious, authority which claimed to be the point of reference 
for all Catholics. In order to overcome this difficulty, the DC, like most Christian 
Democratic parties in Western Europe, initiated a process of “symbolic 
appropriation” by reinterpreting Catholicism in the s nse of an abstract and universal 
set of Christian values, replacing the doctrinal narrowness of the former with the 
broad appeal of the latter and thus legitimizing its political identity, distinct from the 
religious identity of the Church.41 This process of symbolic appropriation contributed 
in uncoupling political Catholicism from the religious authority of the Vatican. It 
also provided the DC with a specific political identity, qualitatively different from 
the religious identity of expressed by Catholic movements and by the Catholic 
Church. The DC, as well as other Christian Democratic parties, “redefined the 
meaning of Catholicism for politics, increased their distance from the Church, and 
became autonomous political organizations”.42  
 
This process of gradual reinterpretation of religious values by no means implied their 
complete dismissal. Instead, it contributed in defining an original religious political 
identity, in which political and religious dimensions would become distinct but the 
ideal link between them would be preserved. While enjoying the advantages 
provided by the presence of a favourable constitutional arrangement, the DC always 
pursued a strategy of detachment from the Church, in order to define its own identity 
autonomously from the Vatican. Yet the DC enacted the process of symbolic 
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appropriation of Catholic values to an undue extent, thus reducing, rather than 
increasing, the distinctiveness of its own religious partisan identity. Therefore the 
DC partly contravened the normative criterion which requires political parties to 
preserve their particularistic idioms, thus jeopardizing its own bilingualism. This, 
together with the party’s failure to criticize and reform the biased institutional regime 
of religious governance in Italy, provides the grounds for condemning the DC on the 
basis of the normative criteria of party politics.   
 
The analysis conducted so far seems to confirm, once more, that the institutional 
establishment of one or more religious faiths from above, through their inclusion into 
a constitutional framework, does not represent the best or most inclusive model of 
church-state relations, not even when it also provides the juridical recognition of 
other faiths. The predominant status conferred to (a) specific religion(s) inevitably 
undermines the impartiality and inclusiveness of this ideal model and prevents the 
presence of a plurality of religious parties. This indirectly shows that a deliberative 
framework involving the political (non-constitutional) inclusion of all religious 
groups represents a better ideal arrangement, for gua anteeing religious pluralism 
and religious partisan identity, than the model of pluralistic institutional 
integration/assimilation proposed by Modood and Kastoryano,43 as I argued in the 
seventh chapter. 
 
The almost confessional framework in which the DC operated, and that the party 
never questioned, represented therefore an obstacle to the pluralistic deliberation 
which religious political parties can in principle convey. By complying with the 
normative criteria of party politics, religious political parties can play a very 
beneficial role within liberal democratic polities and provide “an affirmation of the 
democratic structure of civil authority and democrati  procedures”.44 Participation in 
party politics might also have a formative effect upon religious citizens and religious 
                                                      
43 Commenting on Jemolo’s conclusion, Spotts and Wieser mphasize however that the fundamental 
factor of this confessional phase in Italian history “was less the juridical privileged position of the 
Church than what lay behind it: a nearly organic relationship between the Church and the Christian 
Democrats” (Spotts and Wieser, Italy: A Difficult Democracy, p.244). 
44 Nancy L. Rosenblum, “Religious Parties, Religious Political Identity, and the Cold Shoulder of 




groups, originating a process of “democratic acculturation”.45 The DC (like its 
forerunner, the PPI) certainly helped Catholic principles and values, endorsed by a 
majority of the Italian population, to be integrated in the political life of the country 
in a way respectful of democracy. In line with the tradition of Western European 
Christian Democratic parties, the DC never advanced th ocratic claims.  
 
However, the incorporation of Catholicism into the constitutional framework of the 
Italian state since 1929 crucially undermined this process, reducing the institutional 
and political space for religious pluralism and, in principle, for the presence of a 
plurality of religious parties. The DC ought to have endorsed the institutional model 
of church-state relations invoked by Bruni. This would have guaranteed the state 
recognition of the religious (Catholic) identity ofthe majority of the Italian people 
not by institutionalizing a set of privileges conferred to the Catholic Church but by 
guaranteeing the presence of a democratic deliberatv  space where Catholic citizens 
could convey their history, identity and values, also through a party of Catholic 
inspiration. This would have also been more in linewith the ideal NOCOP which 
best suits, in ideal terms, the presence of religious parties and would have allowed 
the DC to preserve its bilingualism. 
 
Once the Lateran Pacts were included into the 1948 Constitution, the DC (unlike the 
AKP in Turkey) no longer had reasons to fight in order to guarantee a role for 
Catholic religious values in the public political realm as these had been recognized 
and fixed into the state framework. Neither did the DC have a reason for engaging in 
a pluralistic deliberation with non-Catholic religious faiths and, potentially, with 
religious political parties of non-Catholic inspirat on. No other faith had been granted 
official recognition and, had any of them decided to engage in party politics, they 
would have had to operate within a very biased institutional and political framework, 
characterized by the presence of a state religion. The greater acceptance of pluralism 
and democracy, that participation in party politics can produce, was undermined in 
Italy by the establishment of a monistic regime of church-state relations. This defied 
the scope itself of religious partisan politics and resulted in the increasing 
                                                      




identification of the DC with the state.  
 
The Revision of the Concordat (1984) 
The fourth phase of church-state relations in Italy ( fter pre-Fascist, Fascist and post-
1948 ones) resulted from the revision of the Concordat in 1984 (the Treaty and the 
Financial Settlement remained unmodified). The new document, signed by Prime 
Minister Bettino Craxi and Vatican Secretary of State Agostino Casaroli, contained 
important and sometimes radical amendments to the original Concordat. Above all, it 
established that the Catholic Church would cease to be the state-supported religion of 
Italy and it would have to rely on voluntary donations for its survival.46 It was only 
with the 1984 revision of the Concordat, therefore, that the monopoly of the Catholic 
Church was ended, or at least reduced, both at the institutional and juridical levels. 
This also contributed in undermining the political monopoly of the DC. In this 
connection, Ruggero Orfei highlights how the new Concordat constrained the DC to 
redefine its own political identity, by abandoning the mere tutelage of the Church 
interests and embracing, instead, a more difficult propositional role.47 As the revised 
Concordat no longer defined Catholicism as the official religion of the Italian state, 
Orfei argues, the tight link between Catholic citizens, Vatican and DC was inevitably 
broken.48 
 
The new institutional arrangement introduced in 1984 offered, in principle, a better 
framework for the presence of a religious non-confessional party such as the DC. By 
reducing the institutional and constitutional weight of the Catholic religion, it 
provided a thinner and more democratic framework, suitable to the flourishing of 
religious party pluralism. This framework could have been embraced not only by the 
DC but, theoretically, also by other religious political parties, as it no longer 
contained the biased pro-Vatican provisions of the pr -1984 agreement. In other 
words, religious party bilingualism in Italy was in principle rendered more feasible 
by this new framework which provided an impartial, thinner common language, 
potentially more inclusive towards a plurality of religious partisan idioms. Indeed, 
                                                      
46 Spotts and Wieser, Italy: A Difficult Democracy, pp.250-251. 
47 For a detailed summary of the content of the new Concordat, see Ruggero Orfei, Gli Anni di Latta 
(Genova: Marietti, 1998), p.46. 




due to the crisis that invested it during the 1980s, partly triggered by the revision of 
the Concordat, “the DC as a party revealed itself as ‘p rt’…defining itself as one 
among the possible political experiences of Christian inspiration. As part, it could no 
longer be what it was before, when it enjoyed Churc investiture, albeit indirect”.49       
 
The DC, however, failed in the difficult task of redefining its role and its political 
proposal within the new institutional and political context.50 Perhaps the reason for 
this was that the party had been for too long “a hybrid fraction (from the point of 
view of public law) of the institutions”51 and therefore “did not accept being a 
part”,52 preferring to remain “a national party”.53 Despite the DC’s endorsement of 
democratic and parliamentary politics, in the party “there had remained a kind of 
creative ‘extraneousness’ to the most intimate spirit of democracy”.54 The party 
gradually saw its power diminish until the party disbanded in 1993, under the 
political storm of Mani Pulite (Clean Hands), a nationwide judicial investigation into 
political corruption which involved most Italian political parties.   
 
Two points, therefore, can be highlighted on the basis of my normative theory of 
religious political parties. First, the institutional regime of religious governance 
established in 1948 ought to have been challenged by the DC from the very 
beginning. The party ought to have endorsed the proposal put forward by Bruni 
during the debate in the Constitutional Assembly and rejected the inclusion of the 
Lateran Pacts into the new Italian constitution. This would have been more 
                                                      
49 My translation of “[l]a DC come partito si scopriva ‘parte’…qualificandosi come una tra le possibili 
esperienze politiche di ispirazione cristiana. Come parte non poteva più essere quella di prima che 
godeva di un’investitura ecclesiastica, anche se indiretta” (ibid., p.161). 
50 See Guido Formigoni, L’Italia dei Cattolici: Fede e Nazione dal Risorgimento alla Repubblica 
(Bologna: Il Mulino, 1998), p.166. 
51 My translation of “una frazione ibrida (dal punto di vista del diritto pubblico) delle istituzioni” 
(ibid., p.131, italics in original). See also G. Carocci, Storia d’Italia dall’Unità ad Oggi (Milano: 
Feltrinelli, 1975), p.322 quoted in Pietro Scoppola, L  Proposta Politica di De Gasperi (Bologna: Il 
Mulino, 1978), p.188. 
52 My translation of “non si rassegnava ad esser parte” (Orfei, Gli Anni di Latta, p.146). 
53 My translation of “un partito nazionale” (ibid., p.146). 
54 My translation of “era rimasta una specie di ‘estraneità creativa’ allo spirito più intimo della 
democrazia” (ibid., p.157). However, Giorgio Campanini highlights how the absence of a religious 
party representative of Italian Catholics, and respecting the rules of the democratic game, may 
contribute to the reemergence of an authoritarian tendency among Catholics [Giorgio Campanini, “Il 
Significato della Democrazia Cristiana nel Sistema Politico Italiano”, in Emiel Lamberts (ed.), 
Christian Democracy in the European Union (1945-1995), Proceedings of the Leuven Colloquium, 




consistent with the normative criteria of religious party politics and would have 
allowed the DC to preserve its bilingualism rather than being absorbed into the state 
framework and become an almost cartel party. The party’s inability to perform this 
task even after the 1984 changes to the Concordat was partly the result of its almost 
irreversible entanglement with the Italian state. Scond, and relatedly, the DC ought 
to have accepted to be only a “part” within the Italian political landscape. Therefore 
it also ought to have preserved a clearer particularistic idiom, rather than pursuing a 
“catch-all” strategy in order to reach a broader and i terclass constituency and 
preserve its monopolistic control of the state apparatus. 
 
Conclusion 
Compared to the AKP, the DC displayed a lesser degree of compliance with the 
normative criteria of party politics. Certainly this does not mean that the party should 
have been banned. The DC always maintained, at least formally, loyal opposition, 
respect for party pluralism and use of legal means to achieve and preserve its power. 
Yet, as I explained in the first chapter, parties also ought to preserve a distinct idiom 
able to distinguish them from other parties. They therefore ought to avoid becoming 
“cartel” or “catch-all” parties as this would prevent them from fully performing their 
role of bilingual channels placed between civil society and the state. The DC, while 
never abandoning the religious grounds of its political platform, gradually broadened 
its ideology and eventually became entangled with the state apparatus. This 
prevented it from preserving its bilingualism and providing a greater contribution to 
the democratic life of the Italian republic. Furthermore, the DC accepted a biased 
regime of religious establishment which precluded, in ideal terms, religious pluralism 
and the potential presence of a plurality of religious parties. This analysis helps us to 
conclude that the DC in Italy played a less valuable role than the AKP played in 
Turkey. The party did not contribute enough in providing those benefits which 
religious political parties can produce within liberal democratic polities, when they 
comply with the normative criteria of religious party politics that I have presented in 
this thesis. It soon stopped being a bottom-up channel of religious and other societal 






Through my analysis of the AKP in Turkey and the DCin Italy, conducted in the 
final section of my thesis, I attempted to highlight the implications that my normative 
theory of religious parties might have when contextualized in real world terms. I 
showed that religious parties can be good for enhancing liberal democracy when they 
comply with the normative criteria of party politics that I presented in the first 
chapter, and that the AKP has played a more valuable role, in this sense, than the DC 
played in Italy until its demise. This analysis confirms that a normative theory of 
political parties, and of religious parties more spcifically, may help to address some 
of the crucial issues which the agency of political p rties often raises in the real 
world. It is only by having such a theory, I believe, that it might be possible to 
assess, for example, whether parties of religious inspiration (such as the AKP in 
Turkey) ought to legitimately be banned or whether, for example, a party such as the 
DC in Italy ought to have been reformed. My analysis has also provided normative 
grounds for accepting or rejecting specific ideal models of religious governance on 
the basis of their degree of inclusiveness towards religious claims and parties. These 
are not, I believe, abstract and elusive questions, confined to the intangible realm of 
theoretical research, but issues which, while necessarily grounded in a normative 
analysis, bear significant implications in the concrete domain of everyday politics 
and policy-making. 
 
Yet in the introduction I also raised questions of a more purely normative character, 
i.e. whether religious parties are not especially likely to become hegemonic and 
whether religious instances should be allowed into the public political realm of 
liberal democratic politics, e.g. via religious political parties. Does my account of 
religious political parties contribute in defying the diffidence and concerns of those 
advocates of an expansive idea of public reason, who ould rather keep religious 
comprehensive doctrines outside the public politica re lm? Is there not an ongoing 
threat, they might ask, that religious political parties, if allowed within a democratic 
polity, might in fact abuse their democratically gained power and establish an 




My analysis in the fourth chapter, illustrating the implications of the normative 
criteria of party politics for establishing the legitimate limits of partisan advocacy, 
partly helps to answer these questions. There is noway, I argued, to foresee whether 
an apparently democratic party will become undemocratic once in power. Yet a 
normative political theorist must attempt to establish on what grounds we can say 
that this shift is wrong and ought to be contrasted. My normative analysis, therefore, 
aimed to justify those measures (e.g. constitutional checks, police state, army 
intervention etc.) suited to face undemocratic and hegemonic challenges once these 
arise or to prevent them, where possible. The only normatively grounded limits to 
partisan advocacy, I argued, come from within party politics.  
 
Religious political parties which comply with the normative criteria of party politics 
can provide both normative and institutional tools f r ensuring the feasibility of an 
inclusive public deliberation while guaranteeing that religious citizens maintain a 
self-critical attitude, open to argumentative challenges. Rawls’s theory (like all those 
theories which invoke expansive public reason constraints) tends to exclude too 
many comprehensive doctrines (including religious ones) from the public political 
realm, as well as those parties (e.g. religious ones) which convey them. This, I 
argued in the second chapter, also renders it self-defeating, by obstructing the 
process by which people endorsing unreasonable (i.e. in Rawls’s terms) 
comprehensive doctrines may come into line with the ov rlapping consensus, and 
thus contribute to the self-reinforcement of political liberalism. A model of 
pragmatic deliberative democracy, although more inclusive and theoretically sounder 
than Rawls’s (for the reasons that I illustrated in the sixth chapter), still requires 
political parties, including religious ones, in orde  to warrant citizens’ commitment 
to democratic deliberation and respect of pluralism. For the same reasons, while 
endorsing Bader’s NOCOP as the most suitable framework for allowing the presence 
of religious parties, I argued that such a model could not effectively be sustained 
(both normatively and institutionally) without granting a central role to religious 
parties. 
 




the first chapter, there are also other reasons whyreligious parties should be 
welcomed within democratic polities, instead of being seen as potential authoritarian 
threats. First, well into the twentieth century, many (probably most) authoritarian 
regimes have arisen from deeply secular (rather than religious) doctrines. Nazism, 
Fascism and Communism, which I examined in the third chapter, established 
totalitarian polities whose political and philosophical foundations where non-
religious or even anti-religious. Nazism and Communism especially were clear 
examples of “secular fundamentalisms”,1 appealing to “illegitimate scientocracy or 
expertocracy”.2 Also Turkey’s Kemalist regime could have been considered, until 
recently (i.e. paradoxically, until the emergence and success of Islamist parties), a 
form of secular fundamentalism. 
 
However, nationalist, communist and secular anti-religious parties (which could 
potentially lead to analogous authoritarian outcomes) have continued to be allowed 
in most Western democratic polities. This confirms both that secular ideologies are 
as likely as religious ones to give birth to totalitarian and undemocratic regimes and 
that, nonetheless, they have regularly been admitted in o the public political realm of 
Western democratic polities, via political parties. There is therefore no reason, or 
evidence, to believe that religious doctrines might more easily or inevitably lead to 
authoritarian outcomes than secular ones.3 Therefore, as the latter are normally 
allowed into the public political realm, there is no reason for excluding the former. 
All that matters, it seems, is that those parties which convey comprehensive doctrines 
into the public political sphere (both religious and on-religious) comply with the 
normative criteria of party politics, and that the necessary measures (e.g. 
constitutional checks, police state, army intervention etc.) are in place for preventing 
authoritarian outcomes. Most importantly, though, tese measures ought to be 
justified on the basis of the ideal conception of parties that I provided in the first and 
fourth chapters, not on the grounds, for example, of strict public reason constraints. 
                                                      
1 Veit Bader, “Religious Pluralism: Secularism or Priority for Democracy?”, Political Theory, Vol.27, 
No.5, October (1999), p.612. 
2 Ibid., p.614. 
3 There is indeed evidence that appeal to religious intolerance by political candidates in newly 
democratic polities has been less successful than expected. See Marc F. Plattner, “Liberalism and 




Second, and connectedly with the previous point, the widely accepted presence of 
non-religious parties conveying secular comprehensiv  doctrines (liberal, communist 
conservative etc.) in Western liberal democratic polities also helps to answer the 
critique, raised by advocates of strict public reason constraints, that religious 
doctrines are idiosyncratic and therefore not suitable for public political debate. As I 
explained in the seventh chapter, political debate in contemporary Western societies 
is already “multilingual” and has been able so far to accommodate the instances of 
communists, conservatives, liberals etc.4 Therefore, an inclusive public political 
sphere already exists in these polities. As this habeen able to admit so many 
distinctive and not less idiosyncratic comprehensive idioms, there is no reason to 
believe that it could not admit religious doctrines as well. I tried to endorse this view 
through my analysis of epistemological holism conducted in the sixth chapter. 
Furthermore, we should never forget that religious doctrines (like any other 
comprehensive doctrine) acquire an essentially new meaning when conveyed by 
political parties which abide by the normative criteria of party politics. They lose any 
radical, intolerant or uncompromising feature which they might have at the pre-
political and pre-partisan levels. Moreover, as I suggested in the seventh chapter, 
religious political parties help to render religious arguments accessible to non-
religious citizens, by linking them to specific policy matters which all citizens are 
likely to be familiar with (e.g. abortion, public funding of religious schools etc.).  
 
Third, due to the reasons just mentioned, religious parties have in fact already been 
allowed in most if not all Western liberal democratic polities, quite often in the form 
of Christian Democratic parties. These polities have understood that religious 
political parties can in fact contribute to the democratization of religious instances 
and to a dialectic of institutionalization which may prevent religious fundamentalism 
as “[r]eligions who vie for public money and want to exert political influence have to 
accept that polities vice versa exert influence upon them”.5 Religious faiths might 
undergo a process of moderation when engaged in multi-party democracy, as the 
cases of the AKP and the DC show. 
                                                      
4 Bhikhu Parekh, “The Voice of Religion in Political Discourse”, in Leroy S. Rouner (ed.), Religion, 
Politics and Peace (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1999), p.74. 
5 Veit Bader, “Religion and States: A New Typology and Plea for Non-Constitutional Pluralism”, 




Finally, rather than giving birth to undemocratic and authoritarian regimes, religious 
faiths have in fact often contributed to the development of emancipatory 
movements.6 Rawls himself, I showed in the second chapter, refers to the example of 
the abolitionists and of the civil rights movement led by Martin Luther King, Jr., in 
the United States, in which Christian values played a crucial role.7 We should also 
remember the prominent role of many Catholic priests during the Italian Resistance 
against Fascism and, more recently, the 2007 Burmese anti-government pro-
democracy protests, led by the Burmese Buddhist monks.8  
 
Even the rise of Islamist parties in Turkey, which I extensively examined in the tenth 
chapter, has contributed to the gradual democratization of Turkey’s political and 
party system. The AKP’s plea for a more inclusive and democratic public political 
realm, in this sense, might help to render the lattr more permeable to comprehensive 
values (e.g. religious, ethnic etc.). I hope that tese arguments, which I have already 
considered at various points throughout my thesis, may provide an answer to the 
sceptical advocate of an exclusivist public reason, a d therefore justify the 
expediency of allowing religious political parties into the public political realm of 
liberal democratic polities. 
 
There are still many other questions, though, that I have lacked space to address in 
this work. By focusing on religious political parties, I only examined one typology of 
comprehensive conceptions of the good that parties may convey into the political 
realm (i.e. religious views). Although religious parties provide, as I argued, a 
paradigmatic example of the perfectionist character of partisan agency, there are 
many other values, or sets of values, which parties may convey into the political 
sphere. Besides religious parties, indeed, we also find other typologies of parties, 
such as green, social democratic, communist, nationalist or separatist ones.  
 
The issues that I have just briefly illustrated are c ucial for a more exhaustive 
                                                      
6 Parekh, “The Voice of Religion in Political Discourse”, pp.70-71. 
7 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (Expanded Edition) (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2005a), p.251. 
8 BBC News, “Monks lead largest Burma protest”, 24 September 2007. Available at: 




theoretical understanding of political parties as such. Yet I believe that focusing on 
specifically one kind of parties, namely religious ones, does not detract from the 
significance of my findings but rather provides thestimulus for further inquiry. Here 
I defined the normative framework for an account of p litical parties in general, and 
then focused on one of many possible typologies of political parties to show some of 
the potential implications of my theory for the analysis of more concrete issues. My 
hope is that the general theory may also be applied to other kinds of parties and that, 
while displaying its own soundness, it may also be enriched by the findings that this 
further research may produce.                
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